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ABSTRACT 
This project traces the historical evolution of warfare and military 
recruitment in the Senegambia region. It investigates the conscription and 
recruitment of indigenous troops and their service in royal and jihādist forces, 
irregular armed groups, and the French colonial military. Whether through the 
ceɗɗo armies protecting the states of the former Jolof Empire, the sòfa soldiers 
who fought in jihāds in the interior, or the French-recruited tirailleurs sénégalais, 
engaging in regular warfare was one of few paths to personal autonomy. Men 
who embraced a corporate military identity within the caste systems of 
Senegambia gained power through complex patron-client relationships with civil 
and religious authorities. For those whose lives were defined by kinship 
networks, soldiers formed their own stable social category. 
A second line of inquiry identifies a subset of soldiers known as volontaires 
sénégalais, professional soldiers who were so integral to the success of the French 
colonial army in campaigns in the region that they were given compensation and 
xiii 
rations on par with European troops, a de facto admission of their military 
importance. Enlisted Senegalese men became interpreters, porters, recruiters, 
spies, policemen, soldiers, and non-commissioned officers, playing a decisive 
role in combat in the territory that would become modern-day Senegal as well as 
other West African states and kingdoms, particularly Dahomey. 
Further, this study asks questions about colonial as well as indigenous 
power relations and caste identity, examining the ways in which access to 
political and military power structures affected ethnic, caste, and class 
relationships. It considers the caste identity of Senegalese men who fought in the 
various realms that make up present-day Senegal and provides a re-examination 
of their status as “slaves.” Moreover, it focuses on the development of military 
culture within these groups, the tactics employed in inter-state conflicts and 
between indigenous states and a burgeoning French colonial army, and the 
emergence of war making as a vocation. Drawing on studies of martial and 
organizational culture, this project reorients our understanding of patron-client 
relationships and provides a new lens through which to view the development of 
military identity among indigenous troops from Senegambia.  
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GLOSSARY 
 
Almaami: Muslim ruler in the region of Fuuta Tooro and Eastern Senegambia.  
Brak: The ruler of Waalo. 
Bur: Literally “king,” title of the rulers of Siin and Saalum, and occasionally 
appropriated by lesser nobility. 
Caste: Defined social groups or categories organized around occupation or royal 
status, including nobility, weavers, fishermen, storytellers, and slaves. 
Ceɗɗo/Seɓɓe: A caste identity defined by military strength and temporal power. 
Ceɗɗo: A corporate identity of professional soldiers in the former Jolof Empire. 
Damel: The ruler of Kajoor. 
Disciplinaires: Penal troops, typically French, sent for military service in the 
colonies. 
Fusil: Firearm. In the 18th and 19th centuries most often equated with muskets.  
Jaami-bur: Conscripts in the armies of the former Jolof Empire. 
Jihād: Armed struggle for the creation of a Muslim state. 
Laptot: Sailors who often served not only as maritime professionals, but as 
soldiers, translators, and guides.  
Marabout: French term for a Muslim cleric or notable. 
Métis: Men and women with both European and African ancestry. 
Sëriñ: Muslim cleric (Wolof origin).  
Shaikh or Sheikh: Muslim cleric (Arabic origin). 
xx 
Sὸfa: Professional soldiers in Eastern Senegambia and the army of Al-Hajj Umar 
Taal. 
Spahi: Cavalry from North Africa or Senegambia. 
Talibé: Religious student, Muslim disciple. 
Tafsir or Tamsir: A scholar able to provide exegeses of the Qur’an, serving as an 
interpreter of its meaning. 
Tata: Fortification used for military defense. 
Tirailleurs: Literally “sharpshooters,” refers to Senegambian and, in the 20th 
century, West African infantry fighting in the French colonial army. 
Tónjon: Conscripts in the army of Al-Hajj Umar Taal. 
Volontaires: Professional/career soldiers who fought with the French colonial 
military as auxiliary forces.  
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NOTE ON TRANSLATION, NAMES, AND LOCATIONS 
 
All translations from French are my own. 
Outside of quotations, terms and names of persons, places, and ethnolinguistic 
groups in Senegal appear in modern transcription that reflects local spellings and 
pronunciations. Examples include ceɗɗo instead of thiédo or tyeddo, Tukulor 
instead of Toucouleur, Samori Ture instead of Samori Touré, and Kajoor instead 
of Cayor. 
  
1 
INTRODUCTION 
For military historians, the Senegambia region of West Africa lends itself 
well to an in-depth study of the evolution of military strategies, tactics, and 
weaponry. Bordered by the Senegal and Gambia Rivers, the arid climes of the 
northern and eastern savannahs led to the development of specialized cavalry 
regiments and large-scale infantries over the course of the 18th and 19th 
centuries. One of the first points of contact on both the trans-Saharan and the 
trans-Atlantic trade routes, a wealth of written materials and oral traditions 
illuminate the history of the land and its people from at least the 15th century. To 
date, however, little research has been conducted that might lead to a better 
understanding of the military culture that emerged, particularly in the power 
vacuum set off by the breakup of the Jolof Empire in the 16th century and the 
rise of the former Jolof state of Kajoor. By the 18th century, states in Senegambia 
found themselves in regular conflict with one another and a growing number of 
European adversaries. Exacerbating the conflict, in the middle of the 19th 
century a series of colonial governors in Senegal embarked on extensive military 
campaigns to extend the reach of the French colonial empire. 
2 
STATE OF THE FIELD: PRE-COLONIAL HISTORY OF THE SENEGAMBIA REGION 
The majority of studies published on Senegal during this epoch focus on 
its political, economic, and social history. Many of the earliest treatments are 
concerned with the participation of the states of Senegambia in the Atlantic slave 
trade and its influence on political and economic development within Senegalese 
societies. Beginning with Philip Curtin’s Economic Change in Precolonial Africa, 
scholars of the region have discussed the relationship between the slave trade 
and economic and political power of Senegambian states.1 Economic histories 
and studies of the political economy of Senegambia also analyze the evolving 
relationship between European trade houses in Saint Louis and the indigenous 
societies with whom they engaged in commerce.2 Military concerns are often 
found at the periphery of studies on the region that are more focused on 
economic issues relating to the Atlantic slave trade. One strain of thought has 
argued that the European slave trade led to the militarization of African states, 
while others have contended that internal conflicts and civil wars or inter-state 
                                                 
1 Philip Curtin, Economic Change in Precolonial Africa: Senegambia in the Era of the Slave Trade 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1975). 
2 See in particular Abdoulaye Ly, La compagnie du Sénégal (Dakar: Présence Africaine, 1958); 
Boubacar Barry, Senegambia and the Atlantic Slave Trade, trans. Ayi Kwei Armah (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), and James F. Searing, West African Slavery and Atlantic 
Commerce: The Senegal River Valley, 1700–1860 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
3 
conflicts were more important to political and military conflicts than the trade 
itself.3 
A great deal of research beginning in the early 1970s has focused on the 
particularities of the slave trade and at times described what has become known 
as “horse-slave cycle” and “gun-slave cycle” models. Supporters claim that 
European colonial officials and traders instigated and exacerbated inter-state 
conflicts in the Senegambia region in order to increase the number of men and 
women available for export. Those opposed to these models find that warfare 
conducted in many of these states and kingdoms was not reliant on access to 
firearms.4 This project does not address the “guns for slaves” model directly. It 
                                                 
3 For the argument for the militarization of states due to the slave trade, see Boubacar Barry, Le 
Royaume Du Waalo: Le Sénégal Avant La Conque ̂te (Paris: F. Maspero, 1972); Jean Bazin, “Guerre et 
servitude à Ségou,” in L’Esclavage En Afrique Précoloniale, edited by Claude Meillassoux, 135-181 
(Paris: F. Maspero, 1975); and, more recently, Patrick Manning, Slavery and African Life: Occidental, 
Oriental, and African Slave Trades (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990). The most 
comprehensive argument against this thesis is contained in John K. Thornton, Africa and Africans 
in the Making of the Atlantic World, 1400-1800, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1998). In Senegambia this position is supported in Curtin, Economic Change, and James F. Searing, 
“God Alone is King”: Islam and Emancipation in Senegal (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2002). 
4 The key entry point to this discussion is Gavin White, “Firearms in Africa: An Introduction,” 
Journal of African History 12, no. 2 (1971): 173-184. For those supporting gun-slave and horse-slave 
models, see J. E. Inikori, “The Import of Firearms into West Africa 1750-1807: A Quantitative 
Analysis,” Journal of African History, 18, no. 3 (1977): 339-86; W. A. Richards, “The Import of 
Firearms into West Africa in the Eighteenth Century,” Journal of African History 21, no. 1 (1980): 
43-59. Those opposed to the horse-slave and gun-slave models include Ray A. Kea, “Firearms and 
Warfare on the Gold and Slave Coasts from the Sixteenth to the Nineteenth Centuries,” Journal of 
African History 12, no. 2 (1971): 185-213; David Northrup, Africa’s Discovery of Europe (Oxford: 
4 
does acknowledge the desire for firearms as both weapons of war and signifiers 
of social standing, a topic recently addressed by Giacomo Macola.5 
Historians focusing on pre-colonial Senegal and British and French 
encroachment have been more interested in the slave identities of soldiers and 
the impact of slavery on Senegambian societies. For example, scholarship by 
Martin Klein, Philip Curtin, and Boubacar Barry advance theories concerning the 
relationship between the military, jihād, and slavery in Senegambia. While Curtin 
and Klein find jihādist movements contributed to slave trafficking and the use of 
sòfa conscripts by leaders like Umar Taal, Barry claims movements such as Taal’s 
attracted freed slaves who hoped to end European encroachment.6 Barry further 
argues that Muslims were ideologically opposed to the Atlantic slave trade, a 
                                                                                                                                                 
Oxford University Press, 2002); John K. Thornton, Africa and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic 
World, 1400-1800. 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); James F. Searing in 
“God Alone is King” finds the horse-slave and gun-slave models do not apply to Kajoor and the 
former Jolof Empire.  
5 Giacomo Macola, The Gun in Central Africa: A History of Technology and Politics (Athens, OH: 
Ohio University Press, 2016). For earlier studies that also deal with the social context of firearms 
in pre-colonial Africa, see Joseph P. Smaldone, Warfare in the Sokoto Caliphate: Historical and 
Sociological Perspectives (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977) and Gerald M. Berg, “The 
Sacred Musket. Tactics, Technology, and Power in Eighteenth-Century Madagascar,” Comparative 
Studies in Society and History 27, no. 2 (1985): 261-279. 
6 Boubacar Barry, Translated by Ayi Kwei Armah, Senegambia and the Atlantic Slave Trade (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Curtin, Economic Change; Martin A. Klein, “The Impact 
of the Atlantic Slave Trade on the Societies of the Western Sudan,” Social Science History 14, no. 2 
(1990): 231-253, and Martin A. Klein, Slavery and Colonial Rule in French West Africa (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
5 
position supported by Lucie Colvin in her work on Kajoor.7 In his extensive 
history of the Umarian jihād, David Robinson has presented a more complex 
view of Taal’s thoughts about slavery.8  
  One strain of Senegalese history has attempted to unite the religious, 
political, and military spheres through the spread of Islam. Martin Klein’s Islam 
and Imperialism in Senegal: Sine-Saloum, 1847-1914 and David Robinson’s Chiefs 
and Clerics: Abdul Bokar Kan and Futa Toro 1853-1891 and The Holy War of Umar 
Tal: The Western Sudan in the Mid-Nineteenth Century focus on “imperial Islam,” 
the political and military attempts of Muslim clerics to wrest control from 
unbelievers and those whose adherence to the Islamic faith tradition they found 
wanting.9 However, outside of brief examples these works do not examine the 
                                                 
7 Lucie Gallistel Colvin, “Islam and the State of Kajoor: A Case of Successful Resistance to Jihad,” 
Journal of African History 15, no. 4 (1974): 587-606. 
8 David Robinson, The Holy War of Umar Tal: The Western Sudan in the Mid-Nineteenth Century 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1985). 
9 See Martin A. Klein, Islam and Imperialism in Senegal: Sine-Saloum, 1847-1914. Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 1968; David Robinson, Chiefs and Clerics: Abdul Bokar Kan and Futa Toro 
1853-1891. New York: Oxford University Press, 1975, and The Holy War of Umar Tal: The Western 
Sudan in the Mid-Nineteenth Century, New York: Oxford University Press, 1985; A later study, 
though lacking a Senegal focus, is John H. Hanson, Migration, Jihad, and Muslim Authority in West 
Africa: The Futanke Colonies in Karta, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1996. 
6 
military efforts of political leaders and how battles in particular were carried 
out.10 
Another approach to the history of the region centers on the relationship 
of Islamic orders to its social and political spheres, specifically the development 
and political influence of Muslim brotherhoods like the Tijaniyya and Senegal’s 
indigenous brotherhood, the Murids.11 In this vein, David Robinson’s earlier 
work on the relationship between Muslim Sufi orders in Senegal and Mauritania 
and French colonial authorities introduces the concept of accommodation.12 This 
identification of the importance of intermediaries in navigating life in colonial 
Africa has been expanded upon by others.13 For the Senegambia region in 
particular, George Brooks and Hilary Jones have illustrated the role played by 
                                                 
10 Notable exceptions include David Robinson in Holy War of Umar Tal and short passages in 
Martin Klein, Islam and Imperialism, and James Searing, “God Alone is King.” 
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Muridiyya of Senegal, 1853-1913 (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2007); Rudolph T. Ware 
III, The Walking Qurʼan: Islamic Education, Embodied Knowledge, and History in West Africa (Raleigh, 
NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2014); Fallou Ngom, Muslims beyond the Arab World: The 
Odyssey of ʻAjamī and the Murid̄iyya (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016). 
12 David Robinson, Paths of Accommodation: Muslim Societies and French Colonial Authorities in 
Sénégal and Mauritania, 1880–1920 (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2000). 
13 For a comprehensive edited collection on the importance of intermediaries for the colonial 
project see Benjamin N. Lawrence, Emily Lynn Osborn, and Richard L. Roberts, eds., 
Intermediaries, Interpreters, and Clerks: African Employees in the Making of Colonial Africa (Madison, 
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the métis community in Saint Louis and its environs.14 Métis men and women, 
who were of both European and African descent, were integral to the commercial 
success of European trading houses, controlling access to the interior. They 
became significant political, economic, and military leaders in the French-
administered territories of Saint Louis and Gorée. Important intermediaries also 
include Senegalese laptots, sailors who conducted economic and military tasks for 
European trading companies and, later, French colonial officers; and the 
interpreters and translators who accompanied French political and military 
officials on missions in the region.15 
STATE OF THE FIELD: AFRICAN MILITARY HISTORY 
At the urging of military officials and the colonial office in France, in 1857 
Napoleon III declared his intent to create a new army paid for by the colonies. 
These soldiers served as supplementary military forces for French conquest and 
                                                 
14 George E. Brooks, Eurafricans in Western Africa: Commerce, Social Status, Gender, and Religious 
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Hilary Jones, The Métis of Senegal: Urban Life and Politics in French West Africa (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2013). 
15 On laptots see J. Malcolm Thompson, “In Dubious Service: The Recruitment and Stabilization of 
West African Maritime Labor by the French Colonial Military, 1659-1900” (Ph.D. Dissertation, 
University of Minnesota, 1989) and J. Malcolm Thompson, “When the Fires Are Lit: The French 
Navy’s Recruitment and Training of Senegalese Mechanics and Stokers, 1864-1887,” Canadian 
Journal of African Studies 26, no. 2 (1992): 274-303. On interpreters see Tamba M’Bayo, Muslim 
Interpreters in Colonial Senegal, 1850-1920 (New York: Lexington Books, 2016). 
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the subsequent occupation of its West African holdings. The history of the 
tirailleurs begins in 1857, but the history of African soldiers in the French military 
goes back to at least the 17th century. Due to the proliferation of scholarly works 
on World War I and World War II, the tirailleurs sénégalais force is more widely 
characterized by its 20th century context, when it was made up of soldiers from 
not only Senegal but all of France’s colonial holdings in West Africa, including 
present-day Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Guinea, Burkina Faso, and 
Mauritania. Instead of operational histories, historians of the tirailleurs sénégalais 
have written articles and monographs that fall into the category of “new military 
history” or “war and society” studies. New military history, first popularized by 
John Keegan, is best classified under the umbrella of social history.16 Studies in 
new military history tend to examine issues like soldiers’ social lives and their 
impressions of battle, but do not analyze the wars in which they were engaged. 
The vast majority of the analyses published on tirailleurs focus on the lives of 
these men as they took part in policing and counterinsurgency efforts within 
French colonies and later, more famously, as part of France’s defense in World 
War I and World War II.17 Though these types of inquiries provide a window 
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into soldiers’ thoughts and their personal relationships, we lose a major part of 
these men’s lives: their professional careers. 
The first studies of tirailleurs sénégalais soldiers were written by authors 
who viewed the French as a civilizing force in West Africa, capable of harnessing 
the pre-existing “warrior culture” of numerous African “tribes,” like Pulaar 
                                                                                                                                                 
Race and War in France: Colonial Subjects in the French Army, 1914-1918 (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2008); and Joe Lunn’s oral history of Senegalese soldiers’ World War I 
experiences, Memoirs of the Maelstrom: A Senegalese Oral History of the First World War (Portsmouth, 
NH: Heinemann, 1999). Work on the participation of tirailleurs in World War II has been 
published by a number of authors, including Nancy Ellen Lawler, Soldiers of Misfortune: Ivoirien 
Tirailleurs of World War II (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1992); Jacqueline Woodfork, ”‘It Is 
a Crime To Be a Tirailleur in the Army’: The Impact of Senegalese Civilian Status in the French 
Colonial Army during the Second World War,” Journal of Military History 77, no. 1 (2013): 115-39; 
Julien Fargettas, Les Tirailleurs Sénégalais: Les Soldats Noirs entre Légendes et Réalités, 1939-1945 
(Paris: Tallendier, 2012); and in the recent collection on Africa and World War II edited by Judith 
A. Byfield, Carolyn A. Brown, Timothy Parsons, and Ahmad Alawad Sikainga, Africa and World 
War II (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015). Books specifically narrating the treatment 
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Des victimes oubliées du nazisme. Les Noirs et l’Allemagne dans la première moitié du XXe siècle (Paris: 
le cherche midi, 2007) and Raffael Scheck, Hitler’s African Victims: The German Army Massacres of 
Black French Soldiers in 1940 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006). A few studies have 
considered the effect of their experiences in the European theater on African veterans’ 
approaches to colonialism and independence movements. These include Nancy Ellen 
Lawler, Soldiers, Airmen, Spies, and Whisperers: The Gold Coast in World War II (Athens, OH: Ohio 
University Press, 2001); Gregory Mann, Native Sons: West African Veterans and France in 20th 
century (Chapel Hill: Duke University Press, 2006); and Ruth Ginio, The French Army and Its 
African Soldiers: The Years of Decolonization (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 2017). On the private 
lives of tirailleurs see J. Malcolm Thompson, “Colonial Policy and the Family Life of Black Troops 
in French West Africa, 1817-1904,” International Journal of African Historical Studies 23, no. 3 (1990): 
423-53 and Sarah Zimmerman, “Mesdames Tirailleurs and Indirect Clients: West African Women 
and the French Colonial Army, 1908-1918,” International Journal of African Historical Studies 44, no. 
2 (2011): 299-322. 
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(Tukulor, Fulbe, etc.) and Bambara-speaking peoples.18 They focus on the 
military experience and contribution of the tirailleurs forces on European 
battlefields. Positivist works, these texts are not particularly critical of the French. 
Their authors are generally oblivious to the racial prejudices that affected 
recruitment, training, and deployment processes. Neither criticizes French 
officers’ approach to martial race theory or delves thoroughly into the histories of 
indigenous peoples. Their work is marked by a lack of deep knowledge about 
Senegambian societies, which leads to a failure to consider what other factors 
might account for the view of certain men or entire ethnolinguistic communities 
as innately violent or martial. 
Myron Echenberg’s seminal work, released in 1991, and the later research 
of Guy Thilmans are the only recent studies to include the history of the first 
tirailleurs. Echenberg begins with the creation of the tirailleurs force and ends 
with the fall of French colonialism in the late 1950s and early 1960s.19 For the 
                                                 
18 Charles John Balesi, From Adversaries to Comrade-In-Arms: West Africans And The French Military, 
1885-1918 (Waltham: Crossroads Press, 1979); Shelby Cullom Davis, Reservoirs of Men: A History of 
the Black Troops of French West Africa (Geneva: Librairie Kundig, 1934). 
19 Myron Echenberg, Colonial Conscripts: The Tirailleurs Sénégalais in French West Africa, 1857-1960. 
Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1991). Other works by Echenberg include “Paying the Blood Tax: 
Military Conscription in French West Africa, 1914-1929,” Canadian Journal of African Studies 9, no. 
2 (1975): 171-192 and the chapter “Slaves Into Soldiers: Social Origins of the Tirailleurs 
Sénégalais” in Africans in bondage: studies in slavery and the slave trade: essays in honor of Philip D. 
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most part, this text falls into the categories of new military history and studies of 
war and society, examining the social world of the tirailleurs and their particular 
experiences as soldiers in the European theater, as colonized peoples in West 
Africa, and as former soldiers returned from the World War I and World War II. 
Echenberg traces the development of larger “freed-slave” militias into the actual 
tirailleurs force. Then he follows the tirailleurs through World War I, devoting two 
chapters to issues of conscription. He mentions but does not explore the French 
bias against recruiting “forest” and “stateless” people. Echenberg divides their 
history into four incarnations. In his retelling of tirailleurs history, the force began 
as a conquest army. During this period, 1857-1905, the tirailleurs army was a 
mercenary force of “slaves” and lower class Africans, with a small African elite 
in the lower ranks of the officer corps.  
Two lesser known French-language studies on the tirailleurs by Guy 
Thilmans: Les Spahis sénégalais: une cavalerie africaine aux origines de l'expansion 
coloniale (1843-1880) and Les tirailleurs sénégalais: aux origines de la Force noire, les 
premières années du Bataillon 1857-1880, were published posthumously in 2008.20 
                                                                                                                                                 
Curtin on the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of African Studies at the University of Wisconsin, 
edited by Philip D. Curtin and Paul E. Lovejoy (University of Madison, 1986). 
20 Guy Thilmans and Pierre Rosiere, Les Spahis sénégalais: une cavalerie africaine aux origines de 
l’expansion coloniale (1843-1880) (Dakar: IFAN, 2007) and Les tirailleurs sénégalais: aux origines de la 
Force noire, les premières années du Bataillon 1857-1880 (Dakar: IFAN, 2008). 
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Thilmans’s work focuses almost entirely on the creation of France’s armed forces 
in Senegambia. Little is discussed regarding the battles between Senegalese and 
French armies outside of the weapons they carried, the uniforms they wore, and 
the provisions they consumed. Thilmans’s pioneering work on the tirailleurs 
sénégalais is an important point of departure for any military historian of this 
region. But Thilmans’s work draws upon sources only from the 1830s on, and 
does not take into account data from the 18th century or earlier encounters 
between indigenous men and French travelers in the region.  
Unfortunately, none of the above authors explore the tactics employed in 
battle against indigenous armies or the military training many men had prior to 
their entry into French forces. Without understanding the conscription practices 
already in place in Senegambia, we miss a huge part of what tirailleurs sénégalais 
were doing and how they functioned in the historical context of Senegambian 
societies. One strain of thought posits that French recruitment of Senegalese men 
was based around the need for indigenous troops who were cheaper than French 
soldiers and more capable of withstanding the climate of Senegambia.21 There is 
an equally important argument to be made. French dependence on auxiliary 
                                                 
21 This belief originally appears in Charles Balesi’s From Adversaries to Comrade-In-Arms and seems 
to have been adopted from there by Myron Echenberg and subsequent authors. 
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troops, euphemistically referred to as volontaires, “volunteers,” was a risky 
endeavor. These troops, who were most often led by their own indigenous 
officers, were not beholden to French colonial officials. Though they could be 
convinced to serve their own interests through temporary alliances with French 
forces, they were just as likely to switch sides when it suited them. This was a 
topic of great concern for French officers and politicians like Governor Louis 
Léon César Faidherbe, whose goal was to avoid this dependent structure.  
As Michelle Moyd has noted, though there are today many histories of 
African soldiers and some studies of African wars, there are few analyses of 
“African soldiers at war.”22 Until recent years, African historians eschewed 
operational histories on the militaries of pre-colonial African states and 
societies.23 This may be a result of concerns about the promotion of “primitive” 
stereotypes of African peoples and a desire to focus instead on their social and 
political systems. However, the study of military operations only adds to a 
                                                 
22 Michelle R. Moyd, Violent Intermediaries: African Soldiers, Conquest, and Everyday Colonialism in 
German East Africa (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2014), 15. Emphasis in original. 
23 Notable exceptions are the articles contained in the edited collection by John Lamphear, African 
Military History (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2007); John K. Thornton, Warfare in Atlantic Africa; 1500-
1800 (New York: Routledge, 1999); Robert S. Smith, Warfare and Diplomacy in Pre-Colonial West 
Africa, 2nd Edition (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989); Donald R. Morris, The 
Washing of the Spears: A History of the Rise of the Zulu Nation under Shaka and Its Fall in the Zulu War 
of 1879 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1965); Joseph C. Miller, “The lmbangala and the 
Chronology of Early Central African History,” Journal of African History 13, no. 4 (1972): 549-74. 
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scholarly understanding of complex societies. Operational histories have been 
written of a few major conflicts in Southern Africa, including the Boer War, but 
rarely focus on African conflicts. Wars fought for independence against 
European occupation have been the subject of some study, particularly against 
the British Empire. A more recent return to this subject includes the work of 
Moyd and Ronald Lamothe, as well as Richard Reid’s Warfare in African History.24 
A number of excellent studies, both monographs and conceptual essays, 
have been published on the topic of military culture.25 Historians and 
particularly anthropologists have focused on social and cultural interpretations 
of violence and warfare. These scholars emphasize aspects of warfare as 
psychologically, socially, or otherwise meaningful actions, even when “warfare” 
is defined more broadly as violence or the threat of violence.26 Two particular 
                                                 
24 Ronald M. Lamothe, Slaves of Fortune: Sudanese Soldiers and the River War, 1896-1898. Rochester, 
NY: James Currey, 2011; Richard J. Reid, Warfare in African History (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012). 
25 Peter Wilson’s article is most instructive regarding the contemporary understanding of military 
culture: Peter H. Wilson, “Defining Military Culture” Journal of Military History 72 (2008): 11-41. 
An essential overall study is John Lynn’s Battle: A History of Combat and Culture from Ancient 
Greece to Modern America. Cambridge, MA: Westview Press, 2003. Two excellent monographs 
have been published on the specific characteristics of national militaries: Allan D. English, 
Understanding Military Culture: A Canadian Perspective. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University 
Press, 2004; and Isabel Hull, Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in 
Imperial Germany. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006. 
26 Heike Behrend, Alice Lakwena and the Holy Spirits: War in Northern Uganda (Oxford: James 
Currey, 1999); Stephen Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy: The Destruction of Liberia and the Religious 
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studies on British imperialism consider the development of non-Western military 
identities or cultures. These are William Pinch’s Warrior Ascetics and Indian 
Empires, a history of Hindu military asceticism and refutation of current beliefs in 
the non-violent character of Hinduism, and Heather Streets’s Martial Races: The 
Military, Race and Masculinity in British Imperial Culture, 1857-1914, which corrects 
and expands on previous conceptions of “martial,” innately violent, races, 
focusing on British colonial forces of Scottish Highlanders, Sikhs, and Nepalese 
Gurkhas.27 Another two recent texts concern martial race theory and the military 
history of African soldiers: Ronald Lamothe’s work on Sudanese soldiers in the 
Egyptian army successfully bridges the gap between military and social history, 
focusing on soldiers’ identity as well as the military role they played throughout 
the River War of 1896 to 1898.28 Employing the term “violent intermediaries,” 
Michelle Moyd creates a new lens through which to view the askari of German 
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East Africa and, as a result, African soldiers in colonial armies.29 Similar to the 
depiction of African states as helpless against European slavers, treating 
tirailleurs sénégalais as victims of French military predation ignores the 
background of many of these men as military professionals. 
One question concerns the importance of technology on military 
engagements.30 In the context of French West Africa, however, the defining 
feature was the adoption of indigenous military tactics and the cooptation of 
soldiers and officers who knew them best. Two technological advantages that 
were of great help to the military include developments in medicine and 
seagoing technology, in particular the use of quinine as an anti-malarial 
prophylaxis, and the development of the steam engine, which would power 
French ships carrying both supplies and soldiers to forts along the Senegal River. 
Studies of the importance of firearms and weaponry are less applicable to the 
military history of the Senegambia region, though as Macola has written, guns 
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30 One of the most comprehensive studies on this topic is Daniel R. Headrick, The Tools of Empire: 
Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century, (New York: Oxford University 
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served as both tools and status symbols among Senegambian soldiers and 
elites.31 
MILITARY CULTURE IN SENEGAMBIA 
This work adds to the growing field of studies about military culture and 
cross-cultural contact. Like Lamothe’s study of Sudanese soldiers and Moyd’s 
work on the askari, it examines the evolving relationship between colonial 
military elites and the African soldiers under their command, particularly in 
terms of military tactics and training methods. It also focuses on the recruitment 
and conscription policies of the French and the adoption of Senegalese military 
maneuvers in conflicts between the colonial army and the major kingdoms of 
pre-colonial Senegal. Finally, it expands the literature on how Senegalese soldiers 
engaged one another on the battlefield, the methods of warfare employed by 
indigenous armies and their colonial adversaries, and recruitment strategies 
instituted during times of war and those of relative calm. 
This project takes as a starting point the historical evolution of warfare 
and military recruitment in 18th and 19th century Senegambia. It investigates the 
conscription and recruitment of indigenous troops and their service in royal and 
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jihādist forces, irregular armed groups, and the French colonial military. Whether 
through the ceɗɗo armies protecting the states of the former Jolof Empire, the sòfa 
soldiers who fought in jihāds in the interior, or the French-recruited tirailleurs 
sénégalais, engaging in regular warfare was one of few paths to personal 
autonomy. Moreover, this study focuses on the development of military culture 
within these groups, the tactics employed in inter-state conflicts and between 
indigenous states and a burgeoning French colonial army, and the emergence of 
war making as a vocation. Drawing on studies of martial and organizational 
culture, this project reorients our understanding of patron-client relationships 
and provides a new lens through which to view the development of military 
identity among indigenous troops from Senegambia. Its long-range view 
identifies a link between the corporate military identities of ceɗɗo and jaami-bur in 
the armies of the former Jolof Empire and the sòfa and tónjon soldiers who were 
absorbed into the forces of Al-Hajj Umar Taal. Further, this study asks questions 
about colonial as well as indigenous power relations and caste identity, 
examining the ways in which access to political and military power structures 
affected ethnic, caste, and class relationships.  
Men who embraced a corporate military identity within the caste systems 
of Senegambia gained power through complex patron-client relationships with 
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civil and religious authorities. For those whose lives were defined by kinship 
networks, soldiers formed their own stable social category. It considers the caste 
identity of Senegalese men who fought in the various realms that make up 
present-day Senegal and provides a re-examination of their status as “slaves.” 
This work attempts to identify and work towards the recognition of more 
complex hybrid identities that cannot be neatly unpacked as slaves and non-
slave persons. For example, French officers masked the ceɗɗo/jaami-bur and 
sòfa/tónjon background of these troops by referring to them only as volontaires, 
obscuring their true identity. When they fought for the enemy, they were ceɗɗo or 
sòfa, when they fought for the French, they were “volunteers.” 
A continuation of this line of inquiry identifies a subset of soldiers known 
as volontaires sénégalais, professional soldiers who were so integral to the success 
of the French colonial army in campaigns in the region that they were given 
compensation and rations on par with European troops, a de facto admission of 
their military importance. Enlisted Senegalese men became interpreters, porters, 
recruiters, spies, policemen, soldiers, and non-commissioned officers, playing a 
decisive role in combat in the territory that would become modern-day Senegal 
as well as other West African states and kingdoms, particularly Dahomey. 
Though they often failed to realize it, or at least failed to mention it in official 
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documents, French officers and colonial officials looking to expand the empire 
were dependent on an indigenous military culture. It was only through a co-
optation of local strategies, first through the purchase of military services from 
political elites and later the offer to pay captives and professional soldiers 
directly for their allegiance, that the French were able to build the West African 
military force known as the tirailleurs sénégalais.  
This study builds on the scholarship of authors who focus on oral 
traditions and Arabic language sources though, like many studies of pre-colonial 
Africa, it is based for the most part on the firsthand accounts of European 
travelers and the official correspondence and military reports of French 
government officials. In these documents, African men from diverse kingdoms 
and polities throughout Senegambia are often grouped together in ways that 
make it difficult to discern their national or ethnolinguistic background. 
Accounts by European authors pose two major challenges.  
First, the daily lives of Senegambian residents were not conducted in 
French. Most travelers and French officials witnessed events, conversations, and 
military orders conducted in languages they could not understand. Though 
many explorers employed multilingual translators, not all translators were fluent 
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in French and some did not understand it at all.32 For example, Gaspard Mollien, 
who survived the infamous shipwreck of the Méduse in 1816 and returned to 
Senegal in late 1817 for an extended period of travel, wrote a two volume epic of 
his travels throughout Senegambia. He was accompanied throughout his journey 
by Diai Boukari, a 36 year old marabout from Fuuta Tooro who spoke Arabic, 
Wolof, and Pulaar, but no French. Mollien wrote that he and his Tukulor 
interpreter spoke to one another in Wolof, and Mollien provided a short French-
Wolof dictionary at the end of his work.33  
Second, European observers came to the Senegambia region with their 
own personal biases and social and political positions. Some were convinced of 
the superiority of the French Republican tradition. Others were abolitionists on a 
political mission to upend official government policies. A variety of 
preconceptions and prejudices infected the descriptions of rites of passage, 
military traditions, and other local practices with which they were unfamiliar. 
Even those who spent years living in Senegambia often failed to understand the 
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inner workings and social structures of the societies they described. In no case is 
this clearer than in discussions based on caste and slavery.  
A particularly telling example can be found in Michel Adanson’s account 
of the territory. Adanson spent five years compiling a list of the flora and fauna 
of Senegambia. In a discussion of his travel in the north of the region during 
1751, he wrote that he was accompanied by two men he describes as “cubalots,” 
defined as the “name given to Black fishermen.”34 Cubalo is a Pulaar word of the 
Tukulor dialect of Senegal. It refers not only to a profession but to a caste 
identity, as many cubalo (plural subalbe) are not necessarily practicing fishermen. 
Thus it seems likely that the men traveling with Adanson were from Fuuta 
Tooro, or at least were Pulaar speakers. This is particularly interesting in light of 
Adanson’s claim that the men retained for his service by the Compagnie des 
Indes were Wolof.35 Due to the author’s lack of context, it is impossible to delve 
further into possible questions of identity, but it does provide a window into the 
context of Adanson’s voyage and one of which he seems to have been unaware. 
What can be done to remedy these issues? 
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These accounts provide a window into the thoughts and biases of 
Europeans in Senegambia. In the case of official French documents this helps us 
to understand the preferences and interests of French officers and, by extension, 
French military missions in West Africa. They also allow for insights into French 
officers’ views of military culture in the region, which can be stripped of 
invective to illuminate the tactics employed by French forces. Because French 
military officials were trained in a European theater marked by drill and pitched 
battles where enemies faced one another on an actual battlefield, they disdained 
the propensity for “raiding” among Senegambian states and kingdoms. But what 
is a raid? In this context, assaults described as “raids” were marked by espionage 
and the privileging of surprise attacks, through which an assumed enemy could 
be overwhelmed for quick success, an important strategy for armed forces 
without local support or a means to transport food and sustain long pitched 
battles.  
Military reports and the reminiscences of soldiers and French officers also 
outline the general timeframe of the wars they describe and include maps that 
allow the reader to trace, when possible, the routes taken during these wars. 
Though counts of allied and enemy soldiers might be exaggerated in 
correspondence, newspapers, or later memoirs of battles and extended conflicts, 
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they were less likely to be stretched or misrepresented in internal military reports 
outside of public consumption. These reports also illuminate the preferences of 
Senegambian soldiers in the tirailleurs sénégalais through discussions of their food 
and dietary restrictions, religious practices that impeded military service, and the 
contentious issue of the presence in soldiers’ camps of women and their role as 
wives, camp followers, and cooks. 
Chapter One provides a re-examination of the wars fought in pre-colonial 
Senegalese kingdoms, including Fuuta Tooro, Fuuta Jalon, Bundu, Kaarta, 
Waalo, Kajoor, Siin, and Saalum. It identifies two integral characteristics of 
Senegambian warfare: the presence of warrior elites, known in the former Wolof 
states as ceɗɗo and in Eastern Senegambia as sòfa; and the widespread use of 
recruitment of free men and captives into the infantries of the region. This 
chapter also unpacks the characterization of Senegalese soldiers fighting in these 
various realms as “slaves” and challenges the definition of Senegambian armies 
as “slave armies” as opposed to conscript-based military organizations.  
Chapter Two narrows in on the discussions over the formation of an 
indigenous colonial army in the territories of Saint Louis and Gorée. It outlines 
failed French attempts to provide enough European soldiers for its missions in 
the region, particularly the use of disciplinaires, penal troops sent to the colonies 
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as penance for their crimes. It then covers the first Senegalese recruits into the 
predecessors of the tirailleurs sénégalais force, including the volontaires and the 
compagnie noire, and the role of captivity in both recruitment strategies and the 
desires of Senegalese men to create livelihoods for themselves. Finally, it outlines 
the process of professionalization within the colonial army up to the formation of 
the tirailleurs sénégalais in 1857, including official recruitment strategies following 
the abolition of slavery in France and its colonies in 1848. 
Chapter Three utilizes case studies of a number of battles fought between 
French forces and Senegalese armies to demonstrate the dependence of French 
officers on auxiliaries for military missions over the course of the 19th century. 
As the French worked to establish posts along the Senegal River and later in the 
peanut basin of the former Jolof Empire, Senegal’s governors and colonial elites 
relied on alliances with local forces to gain a military edge over their indigenous 
adversaries. It also reviews the recruitment and military strategies adopted by 
jihādist and royal armies and focuses on two wars of the mid-19th century: the 
jihād of Al-Hajj Umar Taal and the conflict between France and the kingdom of 
Kajoor under Lat Joor Joop. 
Chapter Four provides a closer examination of French recruitment and 
training strategies under the military governors of Senegal during the 
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expansionist period of the middle to late 19th century. Charting the rise of the 
tirailleurs sénégalais army during a period of great conflict in the region 
illuminates the reality that, for the majority of the 19th century, the tirailleurs 
were one part of a multi-ethnic army made up of Europeans, Algerians, and 
Senegalese officers, cavalry, and infantry. The practice of conscription and the 
admission of adversaries into conquering armies in post-war landscapes 
originated in a Senegambian military culture in place since the 18th century. The 
flow of troops from one army to another created a reservoir of professional 
combatants in the region, and they would come to form the backbone of the 
French colonial military as it moved to snuff out resistance to its encroachment 
throughout West Africa. 
Chapter Five extends the scope of the French colonial force as it began to 
recruit soldiers in Mali, Niger, and Dahomey, particularly the tirailleurs haoussas 
in the French campaign against Emperor Béhanzin in Dahomey. This was the 
first attempt by the French to create a multi-ethnic African force, and its success 
would have major consequences in the early 20th century. The French were 
dependent on auxiliary troops, including volontaires sénégalais who were 
“recruited” from Senegambia to fight against the Fon of Dahomey. These 
professional soldiers were integral to French success in its campaign. This 
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chapter also studies the campaign itself, and the failure of Dahomean military 
culture to account for French approaches to warfare that stymied Fon reliance on 
espionage, stalking, and surprise attacks to overcome its adversaries. Further, 
many of the tactics employed by the French in Dahomey were based on the 
experience of Senegambian warfare. 
The epilogue outlines the development of martial race theory as it relates 
to the concept of a "force noire," fully explicated in General Charles Mangin's book 
of the same name, which created a system to target certain perceived ethnic 
groups in West Africa due to believed "innate" martial identities. It was this 
process that led to the creation of a multi-national and multi-ethnic tirailleurs 
sénégalais force, made up of men from throughout West Africa. Drawing upon 
studies of martial race theory in the British and French Empires, this chapter 
acknowledges the superficiality of these categories while explaining the 
historical context in which they were created. 
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CHAPTER ONE: Military Culture in the Senegambia Region, 1750-1850 
Kajoor: 
“The warrior showed his manifest approval, desiring nothing so much, said he, as good 
marabouts who could show him the path of happiness, and write for him incomparable 
talismans, which would render him forever invincible in war and grant him eternal 
victory over all his enemies.”1 
 
Fuuta Tooro: 
“For arms, they have a dagger nine to ten inches long, and a flintlock musket, single or 
double barreled. Their costume is very majestic; all the men are soldiers.”2 
 
INTRODUCTION: WARRIORS AND CONSCRIPTS 
This chapter draws on an analysis of procurement systems for military 
manpower delineated into the following categories: Spartan; warrior caste; 
voluntary recruitment; and “draft” or conscription strategies.3 Briefly, the 
Spartan system is predicated on the military education and combat training of all 
males in a given society. Typically this means that young men begin their 
training as pre-adolescents and thus are fully indoctrinated into the military by 
the age of maturity. A warrior caste-based military system designates a 
                                                 
1 Abbé David Boilat, Esquisses sénégalaises: physionomie du pays, peuplades, commerce, religions… 
(Paris: P. Bertrand, 1853), 172. 
2 Boilat, Esquisses Sénégalaises, 394. 
3 This system of categorization is based on that developed by Sol Tax in “War and Recruitment 
for a War System,” War: The Anthropology of Armed Conflict and Aggression, edited by Morton 
Fried, Marvin Harris, and Robert Murphy, 195-207 (Garden City, NY: Natural History Press, 
1968), 196-198. 
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geographic, socioeconomic, or otherwise defined subgroup to supply a standing 
army. Its internal structure is similar to that of the Spartan system, though the 
military within a warrior caste system is not otherwise employed in agriculture 
or other commercial pursuits. Their occupation is warfare.  
The voluntary system is self-explanatory. It may entail a more temporarily 
engaged force, a volunteer reserve, or a smaller professional military augmented 
in times of war by volunteers. All the above systems are for the most part 
marked by ascription, as opposed to policies of conscription, where a subset or 
an entire population is pressed into military service. Conscription has many 
temporal variables, lasting from a short period to the span of a lifetime. In that 
sense it is similar to the system of corvée labor prevalent in many feudal societies, 
where tenants performed various tasks for landowners or other patrons. During 
the course of the 18th and 19th centuries, Senegambian states implemented two 
of these systems of recruitment and military organization: the warrior caste and 
conscription strategies. 
The title of Myron Echenberg’s text on the tirailleurs sénégalais, Colonial 
Conscripts, identifies the French approach to recruitment in West Africa during 
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the late 19th and early 20th centuries.4 But the conscription process has a 
longstanding history in the states comprised within Senegambia, where regional 
powers raised armies through regular levees and calls to arms from at least the 
mid-18th century. The presence of conscripts is obscured in the accounts of 
European explorers and colonial officials by their consistent misidentification of 
these men as “slaves.” Due to the presence of slavery and the failure of many 
outside observers to understand the nature of patron-client relationships, 
Europeans wrote about armies of “slaves” instead of recognizing that many of 
these men were professional soldiers and former war captives. At least some 
conscripts had free status. 
A certain number of these men would have been identified as slave caste 
within the societal divisions of Senegambian states and their Wolof, Tukulor, 
Fulbe, Mandinka, Seereer, and Bambara residents. However, many were just as 
likely to be peasant farmers with feudal obligations, not unlike France’s own 
conscription practices. The terminology applied features the elision of two terms: 
captif and esclave. However, the widespread use of the term captif provides a 
window through which to view the military nature of enslavement throughout 
                                                 
4 Myron Echenberg, Colonial Conscripts: The Tirailleurs Sénégalais in French West Africa, 1857-1960 
(Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1991). 
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the region. For the most part, captif identified a person enslaved through warfare 
and did not thus impose upon them a permanent slave status.5 In local 
languages, particularly Wolof and Pulaar, this differentiation was also clear in 
delineating the difference between warriors who may have been subjugated 
through warfare, ceɗɗo, and slave caste individuals within the social structures of 
Haalpulaar and Wolof societies: maccuɓe and jaam, respectively.6    
Among other subjects of inquiry, this chapter will focus on the use of 
conscription and the presence ceɗɗo/jaami-bur and sòfa/tónjon specialist military 
forces as the backbone of most Senegambian militaries during the 19th century.7 
These armies were made up of large-scale infantries and a varying number of 
cavalry troops. Though the region was engaged in the arms trade from at least 
the 17th century, firearms and in particular rapid-fire weapons would not play a 
major part in the success of military engagements until the late 19th century.  
                                                 
5 On the complicated relationship between the concepts of captif and esclave, see Gilles Holder, 
“Esclaves et captifs au pays dogon: La société esclavagiste sama,” L’Homme 145 (1998): 71-108. 
6 This chapter and those that follow refer to the Tukulor and Fulbe ethnolinguistic groups 
separately, but both fall into the designation Haalpulaar, meaning “Pulaar speakers.” Dialects of 
the Pulaar/Fulbe/Fulani language are spoken throughout and beyond the Sahelian region, from 
the countries of present-day Mauritania as far east as Chad and Cameroon. 
7 The most famous depiction of ceɗɗo is the film of Senegalese auteur Ousmane Sembène, Ceddo, 
centering on the relationship between Islam, Wolof culture, and European intervention prior to 
the colonial period. 
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SENEGAMBIA: THE LAND AND ITS PEOPLE 
The Senegambia region is bordered by the two rivers that provide its 
name: the Senegal River divides the savannah of Senegambia from that of its 
Mauritanian (Moorish) neighbors to the north and the former Songhay kingdom 
to the east; the Gambia River splits the territory of the former Jolof Empire from 
the southern terrains of the verdant Casamance. Northern and much of Eastern 
Figure 1.1 Map of Senegambia, 1819, in Voyage dans l'intérieur de l'Afrique aux sources du 
Sénégal et de la Gambie, by Gaspard-Théodore Mollien (Paris: A. Bertrand, 1822). 
33 
Senegambia lies in what is known as the Sahel, a dry expanse that connects the 
Sahara Desert to the more temperate savannah of Central Senegambia and the 
lush greenery of the Fuuta Jalon region. Geographically diverse, the majority of 
the terrain is dry grassland with various levels of foliage and vegetation. The 
inhabitants of the countryside fished in the rivers bordering it, engaged in animal 
husbandry and small-scale agriculture, and developed local crafts as weavers, 
blacksmiths, woodworkers, and other artisans. 
In Western Africa, Senegambia has one of the longest documented 
histories of agricultural and commercial development. Senegambian peoples first 
came into contact with Portuguese explorers and traders in the mid-15th century. 
Its kingdoms and states participated in the trans-Saharan and trans-Atlantic 
trades in material goods and human bodies. Though the slave trade did feature 
in the Senegambian economy, by the early 19th century the number of men and 
women shipped from its shores across the Atlantic was in decline.8 In the states 
of the former Jolof Empire, Wolof nobility depended on feudal labor for 
agricultural production to increase exports into the interior.9 By the late 18th 
                                                 
8 James Searing, West African Slavery and Atlantic Commerce: The Senegal River Valley, 1700-1860 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 34 
9 Hilary Jones, The Métis of Senegal: Urban Life and Politics in French West Africa, (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2013), 48. 
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century the primary export from Senegal was gum, doubling from 500 to 600 
tons per year at the beginning of the 18th century to 1,000 to 1,200 tons by the 
century’s close. European companies imported gum for a number of processes, 
including the production of textiles, medicines, and book binding.10 
The Jolof Empire, which succeeded the dynastic empires of Ghana and 
Mali, was founded by Njaajaan Njaay between the 13th and 14th centuries. 
Under Njaay, who established his dynastic home in the territory of Waalo, the 
Jolof Empire expanded its influence from the coastal region farther into the 
interior over the course of 300 years. During this period, the political and 
economic ties of the region were linked to trans-Saharan trade routes, leading to 
the spread of goods as well as Islam. A series of revolts in the Jolof states of 
Kajoor and Bawol fractured the Jolof Empire in the mid-16th century, around the 
same time as the region’s first contact with European traders. Portuguese sailors 
engaged the inhabitants of the coast, marrying indigenous women and 
eventually settling small coastal communities in Gorée and Saint Louis.11  
John Thornton notes that the end of the 17th century did not provide any 
clear regional power with “the sort of overarching authority that the great 
                                                 
10 Jones, Métis of Senegal, 44. 
11 Mark Hinchman, Portrait of an Island: The Architecture and Material Culture of Gorée, Sénégal, 1758-
1837 (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2015), 27-30. 
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empires [had] in earlier centuries.”12 The high level of military conflict in the 18th 
century was a result of a power vacuum, exacerbated by internal power struggles 
within African polities in the region. In numerous cases, these fights for 
supremacy were further complicated by the inter-state interference of dynastic 
and political leaders into one or another ruler’s claims to the throne, particularly 
in Waalo, Kajoor, Bawol, Fuuta Tooro, and Gajaaga.13 In the 18th century, the 
former Jolof state of Kajoor came to rival and then to supersede the cavalry state 
of Waalo as the dominant power in the Wolof and Seereer states.14 However, two 
clerical families of noble lineage, the Joops of Kokki and the Faals of Pir 
Safnoxoor, often led opposition to the kings of Kajoor.15 The proximity of the 
state of Waalo and the region of Fuuta Tooro meant these areas were frequently 
disturbed by armed incursions from the Trarza and Brakna tribal confederations 
to the north in what is today Mauritania. These nomadic warriors specialized in 
predatory raids for cattle, millet, and human beings.16 By the late 18th century, 
the region was in a state of political and military upheaval, as will be described 
later in this chapter. 
                                                 
12 John K. Thornton, Warfare in Atlantic Africa, 1500-1800 (London: Routledge, 2005), 22. 
13 Thornton, Warfare in Atlantic Africa, 22-23. 
14 James L. A. Webb Jr., “The Horse and Slave Trade between the Western Sahara and 
Senegambia,” Journal of African History 34 (1993): 221-46, 234. 
15 Colvin, “Islam and the State of Kajoor,” 592. 
16 Searing, “Power and Dependency,” 486. 
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As Martin Klein has written, by the 18th and 19th centuries, around 80 
percent of the population of the Senegambia region was made up of Wolof, 
Seereer, Mandinka, Fulbe, and Tukulor men and women. Their societies had 
roughly similar hierarchical social structures and political organizations based 
upon aristocratic control.17 Adherents of Islam spread their five pillars of faith 
beginning in the 11th century. By the 16th century, Senegambia had developed 
its own Islamic traditions and, toward the late 19th century, its own indigenous 
Muslim brotherhood: the Murids.18 Oral traditions in Kajoor also show that the 
Wolof have believed Islam to be a part of their society and governing structure 
since the beginning of the Jolof Empire.19 According to Colvin, the population 
identified as Wolof was originally composed of Berber, Fulbe, Seereer, 
Mandinka, and Lebu people. By the establishment of the Jolof Empire by 
Njaajaan Njaay in the 14th century, these people had become a recognizable and 
                                                 
17 Martin A. Klein, “Social and Economic Factors in the Muslim Revolution in Senegambia,” 
Journal of African History 13, no. 3 (1972): 419-441, 419. 
18 In-depth studies of Islam in the region include David Robinson, Paths of Accommodation: Muslim 
Societies and French Colonial Authorities in Senegal and Mauritania, 1880-1920 (Athens, OH: Ohio 
University Press, 2000); Cheikh Anta Babou, Fighting the Greater Jihad: Amadu Bamba and the 
Fouding of the Muridiyya of Senegal, 1853-1913 (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2007); Rudolph 
T. Ware III, The Walking Qurʼan: Islamic Education, Embodied Knowledge, and History in West Africa 
(North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 2014); Fallou Ngom, Muslims beyond the Arab 
World: The Odyssey of ʻAjamī and the Muri ̄diyya (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016). 
19 Colvin, “Islam and the State of Kajoor,” 592. 
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distinct ethnolinguistic group. They also came into existence at a time when 
Islam had long been established in the region.20 
In an analysis of travelers’ account to Senegambia, particularly the former 
Jolof Empire, Colvin notes that before the jihād of Almaami Abdul Kader Kane, 
European explorers always described the inhabitants of the region as Muslim. 
Only at the beginning of the 19th century did Europeans and some Euro-African 
chroniclers begin to identify the Wolof as pagans. Colvin finds that the first 
person to make this claim was Gaspard Mollien, whose work was published in 
1818. This may be a result of the guides and interpreters used by many European 
explorers and, later, colonial officials, who came from within the clerical 
community. Mollien’s guide, for example, was a Muslim Tukulor cleric. The 
identification of paganism seems to revolve around three traits: alcohol 
consumption, political participation, and the possession of weapons.21 
For example, the conflict between Abdul Kader and Damel Amari Ngooné 
Ndeela, described later in this chapter, has often been misrepresented in sources 
as a simple conflict between Muslim and pagan rulers. Colvin observes that the 
                                                 
20 Colvin, “Islam and the State of Kajoor,” 592. 
21 Colvin, “Islam and the State of Kajoor,” 601-603. As Colvin notes, not all observers fall into this 
category. Carrère and Holle, for example, wrote that all the people of Kajoor were Muslim, 
including the nobility.  
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Almaami considered the Damel “an errant son,” recalling a friendlier 
relationship between clergy and nobility. Abdul Kader Kane’s criticism was that 
the Damel had enslaved free men, marabouts, and sold them to Christians. 
Further, the king was causing suffering in Kajoor by his refusal to align himself 
with its Muslim clerics and submit to the Almaami, repenting his misdeeds and 
forgoing alcohol. There was no mention of the Damel being of another religion.22 
The social structure of most Senegambian societies has been likened to a 
caste system, with varying degrees of rigidity.23 During the time period in 
question, caste status defined occupational roles and the hierarchy of power in 
Senegambian states. The most comprehensive study of caste in West Africa 
sketches out this system and provides an illuminating look into Senegambian 
societies during this time period.24 In particular, castes of the former Jolof Empire 
and the region of Fuuta Tooro in Northern and Northeastern Senegambia can be 
divided roughly into three groups: nobility and other free persons, artisans, and 
slaves. Writing about what she terms “the social and residential separation 
                                                 
22 Colvin, “Islam and the State of Kajoor,” 600. 
23 The caste system of Senegambia should not be confused with the better known caste society of 
India. In the Senegambia region, castes are regularly defined by occupation. Caste status is 
perpetuated by endogamy and castes are often delineated hierarchically but do not adhere to a 
sense of inherited purity, where certain people are designated “untouchable.” 
24 Tal Tamari, Les castes de l’Afrique occidentale: Artisans et musiciens endogames (Nanterre: Société 
d’ethnologie, 1997). 
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between Muslim clergy and military-political leaders,” Lucie Colvin stresses the 
importance of political agitation in Islamic culture that caused Kajoor nobility to 
attempt to maintain this divide. Other aspects of social isolation include the 
segregation of hereditary occupational groups like blacksmiths and woodcarvers 
in Wolof and Tukulor societies.25 Both Tukulor and Wolof social structures have 
defined categories of slaves, referred to in Wolof communities as jaam, and in 
Tukulor communities as maccuɗo (plural maccuɓe). 
In Fuuta Tooro and Kajoor, craft castes, called either nyeenyo (Pulaar) or 
ñeeño (Wolof), were distinguished from slaves and free persons. Among the 
Wolof, those classed as “free” were further subdivided between nobility, Muslim 
clergy known generally as sëriñ (Wolof), shaykh (Arabic), or marabout (French), 
and peasant farmers, badoolo.26 The nobility “were a warrior class by vocation” 
and received some Qur’anic education in their youth but generally did not enter 
the clergy themselves. They also received military training as adolescents, like 
horseback riding and weapons handling. Drinking alcohol was a symbol of 
                                                 
25 Lucie Gallistel Colvin, “Islam and the State of Kajoor: A Case of Successful Resistance to Jihad,” 
Journal of African History 15, no. 4 (1974): 587-606, 589. 
26 Colvin, “Islam and the State of Kajoor,” 589. 
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belonging to the nobility, drawing the contempt of Muslim and later Catholic 
clerics alike.27 
However, in writing about slavery many observers missed the interplay 
between slave status and access to power. For example, Dominique Lamiral, an 
independent trader who previously worked for the Compagnie des Indes, wrote 
that the Damel’s “first minister” was “always a slave.”28 This man was to always 
keep iron bars suspended from the “head of his bed” in order to “remind him 
constantly of his state of servitude.” Lamiral claimed, in fact, that all the Damel’s 
ministers were slaves, yet they were “often more powerful than their master.”29 
Writing in the 1820s, Gaspard Mollien made similar claims about the “slaves of 
the Damel,” though he did not differentiate between types of “slaves” in the 
employ of the king. In his account, “crown slaves” were to “place irons under 
their beds, in order that they do not forget that their chains could be tightened 
again, should they commit tyrannical acts against free men.”30 Mollien also 
discussed the rarity of intermarriage between nyeenyo and free persons or 
between Muslims and those he perceived as pagans. He claimed that people in 
                                                 
27 Colvin, “Islam and the State of Kajoor,” 595. 
28 Lamiral, L’Affrique, 187. 
29 Lamiral, L’Affrique, 187-188. 
30 Gaspard-Théodore Mollien, Voyage dans l’intérieur de l’Afrique, aux sources du Sénégal et de la 
Gambie, Tome 1 (Paris: A. Bertrand, 1822), 170. 
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the region “maintain with care their genealogy” due to their “great pride in their 
origins.” As a result, it was unlikely that they would marry with those “of a 
lower rank.”31 
                                                 
31 Mollien, Voyage Tome 1, 171. 
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Figure 1.2 Image of Ceɗɗo in Esquisses sénégalaises: physionomie du pays, peuplades, commerce, 
religions…, by Abbé David Boilat (Paris: P. Bertrand, 1853). 
MILITARY CULTURE IN SENEGAMBIA 
Ceɗɗo, a Pulaar word that was adopted by Wolof and Seereer peoples, 
came to signify a class of soldiers important to Wolof states. In a later definition 
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of the term, ceɗɗo indicates one who holds political power; its opposite in Wolof 
is badoolo: “one with no political power.” Throughout the 19th century, this term 
was used most often to describe soldiers.32 Ceɗɗo developed into a corporate 
identity, and ceɗɗo status was passed down through generations.33 These men 
were not removed from a homeland so much as born into a caste system that 
meant their position in life would be military service. Further, many of these men 
gained political power and enjoyed great wealth and influence.34 In fact, some of 
the greatest generals, military strategists, and confidants of kings and other 
political figures were of former war captives. They dominated the forces of the 
kingdoms of Kajoor, Waalo, and Fuuta Tooro and, eventually, came to make up a 
large part of the French colonial forces in 19th century Senegambia. 
 Regarding Senegambian troops, George Brooks writes that from the early 
17th to the mid-19th century, the rulers of Kaabu and those of Wolof and Seereer 
states increased the proportion of captives serving in their armies; these men 
                                                 
32 Eunice Charles, Precolonial Senegal: The Jolof Kingdom, 1800-1890 (Boston: African Studies Center, 
Boston University, 1977), 6. James F. Searing, “God Alone is King”: Islam and Emancipation in 
Senegal: the Wolf Kingdoms of Kajoor and Bawol, 1859-1914. (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2002), 4. 
33 James F. Searing, “Aristocrats, Slaves, and Peasants: Power and Dependency in the Wolof 
States, 1700-1850,” International Journal of African Historical Studies 21 (1988): 475-503, 483-484. 
34 In this way, warrior caste men were highly similar to the Mamlūk soldiers of South Asia. For an 
overview of the power of Mamlūk soldiers, see in particular Reuven Amitai’s chapter in Brown 
and Morgan’s Arming Slaves, “The Mamlūk Institution, or One Thousand Years of Military 
Slavery in the Islamic World,” 40-78. 
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were known as nyanchos in Mande states and as ceɗɗo in the Senegambia region.35 
As James Searing has noted, though the ceɗɗo military has been studied almost 
exclusively in relation to the Atlantic slave trade, it served other quite unrelated 
social functions. Military specialists had a privileged position deriving from their 
status as warriors serving the Senegambian aristocracy. As a result, the feudal 
nobility could use ceɗɗo to police those who labored in the fields.36  
Ceɗɗo is an ambiguous term within the caste system. Functioning in at 
least two major polities, among the Wolof and Tukulor people, it seems to have 
developed into a definable corporate identity by roughly the mid-18th century. 
As Tal Tamari has demonstrated, within its Tukulor origins, ceɗɗo signified 
temporal power.37 In Wolof society, this was for the most part also the case. 
Though European observers and some métis critics characterized ceɗɗo as drunk, 
aggressive, pillaging soldiers, focusing on the patron-client relationships 
between ceɗɗo and the royal lineages to which they were bound provides a 
window to better understand their place within Senegambian societies. The ceɗɗo 
had access to wealth and power due to their often close relationship to the ruling 
                                                 
35 George E. Brooks, Eurafricans in Western Africa: Commerce, Social Status, Gender and Religious 
Observance from the Sixteenth to Eighteenth Century (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2003), 35-
36. 
36 James Searing, “Aristocrats, Slaves, and Peasants: Power and Dependency in the Wolof States, 
1700-1850,” International Journal of African Historical Studies 21 (1988): 475-503, 480. 
37 Tal Tamari, Les castes de l’Afrique occidentale. 
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class. As soldiers who fought in defense of the king, they often performed 
bureaucratic functions in addition to their military responsibilities. Certainly 
some, if not most, converted to Islam, but they marked their separate status by 
their style of dress and behavior. 
There is little consensus regarding the identification of ceɗɗo as a caste 
identity or as a subset of the slave caste.38 This controversy at least in part stems 
from the need to delineate between ceɗɗo/seɓɓe among the Tukulor of Fuuta 
Tooro and the Fulbe of Fuuta Jalon, and ceɗɗo among the Wolof and other 
inhabitants of the Jolof Empire.39 In a comprehensive study of the social structure 
of the Tukulor of Senegambia, Yaya Wane specifies the difference between the 
                                                 
38 A sample of the multitude of definitions for ceɗɗo in Kajoor and other Wolof states follows: 
Jones in Métis of Senegal, 48, describes ceɗɗo as “a titled class of slave warriors” existing “within 
the slave hierarchy”; Mamadou Diouf in Le Kajoor au XIXe siècle: Pouvoir ceddo et conquête coloniale 
(Paris: Karthala, 2014), 82, describes ceɗɗo as a class formed from jaam who were armed by the 
nobility of Kajoor; Abdoulaye Bara Diop in La sociéte wolof: tradition et changement: les systèmes 
d’inégalité et de domination (Paris: Karthala, 1981) 56, 216, 224, equates ceɗɗo with “pagan” and 
discusses their importance in the political hierarchy. Later, on 226, Diop refers to ceɗɗo as 
supporting Latsukaabe in the “war of the marabouts” but differentiates ceɗɗo from the “corps of 
elite slaves of the crown” that Latsukaabe armed to support his claim to the throne of Bawol. 
Boubacar Barry in Le Royaume Du Waalo, 90, describes ceɗɗo as warriors recruited from within the 
“captives of the crown” or “crown slaves.” Hinchman in Portrait of an Island, 31, refers to ceɗɗo as 
“warrior-slaves.” 
39 In later chapters the term ceɗɗo is used to describe the professional warriors of the former Jolof 
Empire. Here ceɗɗo/seɓɓe and ceɗɗo are both employed to clarify the differences between these 
men in Haalpulaar and Wolof societies, respectively. As outlined in the work of other scholars 
like Yaya Wane and Tal Tamari, ceɗɗo/seɓɓe is a more stable category within the Tukulor caste 
hierarchy, where it refers to temporal power and has no relation to the slave caste. In Wolof 
society, the adopted term does not fit neatly into a specific caste. 
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temporal power of ceɗɗo/seɓɓe and the spiritual power of tooroɓɓe, theMuslim 
clerics known as marabouts, imams, and cernos within Tukulor society.40 This does 
not mean, however, that there is a stark divide between Muslim and non-
Muslim. Instead, Wane notes that the characteristics of ceɗɗo/seɓɓe are that they 
may convert to and practice Islam, but not follow all of its pillars. Their 
temperament is marked by courageous actions, even to the point of rashness, and 
insensitivity to physical pain.41 In fact, the characteristics of ceɗɗo/seɓɓe are what 
made them excellent soldiers. Wane is quick to point out that their status as 
agents of the nobility did not equate to a tacit acknowledgment that nobles held 
higher social status. However, their position as military professionals did lead to 
the establishment of ceɗɗo/seɓɓe villages, typically located where garrisons would 
have been stationed in an earlier era. Wane also writes that ceɗɗo/seɓɓe men could 
often be identified by the gold hoop earring hanging from their right earlobes.42 
In Fuuta Tooro, James Johnson has written that the ceɗɗo/seɓɓe were free 
persons who “were the warriors of the state and exercised considerable political 
authority as servants or agents of the crown” in the period before the almamate 
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inaugurated by the jihād of Abdul Kader Kane.43 Origins of ceɗɗo/seɓɓe in Fuuta 
Tooro are a subject in need of further study. Their characteristics are generally 
identified as “courageous, skillful with weapons, excellent horsemen, difficult in 
character, and only recently converted to Islam.”44 Though ceɗɗo/seɓɓe were 
represented as “slaves” in European accounts of the 18th and 19th century, their 
status is not as simple to grasp as the divide between slave and non-slave 
persons, especially in a society delineated by caste membership. Instead, ceɗɗo in 
both Wolof and Tukulor societies were marked by an outsider status and came to 
embrace this identity. They did not serve as pawns within the military. Ceɗɗo 
trained in warfare and became military specialists, leading to broader political 
and economic power. This authority in many ways subverted their outsider 
status by allowing them to marry, father children, and pass on a status that was 
not a caste unto itself but instead a type of corporate identity. Seen through this 
lens, the relationship between ceɗɗo and sòfa becomes clear: both served as 
military specialists in the Senegambia region, serving as officers in the major 
armies of states from Waalo to Fuuta Tooro to Kaarta. 
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Eunice Charles, in her work on the Jolof kingdom, also points out that 
ceɗɗo did not necessarily designate slave status. In employ by the nobles of Jolof, 
known as kangaams, these soldiers were unpaid but received a portion of the 
spoils of war as well as equipment used during battle.45 Thus it was both the king 
and the nobility who depended on these soldiers, whether these men were 
designated ceɗɗo or not. Charles has written that the “royal slaves” tended to live 
in Cen and Waxox and that there are few contemporary accounts that relay the 
number of captives in the king’s employ, particularly for the 18th century. 
Charles claims that slave status was inheritable and thus each ruler had access to 
this reservoir of soldiers, who passed their status from father to son.46 It seems 
likely that those nobles identified by Charles as kangaams are similar if not 
perhaps the same as the lamanes described by John Thornton as “hereditary 
rulers…[who] possessed permanent forces near their residences and the right to 
summon others for their armies.”47 He also discusses the payment of these men 
in “booty,” similar to those rights Charles designates as being given to the ceɗɗo.  
Like Wane, Searing notes the complicated relationship between ceɗɗo and 
Islam in Wolof society where he finds that many ceɗɗo did convert to Islam, 
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though they certainly exempted themselves from certain precepts, particularly 
any which might interfere with their responsibilities as soldiers and agents of the 
king. Ceɗɗo also consulted marabouts and other Muslim leaders as advisers and 
sought their aid and spiritual protection in the form of amulets or charms known 
locally as teere or gris gris.48 However, among the Wolof ceɗɗo never evolved into 
a full, recognized occupational group or caste, nor should their description as 
“slaves” in European sources be assumed to equate them with slave caste people 
like the jaam and maccuɓe. Equating ceɗɗo with slavery confuses the level of 
power to which most ceɗɗo had access. Outside of nobility, ceɗɗo were often the 
most powerful group within a polity.  
One of the defining characteristics of ceɗɗo status is alcohol consumption.49 
Much of the emphasis on drinking eau-de-vie (brandy) or sangara (alcohol) and 
the perceived pagan-Muslim divide between ceɗɗo and marabouts stems from the 
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wide use in secondary literature of the Abbé David Boilat’s survey of the region. 
The Abbé Boilat, a métis Catholic priest with French and Senegalese roots, wrote 
that ceɗɗo were the opposite of marabouts, signifying their “impious” or pagan 
roots. He stressed that not only did these men form “the militia” of Kajoor, 
Waalo, Bawol, Siin, and Saalum, but also that they were employed and fed by 
their patrons.50 Boilat focused intently on the drinking habits of ceɗɗo, which 
other than being an identifying characteristic is not a point of particular interest 
in this study. The focus of Europeans and those aligned with the French 
“civilizing mission” tended to overemphasize the drunkenness and “vice” 
engaged in by ceɗɗo. Their alcohol consumption provides a marker for which to 
search within travelers’ accounts and official records and correspondence, but 
the fact that they provided military service that was sought after and prized 
within Senegambia leads to a conclusion that their drinking behavior was not a 
subject of major concern within their own communities.51 
 Searing describes the negative stereotype of ceɗɗo among colonial officials 
as “drunken brutes, corrupted by their frequent consumption of European trade 
alcohol (locally known as sangara); military tyrants, who frequently pillaged and 
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enslaved their Wolof subjects, selling them into slavery to obtain horses, 
firearms, liquor, and trade slaves.”52 Searing writes that the definition refers to a 
particular group of people who were notable for their resistance to Islamic 
conversion as well as their military identity. He further claims that it was used 
often to describe what he calls “non-Fulbe” but what might instead be regarded 
as “non-Haalpulaaren,” including the Wolof and Seereer.53 Ceɗɗo eventually 
became a corporate identity. Ceɗɗo status was passed down through generations 
and these men and later women could not be easily defined as “natally 
alienated” persons, to use the term conceived of by Orlando Patterson.54 Ceɗɗo, 
like the alkati of the Jolof rulers, had to hang an iron bar in their home to remind 
them of their servile origins. Their real power grew at the end of the 17th century 
with the restoration of aristocratic power in Kajoor.55 
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The Damel created a large army of ceɗɗo recruited from within the jaami-
bur, men typically described as “slaves of the crown.” These men were then 
given positions of privilege as military specialists and enforcers of dynastic 
power.56 Curtin has claimed that the early 19th century brought a number of 
soldiers from the Wolof states and Malinke kingdoms. Due to their high status 
and growth of their power and influence over Wolof states, by the end of the 
18th century certain members of the ceɗɗo had formed a virtual “branch of the 
ruling class” and thus landed “more and more outside of royal control.”57 
By the mid-18th century, a similar development in social structure and 
military organization had developed in the kingdom of Segu. As Richard Roberts 
has demonstrated, in the Middle Niger Valley kingdoms of Segu and Kaarta 
many soldiers were conscripted by their sovereign or lesser nobility.58 The use of 
“soldier-slaves,” introduced by Biton, the first king of Segu, created a force 3,000 
strong.59 These men, called alternatively sòfa and tónjon, played important 
political and military roles throughout the course of the 19th century and, as will 
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be seen later, were used by Al-Hajj Umar Taal during his jihād in Northern and 
Eastern Senegambia in the middle of the 1800s. The ton was originally an 
organization of the nobility, but as warfare increased in the region, new recruits, 
often war captives, began to outnumber the nobles. Eventually, some of these 
tónjon became chiefs and administered conquered territories. Similar to ceɗɗo, 
they were rumored to be “hard drinking” and “hard fighting,” and their sense of 
corporate identity was founded on an ideology equating honor with poverty.60  
One of the defining factors in the European conquest of African polities is 
the ubiquitous presence of African troops in almost all major conflicts. A further 
feature particular to the Senegambia region is the omnipresence of large-scale 
infantry and conscripts in the forces of all major African kingdoms and empires. 
This is a defining characteristic of indigenous militaries in Senegambia, 
particularly during the era under study. Though the presence of professional 
warriors, whether termed ceɗɗo, sòfa, or tónjon, was commonplace in the dynastic 
states and almamates, so was conscription or some level of levée en masse. 
Conscription is a topic that appears regularly in the descriptions of travelers in 
the region. Largescale conscription in Northern Africa would have been known 
to many in the region due to the dissemination of information along the trans-
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Saharan trade routes, including that of the Sultan Mawlay Isma`il during his 
reign between 1646 and 1727. Mawlay Isma`il built his army of Black soldiers, 
known as the `Abid al-Bukhari, by conscripting both free Black Africans and 
slaves living throughout the kingdom.61 
In fact, the traveler Jean-Baptiste-Léonard Durand claimed that all of the 
subjects of Kajoor were “slaves” because they “obeyed” and “served” the Damel 
without question. He noted compulsory military service and corvée labor among 
the duties of the inhabitants of the kingdom.62 He made a similar claim about the 
Brak (ruler) of Waalo, stating that “in case of war, all subjects are required to take 
up arms, at their own expense.” Further, “the chiefs of each village lead their 
troops and they meet up with the prince.”63 Recounting his time in Bundu, 
Durand reported that in that kingdom “every free man is a soldier; no 
government has troops in his pay.”64 
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The Brak of Waalo possessed a personal guard of only 200 infantry, with 
the rest of his forces “raised by officials, who were his personal slaves, from the 
rest of the country through levy, in which the levied soldiers supplied their own 
arms, sometimes of low quality.”65 These conscripts were often undisciplined and 
ill equipped for battle. In less decentralized states, small polities raised armies in 
similar fashion to the larger kingdoms, including the smaller states of Galam and 
Gajaaga, and possibly those of Siin and Saalum.66 
In his description of the armed forces of Fuuta Tooro, the Abbé Boilat 
claimed that among the Tukulor “all men are soldiers.”67 In one of many 
accounts of the war fought between the Almaami Abdul Kader Kane of Fuuta 
Tooro and the Damel of Kajoor Amari Ngooné Ndeela, Boilat noted that after 
Abdul Kader sent emissaries to demand the conversion of Amari Ngooné, the 
Damel sent them back to the Almaami accompanied by 30 ceɗɗo on horseback. 
Upon their return, the Almaami “summoned all his warriors and ordered them 
to prepare for the expedition all men from the age of puberty to the elderly” in 
service of his jihād.68 Boilat relayed the chronicle that the force amassed 
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numbered more than 20,000 men, put together over the course of only a few 
days.69 This would only be possible through a longstanding implementation of 
conscription in the region. 
  In Richard Roberts’s work on the states of Segu Bambara and Segu 
Tukulor, he discusses war making as an occupation. Roberts claims that soldiers’ 
livelihoods were based on the accumulation and sale of captives, regardless of 
European involvement, and that this need explains the constant low-level 
conflict in the region as well as the use of raiding and counter-raiding tactics that 
will be discussed later in this chapter.70 Martin Klein has made a similar 
argument about the military as an occupation, noting that defeated soldiers often 
asked to be taken into the victorious force, though conscription through conquest 
was less common in more decentralized societies.71 As Roberts observes of 
Bambara and Tukulor soldiers, some “were conscripts whose livelihood derived 
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from different activities,” while others “were professional warriors who earned 
their living by making war.”72  
If conscription was common, many men would have had military 
training. Thus, M. Saugnier, who described his trip to the Senegambia region 
following his own captivity in what is today Mauritania and Morocco, also wrote 
about the prevalence and importance of those he designated “slaves” in military 
positions. Saugnier’s account also sheds light on the understanding of numerous 
groups in the region. He made similar claims about the Wolof when he discussed 
the enslavement of certain peoples over others. Saugnier perpetuated a belief in 
the docility of the Bambara, who he identified as less likely to attempt escape 
than the Wolof. Saugnier wrote that it was not necessary to put the Bambara in 
irons, unlike the Wolof who were good swimmers and had connections with the 
habitant community in Saint Louis.73  
Due to the distance of Bambara lands and kingdoms, Saugnier claimed 
that they were unlikely to participate in rebellions. He also held that the fear of 
being put in chains caused Bambara “slaves” to oppose their Wolof counterparts, 
and that the Bambara and Wolof peoples were natural enemies. He further 
                                                 
72 Roberts, “Production and Reproduction of Warrior States,” 399. 
73 M. Saugnier, Relations de plusieurs Voyages à la Co ̂te d’Afrique, à Maroc, au Sénégal, à Gorée, à 
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claimed that “Saracolets, Saltiguets, Poules, Bracs & Wals” must be put in chains 
but not to the extent of the Wolof.74 As an example, Saugnier stressed the need 
for one to two pairs of irons for each Wolof man, while those of other nations 
could be held with one pair of irons per two individuals. He cautioned against 
holding more than 20 Wolof captives and argued it necessary to check in on them 
each morning and evening, and to check that their irons were securely fastened.75 
One measure of control introduced by Europeans to the region was the 
firearm. Europeans were using matchlock muskets in the 16th century, though 
they proved very dangerous for the user due to the need to light the powder 
charge by hand with the use of a match. These muskets would not have been 
useful outside of Northern and Eastern Senegambia. The high humidity of the 
coastal regions would interfere with the ability to light a matchlock musket, 
dampening the gears, and destroying the functionality of the weapon. By the 
mid-17th century, a safer and more reliable flintlock musket or fusil started to 
replace the matchlock muskets. No longer requiring the firing of a match to light 
the powder, these firearms were more effective and environmentally versatile, 
and French military personnel were attaching bayonets to these fusils by the start 
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of the 18th century.76 As John Lynn has outlined, this change in weapons 
technology was accompanied by a change in military tactics in Europe, with the 
emphasis on holding a position and maintaining discipline while taking 
casualties. Enforcing this level of discipline required the regular drilling of 
soldiers, marked by the repetitive practice of marching and weapons handling 
under the command of officers.77 
Gunpowder was introduced to the Senegambia region as early as the 15th 
century, with the use of muskets and artillery growing from the late 16th into the 
17th century, particularly as a result of the development of flintlock muskets in 
the 1680s, which made these weapons suitable for employ in more humid 
African climes.78 Regional specifications led to the adoption of firearms at 
different times, as well as the embrace of cavalry and large-scale infantry 
deployment. Populations living within densely forested areas crisscrossed by 
waterways tended to focus on smaller projectile weapons, ships, and boats, while 
the populations of the savannah were more dependent on infantry and cavalry, 
depending on the prevalence of certain ailments like sleeping sickness. 
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As noted above, firearms were introduced in the 17th century, but they 
were not utilized widely until much later. Instead, the soldiers of the Senegambia 
region continued to arm themselves with swords, javelins, lances, and bows and 
arrows. The kingdom of Waalo notably had only about half their infantry of 
3,000 soldiers carrying firearms by 1734. During the 19th century, African 
blacksmiths learned how to make guns and many African leaders succeeded in 
turning new weapons technology to their own purposes. Despite this evidence of 
a massive rise in arms imports, Philip Curtin and W. A. Richards’s conclusion is 
convincing: for Senegambia, the “arms for slaves” theory is not supported by the 
evidence from the 18th century, when changes in the volume of the gun trade 
were not directly attributable to changes in the volume of the slave trade. The 
slave trade began its decline in Senegambia in the 1730s when the gun trade had 
barely made an impact. The import of firearms peaked in the 1830s when the 
slave trade was focused elsewhere.79 
Quoting from Jack Goody’s Technology, Tradition and the State in Africa, 
Richard Roberts lists four “military technologies” with their corresponding 
political structures: bows and arrows, which correlate to acephalous political 
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organizations; spears and swords, representing a “transitional stage” between 
decentralized societies and consolidated states; and horses and guns, 
implemented by centralized states to greater and lesser degrees of success. Much 
of this success depends on ownership of weapons, particularly firearms, which 
centralized states amassed and then distributed to their soldiers.80 However, 
nobility and their clients, specialized warriors, might accumulate firearms on 
their own accord as a sign of their military status or political dominance. In the 
Senegambia region, soldiers were often required to supply their own arms, 
including horses for the cavalry, though the state might attempt to compensate 
these men and provide them with the supplies required for military campaigns.81 
The Abbé Boilat wrote that ceɗɗo were armed with “fusils” and “sabres,” 
flintlock muskets and sabers. Often they were provided “arms and horses” by 
their patrons.82 Boilat also wrote that the cavalry of Fuuta Tooro carried “nine to 
ten inch” daggers and single or double-barreled flintlock muskets. They wore 
embroidered white caps and “capes” and carried powder boxes and gris gris 
which hung from their torsos.83 Mollien wrote that the troops of Fuuta Tooro 
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dressed similarly to Mamlūk forces, providing an “imposing” image to those 
who came across the Almaami’s army. The army was dressed completely in 
white, wearing white turbans and robes. The force he came across had a cavalry 
numbering 300 horses and riders and Mollien claimed that, like French 
squadrons, the cavalry of Fuuta Tooro was organized into two columns. 
Marching behind the cavalry were infantry soldiers who Mollien described as 
“the dregs of the people.”84 Infantry numbered up to 1,200 men and most carried 
flintlock muskets. 
 Durand wrote that the army of Bundu was composed of 10,000 to 12,000 
men, all dressed the same, and that the officers were distinguished by the blue 
pagnes they wore and the ostrich feathers they placed in their “turbans.” He 
claimed the general could be identified by the three feathers he wore. Officers 
and the men under their command were armed with some combination of 
daggers, sabers, bows and arrows, flintlock muskets, and spears. They might also 
carry shields made from cowhide. The cavalry was smaller, less than 1,000 men, 
armed with sabers, daggers, and spears.85 
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  This is similar to the account of Major William Gray, who traveled 
through Eastern Senegambia during the early 1820s. Gray described the cavalry 
of Bundu as securing the sleeves of their “gowns” behind their necks, securing 
them with straps to prevent them from billowing during the ride. Men carried 
gris gris to one side and a “powder horn and ball bag” on the other, suspended 
from multi-colored cords. He wrote that they also carried a long knife of nine 
inches to one foot, which he described as similar to a Scottish dirk, and either 
single or double-barreled muskets. Certain “princes and chiefs” also carried 
swords and “one or two pistols which hang dangling in thin leather holsters…at 
the pummel or front horn of their saddle.”86 
 Gray wrote that the military force at the disposal of the kingdom of Bundu 
numbered only 500 to 600 horses and 2,000 to 3,000 infantry. The Almaami’s 
most effective forces were “entirely composed of the Joloff and Woolli people” 
who were “proverbial for bravery.”87 Thus, when the Almaami found it 
necessary he would: 
call this army to the field…he repairs with his own immediate followers to 
some village at a short distance from the capital, and there beats the war 
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drum, which is repeated by each village, and in this manner the call to 
arms is circulated over the country.88  
This form of the levée en masse led the political leaders of the almamate to 
“with as little delay as possible” assemble their local forces and proceed to the 
Almaami’s location, “where those chiefs consult with the king on the plan of 
attack or defence.”89 However, Gray claimed that every soldier was responsible 
for his own ammunition and armaments, as well as any other “means of 
support.” As a result, he wrote, “when I saw the army assembled, a great many 
indeed had no other weapons than a knife and a bludgeon of hard wood,” 
though “a favoured few receive two or three charges of powder and ball with a 
couple of flints” and in a few cases, those favored by the Almaami would be 
presented with a horse or a firearm.90 
The Jolof were using cloth armor as early as the mid-16th century, an 
additional protective element to the shields they carried. Infantry typically 
armed themselves only with shields as protection. The weapons used included 
lances, swords, and javelins, prior to the adoption of firearms later in the 17th 
century. Mounted soldiers tended to carry javelins instead of bows, carrying 10 
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to 20 javelins in a quiver that they would throw “with great speed and skill, as 
fast as a musket ball, according to a 17th-century writer.” The use of javelins in 
particular seems to be a uniform practice throughout the region. These javelins 
were tipped with barbed points, and launched prior to close combat, where 
swords or lances might be more widely employed.91 
Major William Gray observed that in the kingdom of Bundu, soldiers 
carried “long spears, bows and arrows, and occasionally a long gun.” Those with 
firearms were excellent marksmen and suffered more “from the difficulty they 
find in obtaining powder, ball, and small shot, than from any dislike to miss their 
mark.”92 
Regarding weapons in Siin, Demanet mentioned both swords and 
firearms. According to the traveler, copper weapons were preferred. Iron or steel 
weapons were prone to rust. Swords in particular were often priced according to 
their level of embellishment.93 Firearms were owned only by the king and the 
nobility, often garnished with copper, and single and double-barreled muskets 
and pistols were valued highly. Demanet claimed that one “slave” was worth 
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two pistols, two single-barreled muskets, or one double-barreled musket.94 These 
weapons and maces or clubs are the only mentioned throughout Demanet’s 
account. Noting that firearms were introduced to the region by Europeans, 
Demanet claimed that they were rarely used in battles because soldiers did not 
trust their efficacy and further believed that they were not appropriate weapons 
for gens de coeur, “men of heart,” perhaps harkening back to a believed medieval 
sense of chivalric code.95 According to Demanet, it was unheroic to shoot a man 
from a distance without the ability to distinguish who he might be. 
Mollien wrote that “there are almost no known nations on this vast 
continent that do not use firearms.”96 He relayed that the Bambara made their 
own powder and that matchlock fusils were prevalent throughout the states of 
Senegambia. Mollien added that in Kajoor soldiers did not “entirely disdain the 
weapons of their ancestors,” and asserted that the bulk of the infantry continued 
to use spears and bows and arrows though many soldiers carried swords and 
daggers as well.97 Military culture in the Fuuta Jalon region continued to be 
marked by projectile weapons, noted René Caillé, a visitor to the region in 1827 
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and 1828. In his description of his time in the south, Caillé wrote that the 
“Foulahs” depended on poisoned arrows, bows, and spears.98 
By the early 19th century, the ceɗɗo were typically armed with muskets 
and lances.99 In a late 18th century account, Antoine Edme Pruneau de 
Pommegorge, who spent a considerable amount of time in the French-held 
territories of Senegambia, particularly Gorée, and traveled widely within the 
region, discussed the civil wars that took place in the Wolof states throughout 
much of the 1700s.100 According to the author, many of these wars were fought 
between members of one family, and the rulers interested in trading captives for 
weaponry typically focused on swords, gunpowder, muskets, and ammunition. 
He described the Wolof as courageous soldiers, with little fear of death.101 
Pruneau de Pommegorge, who learned some Wolof during his tenure in Gorée, 
provided a French-Wolof dictionary of necessary phrases at the end of his 
account, which included the following weapons: fetal for a musket, guiessi or 
guiassi for a sword.102 
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Figure 1.3 Representations of “Peul” and “Yoloff Soldiers, Early 19th Century, Voyage dans 
l'Afrique occidentale, by Anne Raffenel (Paris: A. Bertrand, 1846). 
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WARS AT SEA  
In a fascinating overview of the role of waterways in the political and 
commercial history of pre-colonial Senegambia, Ousmane Traoré describes the 
level of control indigenous rulers were able to assert over the trade engaged in 
by Europeans. Though they allowed European trade missions into their territory, 
Traoré notes that leaders like Lat Sukaabe Faal exercised authority to prevent 
monopolies and punished French and British transgressors.103 However, this 
control of the waterways did not lead to the development of fleets of ships or 
naval infantry units. It is unclear why this may be, as French and British fleets 
were commonplace in oceanic ports. 
 The captain of Saugnier’s trade mission on the Senegal River, a man he 
called Scipion, is described by James Searing as a man named Charles Scipio, “a 
freed slave of Bambara origins.”104 Saugnier noted Scipio’s military prowess, his 
fluency in French, Arabic, and Bambara, and described some of his close calls as 
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Scipio led the defense of the convoy.105 One particularly interesting point to note, 
if it is true that Scipio was a captive, is Saugnier’s claim that Scipio was “known 
by all the Black princes” and that his presence obliged those in opposition to 
refrain from attack.106 This reputation is borne out through an episode where 
Scipio was entreated to stay with the “Fouquet of Tuago,” the Sarakule prince of 
Galam, during a return journey when Scipio and his crew were held up near 
Bakel. Scipio was able to convince this prince to loan him a number of men in 
order to bring one of the ships onto the land in order to repair some damage.107 
Just as Pruneau de Pommegorge claimed that the Wolof were courageous 
soldiers, Saugnier made a similar assertion about the Sarakule or Soninke, who 
he refers to as the “Saracolets.” Saugnier affirmed that it was rare to find 
Sarakule for sale as they were excellent defenders of their kingdom, always 
successful against attacks. Saugnier also described the Sarakule as neighbors of 
the “Poules” and claimed that the forces of the sovereign of Tuago could number 
30,000 men.108 However, he later described a defeat suffered by the Sarakule 
seven years prior to this voyage, which would have been around 1778. Saugnier 
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alleged that Scipio and a force of perhaps only 800 men from the colony of Saint 
Louis defeated an army 12,000. Though Scipio may have been a captive at the 
time, he was recognized as a general, and set fire to the territory of the Fouquet 
of Tuago. Later the king was taken hostage, though according to Saugnier he was 
returned without a ransom payment.109 This story makes it likely that Scipio was 
a sòfa or tónjon military professional, misidentified here simply as a “slave.” 
For reasons that are unclear, this 1785 encounter between Scipio and the 
current Fouquet of Tuago turned sour, and Scipio found himself once more 
under threat. In keeping with the theme of invincibility, Saugnier claimed that 
Scipio’s sailors believed themselves to be invincible under his command. As the 
army of Tuago assembled near the river, they shot at the convoy, but were 
unable to cause significant damage and prevent passage of the vessel. However, 
this was only the first of a number of dangerous encounters by Scipio, who soon 
found himself under threat of the “Pulaar nation,” probably a state of Fuuta 
Tooro, and its leader, who Saugnier called the “Almamy des Poules.” Low in 
numerical strength, Scipio provided weapons to Bambara captives who were 
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being transported on the ship and commanded them in Bambara in preparation 
for a Tukulor attack.110  
Due to the numerical inferiority of his retinue, Scipio kept to the river, 
though he was taunted from the riverbeds by Tukulor soldiers led by “Tampsirs,” 
Islamic scholars and religious leaders in the region, who threatened to re-enslave 
him and force him to work the land.111 However, he staged an evening raid when 
he and 12 of his men swam or waded to shore and took six princes hostage, 
returning them to his ship and putting them in shackles. He then worked out a 
deal to release the prisoners following his safe passage out of the region, as 
opposed to a negotiated surrender. However, the low tide led to difficulty and 
Scipio had to renegotiate, offering 30 guineas, 10 muskets and 14 double-barreled 
muskets, and 14 barrels of gunpowder to the “Tampsirs,” who then allowed him 
to continue unabated.112 
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WARS ON LAND 
Warfare in the Senegambia region took place mostly on land. The armies 
of the savannah were generally larger and made up of cavalry and infantry, 
though the numbers that exist for this period are often based on secondhand 
observation or myth. The ratio of infantry to cavalry could have been as low as 
ten-to-one, with higher ratios in coastal regions. Thus, Jolof may have had many 
thousands of cavalry and smaller states cavalry in the hundreds, with infantry 
numbering anywhere from the low thousands to tens of thousands in the largest 
Figure 1.4 The Army of Fuuta Tooro, Early 19th Century, Voyage dans l'intérieur de l'Afrique 
aux sources du Sénégal et de la Gambie, by Gaspard-Théodore Mollien  
(Paris: A. Bertrand, 1822). 
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empires.113 One of the earliest examples provides a similar formula of 
organization and warfare to the time under study. In his memoir of the 
Senegambia region, the general administrator and later governor of Gorée Joseph 
Alexandre le Brasseur also concentrated a great deal on the military situation in 
the late 18th century. Le Brasseur was particularly focused on the kingdom of 
Kajoor, probably due to its vicinity to Gorée and importance in providing 
captives for the Atlantic slave trade that passed through the island. He claimed 
that the Damel of Kajoor engaged in raiding and would sell the majority of 
prisoners to the French, and the rest to the Moors in the north of the region in 
exchange for horses.114 
In one of his more interesting chronicles, le Brasseur recounted the history 
of the 16th century military confrontation between the Viceroy of Kajoor, Amari 
Ngooné Sobel Faal, who le Brasseur referred to as Amarigonné, and 
Manguénouka, described as a “slave” of the king “for whom he had a great deal 
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of affection,” and the king of the Wolof states.115 According to le Brasseur, Amari 
Ngooné was challenged by Manguénouka to fight for the throne of Kajoor after a 
particularly humiliating encounter when Amari Ngooné and his army were 
forced to wait for many days for an audience with the sitting Damel, represented 
in the text as Boumenguelé.116 In le Brasseur’s account, Manguénouka challenged 
his lord to return home and amass a larger force, and then to return to overthrow 
Boumenguelé and take the throne for himself. After Amari Ngooné followed 
suit, decamping to return home, Boumenguelé was incensed by this show of 
disloyalty and sent a small detachment in pursuit. The two armies met near 
Kajoor and fought for less than an hour, in which Boumenguelé was killed and 
both Amari Ngooné and Manguénouka were injured. Following the success of 
Amari Ngooné, he named Manguénouka an “alquier,” a vassal of sorts in charge 
of military and political functions. Le Brasseur claimed that the sovereigns of 
Kajoor and Bawol forced their alquiers to mount irons in their home, reminding 
them of their servile status.117 
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Le Brasseur also relayed his contemporary account of a man he referred to 
as Farakaba, a military strategist who shifted the focus of Senegambian forces of 
the region away from raids and ambushes. Instead, Farakaba established an open 
field for his soldiers to undergo regular drills. He also introduced long-term 
strategy: where previously wars lasted less than two days, he held campaigns 
that could go on for more than 40.118 He also formed alliances with other leaders, 
like the Seereer Bur (king) of Siin: though the Seereer ruler in the end failed to 
send the auxiliary troops he promised to Farakaba, he did provide asylum to 
those in the Wolof states who wanted to join his army.119 Farakaba changed the 
waging of war in the region, noted le Brasseur, as the Damel of Kajoor’s 
counterattack also raised a force of 4,000 men to stage a surprise attack against 
him.120 
Slave status men gained high office, particularly in the Wolof states. The 
examples of Manguénouka and Farakaba demonstrate the level to which former 
captives could accumulate territory, amass armies, and influence rulers. Eunice 
Charles notes the distinction in the kingdom of Jolof between the newly-enslaved 
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and systems of hereditary enslavement. Depending on physical location this 
servitude could take many forms, including feudal-like duties or more direct 
contributions to the household. However, the hereditary slave class, like the rest 
of society, had hierarchies, with the royal or military class of former war captives 
ranking at the top.121 
The first state to regularly employ the use of firearms in warfare was 
Bawol, under the Geej dynasty at the end of the 17th century. Its first army was 
“formed around a core of 300-500 musketeers, who exercised in formation.”122 
These men fought on foot and, during the reign of Lat Sukaabe Faal, were able to 
defeat the forces of Kajoor and annex portions of Waalo, though both of those 
states had more horses but less skill with firearms. By the early 19th century, 
Kajoor’s forces were still based around a core infantry regiment, many of whom 
by this era would be carrying flintlock muskets. In the mid-19th century, this 
infantry force would transform into a mounted cavalry unit but its size remained 
steady at around 500-600.123 
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The use of firearms, however, was not a guarantee of victory. In the early 
18th century, polities including the Bambara kingdoms and the people of Khasso, 
both in Eastern Senegambia, were able to protect themselves entirely with bows 
and arrows and sabers. However, the growing use of firearms did lead to a 
change in troop formation, particularly focused on the use of firearms to repel 
cavalry charges. Thus, later in the 18th century, the infantry of Kajoor and Bawol 
deployed in a single line, with cavalry assembled at the rear. The general or king 
made up a rear guard that only deployed if needed. The infantry “advanced at 
will, by platoons, probing enemy lines for weakness, in a system which the 
French observer Doumet, writing in 1769, thought was ‘without order and 
without art.’” Firepower was the main focus to repel oncoming forces, and hand-
to-hand combat was rare.124 It is at present unclear if the breakup of the larger 
Jolof Empire into the states of Waalo and Kajoor and the kingdoms of Saalum 
and Siin led to a rise in raiding parties, whether small or large in scale. As noted 
above, nobles and their entourages played larger and greater parts in the battles 
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of the 18th century. Rulers employed both their own standing armies and relied 
on the troops of the nobility, some of whom may have been war captives, who 
supported their own separate regiments. Some of these men clearly inherited 
their military profession.125 
Mungo Park, writing at the onset of the 19th century, declared that 
“nearly one half” of the Kaartan army was composed of Muslims, and expressed 
concern for his welfare claiming that he could be “taken for a spy” leaving 
Kaarta for rival states. He also described Mandinka men as “very dexterous 
marksmen,” who used bows and arrows but only rarely employed the use of 
poison for their arrows, though they did know how to use it.126 Durand wrote 
that the king of Bundu ordered “several movements” to show one of Durand’s 
French companions, M. Rubault, “the idea of an African battle,” which seems to 
have been in the style of a skirmish and was reportedly “accompanied by 
frightful cries.”127 
                                                 
125 Thornton, Warfare in Atlantic Africa, 37. Another important source for the impact of cavalry and 
the number of horses imported into the region, particularly in Kajoor, Bawol, and Jolof is Webb, 
“The Horse and Slave Trade between the Western Sahara and Senegambia.”  
126 Mungo Park, Travels in the Interior Districts of Africa (London: W. Bulmer and Co., 1799), 97-99, 
280. 
127 Durand, Voyage au Sénégal, 372. 
80 
Archers were more prevalent along the coast and were often armed with 
poisoned arrows. It seems archers were also one element of larger forces that 
included infantry and cavalry and took part in pitched battles. In those battles 
the infantry would form “squadrons and lines” with “shield-bearing infantry in 
the front ranks and on the flanks, with archers shooting over them.”128 These 
formations were typical in the 16th century coastal region. Though the ceɗɗo and 
the nobility in the kingdom of Jolof and its subsequent states are most closely 
identified with cavalry, the Hassani warriors operating from the north bank of 
the Senegal River were also known for horsemanship.129 
When Mollien arrived at the Kajoor village of Gandiolle, a coastal village 
south of Saint Louis, he found that the Damel there following the refusal of the 
inhabitants to provide him 83 captives. Mollien observed that Gandiolle was 
“filled with men on horseback and infantry who came from all the provinces.”130 
Durand wrote that in Waalo, the cavalry was the most impactful division within 
the military. He stated, however, that cavalry and infantry were in charge of 
foraging and pillaging to provide themselves with food and other supplies. In 
one of a number of accounts to make this claim, Durand wrote that military 
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campaigns were decided by one battle, but that the end of the present war might 
be the cause of the next, which could follow in short order.131 The cavalry of 
Waalo declined from between 3,000 and 6,000 in the late 17th century to 2,000 by 
the mid-18th, while the cavalry in Kajoor increased from 300 to between 2,000 
and 3,000 in roughly the same period.132 
In a description of the kingdom of Siin, Demanet described it as having in 
times of war 4,000 infantry and some thousand cavalry. He pointed out in a 
larger context that the kingdoms of the coast were in a perpetual state of war 
over the smallest pretext, particularly the accumulation of “slaves” and items 
including gunpowder and weapons.133 He also provided a general description of 
battles in the region. Armies assembled on the day of battle would be organized 
in lines under a commanding officer, with a rear guard in place for both the 
purpose of a late rally or a retreat. Cavalry formed a second wave, organized by 
platoons, in order to regularly charge the enemy and maintain the ability to 
regroup quickly following each charge. According to Demanet, the cavalry were 
not expected to be a decisive part of battles. Close combat situations for infantry 
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occurred when soldiers fought without firearms, at the length of only “their 
swords, their lances, or their assagais, that they would thrust with as much 
strength as possible.”134 
Demanet wrote that the army was headed by the king, his generals, and 
the court nobility. The general in charge received his orders directly from the 
king and relayed them to the ranks. Kings rarely sought escape even when their 
armies were conquered without an “express order of the General.” Without this 
allowance, the king would be seen as a coward and quickly dethroned, believed 
to be incapable of governance.135 Interestingly, Demanet also claimed that combat 
was completed after one hour. Then the victorious pursued the vanquished and 
took those they captured prisoner, selling them into the Atlantic slave trade 
without exception, even the king, who would either be sold to Europeans or 
ransomed at the discretion of the conquering force. Demanet wrote that infantry 
combat was rare, despite his above claim that cavalry were not a decisive factor 
in battles. Instead, cavalry were important for raids on neighboring kingdoms, 
typically for captives, and the bounty was shared among the soldiers who, 
according to Demanet, would desert en masse if slighted. Following the war and 
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the dissemination of payment, only the king’s guard, about 300 soldiers, would 
remain with their sovereign. This guard was regularly replaced, with each guard 
serving a definitive enlistment period.136 
Though it is not directly addressed, it seems through a discussion of burial 
practices, that most of the armies discussed by Demanet were made up of 
Muslim soldiers.137 Rites of circumcision were tied up in military service as well, 
as an official of the king in the Wolof states was charged with the carrying out of 
the rite, and the ceremony was concluded with the firing of muskets. Further, 
young men were arranged into “garrisons” in the forest after undergoing 
circumcision, and those who were not circumcised could not participate in 
battles.138  
In the militaries of the almamates of Bundu, Fuuta Jalon, and Fuuta Tooro, 
George Brooks mentions the presence of bowmen and cavalry. Though these 
elements certainly were influential in expanding control, conscripts also played a 
part in all major military organizations in the region.139 Surprise attacks in the 
form of protracted raids were common throughout the 16th, 17th, and 18th 
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centuries, particularly for the purpose of accumulating captives and cattle. 
However, these attacks were not always conducted by smaller, nomadic forces 
like those of Northern Senegambia and the modern states of Mauritania and 
Morocco. For example, a raid in 1785 involving the Damel of Kajoor employed 
3,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry. It yielded 30 captives who were sold to pay off a 
debt owed by the ruler of Kajoor to a nomadic king.140 
Demanet claimed that the Damel of Kajoor was often at war with his own 
people, who claimed to live independently from their ruler. In an event 
described by Demanet, in 1763 the Damel surprised many of those who were in 
rebellion against him, confiscating their cattle and taking a large number 
prisoner.141 Those who escaped reassembled and set an ambush for the king’s 
army. The rebels were successful and forced the Damel to return the cattle and 
prisoners he had previously captured. Demanet also claimed that often during 
rebellions, women and children would escape to Gorée while armed men would 
retreat to the Isle de Madeleine, another nearby island, assumedly if they 
believed they did not have the strength in numbers needed for success. Those 
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who were caught, however, were taken prisoner and often sold into the Atlantic 
slave trade.142  
Abdul Kader Kane, the first Almaami of Fuuta Tooro, fought numerous 
jihāds against Waalo, Kajoor, and Bundu in the late 18th century. Boilat wrote 
that during the conflict between Fuuta Tooro and Kajoor, the Damel Amari 
Ngooné Ndeela sent numerous spies against the Almaami of Fuuta. These spies 
were tasked with discovering the route of the Almaami’s forces. The army first 
traveled by land through Waalo in order to avoid crossing the Senegal River. 
Again, this points to the problem many indigenous militaries had with water 
crossings and their low level of interest in developing any kind of marine 
infantry or naval system. In the meantime, the Damel employed scorched earth 
tactics that left Abdul Kader’s army without regular access to water or 
provisions. Thus by the time they reached the borders of Kajoor, they were dying 
of thirst and exhaustion.143 It is likely that many deserted along the route. As 
noted earlier, Boilat claimed that the army at its start numbered 20,000, though 
Lamiral wrote that the Almaami summoned 30,000 men, commanded by 
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“priests,” who for the most part were armed only with bâtons, wooden sticks.144 
The forces of Kajoor attacked at Bounghoye and decimated the Almaami’s army, 
taking Abdul Kader captive. He would live at the court of Kajoor for the next 
three months before being released to return to Fuuta Tooro. To this James 
Johnson adds that Abdul Kader requisitioned troops from Waalo for the 
expedition against Amari Ngooné Ndeela, but the Brak “sent word to the 
Damel” that his forces would defect to Kajoor and fight against the Almaami.145 
Though Amari Ngooné Ndeela enjoyed military success against Abdul 
Kader Kane, he was less successful against the Lebu villages of the Cap Vert 
peninsula. The traveler Mollien wrote that Amari Ngooné Ndeela named one of 
his alkatis “alquier of the peninsula” and instructed him to gather 10,000 horses 
for a cavalry force to send against the inhabitants of Cap Vert. Their response 
was to erect a wall “one quarter of a league east of Dakar” that traversed the 
peninsula from north to south. It was built of stones placed carefully together 
and measured six feet tall and one foot thick.146 The troops of Kajoor camped 
near the fortification though the Damel remained at Rufisque. Mollien claimed 
that the troops of Kajoor were overconfident due to the size of their force and did 
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not post sentries throughout their encampment. As a result, the local population 
rose against them and engaged in a stalking attack while the troops were asleep. 
The severity of the attack, about which unfortunately there are few operational 
details, was enough that the Damel withdrew from the peninsula and “granted 
the rebels peace and independence.”147 
 Mollien, in describing his relationship to his guide and host Fali-Loum, 
wrote of the latter’s desire for ammunition upon Mollien’s departure. Mollien 
noted the regular threat of stalking attacks or raids in the kingdom of Kajoor, 
described as “Damel attacks.” He gave Fali-Loum ammunition for flintlock 
muskets and shortly after his departure found himself and his companions 
surrounded by sentries of a neighboring settlement. These sentries were on alert 
for military parties sent out by the Damel, another example of the prevalence of 
surprise attacks and raids in Kajoor during this time period.148 Mollien wrote that 
stalking attacks, however, were common in Kajoor. Soldiers hid in the brush 
waiting for their enemy’s approach and shot at advancing troops before 
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disappearing further into the undergrowth. These attacks and large-scale battles 
like those mentioned above were most common.149 
 Mollien wrote of the tradition of stalking raids and battles in open 
territory that were fought in the states of the former Jolof Empire. He provided 
two examples from the reign of “one of the predecessors of the Damel” to 
illustrate the warfare common in the region and the professional character of 
soldiers, or proof of their “extraordinary bravery and nobility of soul.”150 First, a 
marabout seeking to join with the Lebu of the Cap Vert peninsula who had “twice 
beaten the troops of the kind of Cayor” unknowingly came upon the troops of 
the Damel near Dakar. His troops were made up of infantry. Ecountering the 
infantry and cavalry of the Damel, they were outnumbered and routed by the 
Kajoor army. In order to avoid capture the marabout set fire to the hut in which 
he had been praying, choosing death over capture.151 
In a second example, Mollien described a prior conflict between the troops 
of Kajoor and Bawol. Again, identifying the involved parties is difficult but it 
seems the soldiers of Bawol were regularly engaging in guerrilla tactics in 
forested areas. They “sought only combat where their cunning and the difficulty 
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of the terrain” granted them advantage over their adversaries. However, having 
been accused of cowardice, the Teen (king) of Bawol ordered his men out of the 
woods to meet the forces of Kajoor in the open. Claiming that they would hold 
their ground instead of seeking “salvation in flight,” the forces of Bawol “filled 
their great breeches with sand and, overpowered by the weight of this burden, 
knelt and prepared to shoot.” The troops of Bawol were destroyed once they ran 
out of ammunition, though according to Mollien Kajoor sustained heavy 
losses.152 
Accounts from military campaigns led by French officers throughout 
Senegambia illuminate the varied concerns of the colonial military and the 
strategies employed against indigenous militaries in the region. Steamboats were 
introduced on the Senegal River beginning at the end of 1819 and, as a result, 
during the high season coastal villages fell in range of French artillery.153 For 
example, Captain Auguste Courau led an expedition to Richard Toll through 
parts of Northern Senegal in May and June of 1828. During his campaign, 
Courau wrote regular reports addressed to Governor Jean Jubelin on a variety of 
topics, many touching on the military situation and incursions in the region. At 
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least part of Courau’s force was supposed to be made up of Senegalese laptots.154 
However, early on in his mission he was still waiting for these laptots to arrive 
from Saint Louis, stating that he believed his forces would be better off with 
these professionals than with “all of the Waalo,” assumedly referring to the men 
available for military campaigns. He was concerned, however, of the neighboring 
communities’ antipathy toward these troops and stated that it might “become 
difficult to obtain the results we desire.”155 Clearly the French had a few allies in 
the region, as Courau asked for 10 guns and 500 cartridges with which to arm the 
inhabitants of Dagana.  
By the time of his mission in the north, Courau had been in Senegambia 
for at least 10 years. This seems to be the first expedition he commanded. At least 
one aim of the operation was to gather intelligence about a French adversary 
Courau refers to only as “Amar.” This is most likely a reference to the Brak Amar 
Mboj, who ruled Waalo during much of the 1810s and 1820s. Courau’s main 
concern about Amar was how many marabouts he had aligned with his kingdom. 
He noted that Amar’s son attacked the ship of an ally of France, killing one laptot 
and wounding another. Noting his suspicion of who could or could not be a true 
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ally, Courau wrote in a letter in late May of 1828 that he had received weapons 
and ammunition, which he would distribute temporarily to marabouts aligned 
with the French. However, he would recoup all weapons before leaving the area 
in order to prevent any guns or ammunition being made available to the troops 
belonging to or allied with Amar.156  
The military situation must have grown tenuous throughout the first half 
of 1828, as on May 29 Governor Jean Jubelin issued a decree that all ammunition 
and firearms were prohibited in Saint Louis and all territories near the Senegal 
River. He also forbade the distribution of weapons and ammunition from Saint 
Louis to “any location on the river.” All ammunition would be placed on board 
ships to ensure its safety and could not be accessed without special permission 
from the governor himself.157  
Courau wrote to inform the governor of the desertion of many of his 
troops, both laptots and allied troops from the Trarza and Waalo-ruled territories. 
Courau viewed these actions as treasonous and vowed to mete out severe 
punishment against those who departed with an enemy force of 1,800 “trained 
and well-armed” men who arrived from Waalo to contend the French 
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encampment.158 Following this event, Courau penned a proposal to the “Emir of 
Darmankour.” In it, he wrote:  
The governor promises to protect those who take up arms against Amar. 
The moment has come and we will protect you. The governor is a man of 
his word. Until the 10th of June the orders of the governor are to respect 
the marabouts to return or travel to Waalo with their tribes…because after 
this day, all protection will be withdrawn from the marabouts who stay on 
the right bank.159 
On June 3rd, Courau wrote again to the governor to express his dismay 
about military engagements against the troops of Waalo and their allies the 
Moors.160 From his base in Richard Toll, he told Jubelin that his suspicions were 
confirmed: one could not have more confidence in the leaders of Waalo than in 
the Moorish confederation. Courau claimed that his initial plan was only to make 
small incursions against the troops of Amar (attaques parcielles), which he also 
referred to as “pillaging,” because he was under the impression that Waalo and 
Moorish troops avoided direct large-scale conflicts, where firepower could be 
decisive. His experience did not prove anything to the contrary, as he saw 
firsthand that enemy troops avoided gunfire.161 Courau was impressed with the 
laptots who remained under his command, claiming that they showed their 
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dedication and proved that they were not trying to avoid the enemy “by 
remaining alone in the desert for 24 hours longer than their allies.” 
Unfortunately, he believed that much of what he brought to the region in terms 
of weaponry and resources had been sold and ended up in the hands of Amar, 
who had a special relationship with the British, and the people of Waalo. He 
reiterated his belief that Waalo troops would not engage with musket fire and his 
hope that alliances could be made with enemies of Waalo to defeat Amar and 
end his reign.162 
Conclusion 
A re-examination of the wars fought in pre-colonial Senegalese kingdoms 
identifies two integral characteristics of Senegambian warfare: the presence of 
warrior elites, known in the former Wolof states as ceɗɗo and in Eastern 
Senegambia as sòfa; and the widespread use of conscription of both free men and 
former war captives in the infantries of the region. Through a further review of 
the characterization of Senegalese soldiers fighting in these various realms as 
“slaves,” it challenges the definition of Senegambian armies as “slave armies” as 
opposed to conscript-based military organizations.   
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CHAPTER TWO: Disciplinaires, Laptots, and the Compagnie Noire: French 
Recruitment Strategies 1800-1850 
INTRODUCTION: THE SEARCH FOR MILITARY MANPOWER 
In the first half of the 19th century, French officials struggled to find 
soldiers to maintain their garrisons in Senegal, much less enough for military 
expeditions in the region and abroad. One major impediment surely was the 
constant turnover of French officials. From France’s return to power at Saint 
Louis and Gorée in 1817 until 1850, Senegal had no less than 22 governors, some 
of whom served for only a few months before succumbing to illness or being 
subjected to removal due to shifts in France’s political landscape. These men, 
many of whom had little knowledge of Senegambia or its inhabitants, were 
unable to provide a coherent action plan for military engagement. In fact, they 
could barely fill the small garrisons they had. 
Militarily, the situation for the French depended greatly on where 
European officers fell regarding the debate between two recruitment strategies: 
first, the creation of multi-ethnic regiments of European and African soldiers; or 
second, the segregation of French and Senegalese troops. Those who recognized 
that the military situation in the region created a number of opportunities for 
Senegalese soldiers generally opted for the first option. Officers who had less 
experience thought that it would be impossible for Europeans and Africans to 
95 
serve together in cohesive companies. Regardless of their position on the 
integration issue, however, all military officials realized the difficulty in 
maintaining forces at French garrisons, even through the process of rachat. 
Soldiers who were conscripted were at times sent far from the regions of their 
birth, but they were not sent so far that they were unable to desert and find their 
way back home. Thus, the most successful French African regiments, from an 
institutional perspective, were the so-called Wolof companies of Cayenne and 
Madagascar. Lessons from these companies would go on to inform French 
military recruitment and training policies as conflict escalated in the region in the 
second half of the 19th century. 
As noted in Chapter One, the first contact between Europeans and the 
residents of Senegambia began through encounters with Portuguese explorers in 
the mid-15th century. France established its first fort in 1659 in Saint Louis, on 
the island of Ndar in the northwest of the region. It built a presence at Gorée in 
1668 when it pried the island from British control. As a result of tumult on the 
continent and in French and British colonies during the revolutionary era, 
European rule through the 18th century was unstable and Saint Louis and Gorée 
passed from British to French control. In 1758, French officials armed free 
Africans who lived near the fort at Saint Louis to help defend against a British 
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attack, though they were ultimately unsuccessful.1 French control was only 
solidified following a final period of British occupation from 1809 to 1817. As a 
demonstration of the slow rise of the French population, there were 231 
Frenchmen in Senegal in 1738. By 1835, though the population as a whole 
increased tenfold in French-held territories, the population of Frenchmen had 
decreased to 151.2 In Saint Louis specifically, the population numbers grew from 
around 2,500 free residents and approximately 2,500 to 3,500 “slaves” in the mid-
1780s to 4,924 free people, 634 indentured laborers, and 6,118 “slaves” in 1835.3  
 The 17th century also saw the rise of European-run trading companies, 
including, most importantly, the Compagnie des Indes and the Compagnie du 
Sénégal. These companies operated trade routes along the Senegal and Gambia 
Rivers and dominated the trade in humans and, later, gum from the Senegal 
River valley. The Compagnie du Sénégal was granted exclusive slave trading 
rights by the French government in 1677, and became part of the Compagnie des 
                                                 
1 Jones, Métis of Senegal, 25. 
2 Klein, “African Traditions of Servitude,” 34. 
3 These population numbers are drawn from Hilary Jones, Métis of Senegal, 30; and Martin A. 
Klein, Slavery and Colonial Rule in French West Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998), 23. 
97 
Indes in 1716. These companies operated independently from the French 
government, but cooperated in many ways in the colonial project.4 
 Slavery was abolished throughout the French Empire in February of 1794, 
ordered by the Republican government. In practice, this had little effect in the 
territories it controlled in Senegambia, which were administered by the Euro-
African community known as habitants. The French colony of Saint Louis was 
made up mostly of servants owned by French officials, Senegalese nobles, and a 
growing métis population of European and African ancestry. The French 
administration in Saint Louis did not generally keep its own servants but, 
instead, rented the service of captives and other dependents from the habitants 
for public works and other needs.5 These métis merchants controlled access to the 
interior and served as intermediaries between French officials and businessmen 
and the indigenous populations of the surrounding states and kingdoms.6  
 French merchant trading and slaving companies like the Compagnie du 
Sénégal provided their own weapons, though they occasionally recruited African 
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soldiers during the 18th century.7 Pruneau de Pommegorge wrote that in the late 
18th century in Saint Louis there were 10 to 12 white sailors, 40 to 50 soldiers, 
some “mulatto” sailors, and 100 to 150 African sailors.8 Lamiral relayed his 
experiences in the Saint Louis region at the same time, addressing in particular 
the military usefulness of indigenous men. When describing the trading habits of 
the habitant community of Saint Louis, Lamiral wrote about the importance of 
taking trips down the Senegal River to trade with nearby kingdoms. For these 
trips, Lamiral suggested “a crew of Blacks, armed by us, who defend themselves 
and defend us much better than the soldiers are able to do, regardless of their 
level of acclimatization.”9 These sailors were most likely laptots, men who served 
in both commercial and military roles.10 The laptot community may have 
originated in the Soninke labor migration.11 Eventually laptots came from 
different ethnolinguistic backgrounds and many were Wolof, or at least Wolof 
speakers. 
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ESSENTIAL AUXILIARIES: LAPTOTS, DISCIPLINAIRES, AND THE FIRST VOLONTAIRES 
 Laptots were wage laborers though many had captive or slave caste 
origins. They served as captains and crew members for business ventures or 
what J. Malcolm Thompson has termed “commercial escort duty.”12 Their 
services were retained for maritime missions during the trade season. These 
undertakings were commissioned by European or métis merchants who needed 
navigators, porters, interpreters, and other intermediaries to engage with 
indigenous brokers on the Senegal River. Due to the unstable nature of European 
political control and the relative strength of commercial ventures in the late 18th 
and early 19th centuries, by the time French rule returned to Saint Louis and 
Gorée, laptots were the major security brokers available for political and military 
missions otherwise staffed by European soldiers. In addition to furthering trade 
relations on the banks of the Senegal River, laptot militia units “provided the 
state with one of its most effective amphibious combat forces.”13 The ship captain 
Scipio, whose travels were relayed in the previous chapter, serves as an example 
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of an individual known to be a former captive and a military leader. He has been 
classified elsewhere as a laptot.14 
 Thompson and James Searing connect laptots and ceɗɗo in relation to their 
status as power brokers and military professionals.15 Both laptots and ceɗɗo men, 
for the most part, were former captives, dependent on their political and 
economic patrons, relationships that allowed them to build their own power 
bases. This may not have earned them prestigious positions in all cases but it 
would have laid the path for the level of autonomy they achieved in the 19th 
century, where many men could not be pressed into service and, in the case of 
laptots, were at times able to attain the same wages as European counterparts. 
 As the French government regained control over Saint Louis and Gorée, 
engaging in the work to build a colony, it brought over French soldiers to 
augment the forces of laptots. These men were typically disciplinaires, men who 
were sent to the colonies as punishment for violating rules of conduct during 
their service, and they experienced a higher mortality rate than other Europeans 
in the region.16 The French military was not the only colonial army to employ 
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penal troops but it did differ from other European forces in important ways, 
particularly in its transition from a dynastic to a meritocratic officer class. Instead 
of purchasing commissions, French officers were promoted based on educational 
or military performance.17 Though it is difficult to draw direct lines of influence, 
this may have made an impact on French ideas about recruitment and promotion 
in the colony. Disciplinaire status did not necessitate a permanent lowly position 
within the military. However, as will be shown later, desertion was a major 
concern even for French men serving in the unfamiliar terrain of Senegambia. 
 There was one major attempt to establish a “volunteer” force in Saint 
Louis in 1803, under the direction of Governor François Blanchot, who served as 
governor of Senegal for the better part of 20 years, from 1787 until his death in 
the colony in 1807. Blanchot, who also served in France’s Africa battalion, 
declared that the habitant community of Saint Louis was responsible for 
providing the territory with men for military service. He proclaimed that the 30 
“volunteers” must be aged 18 to 26, born in Senegal, and able to bear arms and 
speak French.18 This requisition for Blanchot’s volontaires du Sénégal could not 
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have been very popular. Only a few weeks passed before Blanchot authorized 
the mayor of Saint Louis to augment the number of volontaires with men who met 
the expanded age range of 18 to 36, as long as they were not heads of their 
households.19 
 Blanchot did not write much about his decision to institute conscription, 
so it is not possible to know whether he was aware of conscription practices 
already in place in many Senegambian states. Regardless, he made his intentions 
clear that it was a civic duty. He wrote:  
The native habitants of Senegal must finally be persuaded that no one can 
claim the protection of the government and enjoy the rights of citizenship 
without fulfilling the ensuing obligations, and that one who refuses to do 
so declares oneself rebellious and must be treated as an enemy.20   
 Thus, conscription became a part of French recruitment strategies at this 
early stage, when the ideals of the first French Republic were instituted 
throughout its territories. It was the 1791 constitution of the Republic that first 
instituted mandatory service in France for the formation of a national guard. This 
article was further codified in 1794 and conscription was retained as standard 
practice through the Napoleonic era, ending with the restoration of the Bourbon 
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monarchy in 1815. As outlined later in this chapter, this process of enlistment 
would continue throughout the 19th century.   
The original volontaires sénégalais was meant to serve as a small garrison or 
national guard for the European and métis inhabitants of Saint Louis. It is unclear 
whether or not the volontaires ever operated as more than a standing force. They 
were trained to operate the heavy artillery installed at Saint Louis and required 
to participate in regular training, “to exercise every day at the battery” in order 
to prepare for any future attack by European or African troops. Once they 
attained a certain level of discipline, they could train once per week.21 Little is 
known about what became of these volontaires after Blanchot died in 1807, but 
one contemporary author claimed that when British ships arrived to retake Saint 
Louis in 1809 these soldiers deserted instead of defending the habitant 
community on behalf of the French government.22 
When the French returned to Saint Louis and Gorée in 1817, they did so 
with a completely European force. Having abolished slavery in all French-held 
territories in 1794, slavery was legalized once again in 1802 under the reign of 
Napoleon, and would not be abolished in the French Empire until 1848. 
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However, France had openly committed to ending the trade in human beings by 
the time it regained control of Gorée and Saint Louis. Following the spotty record 
and high mortality of disciplinaires, penal troops serving under the French flag, 
colonial officials continued their search for auxiliaries to maintain and expand 
their control. For example, in a letter marked July 31, 1819 Captain Adjutant 
Major Guillet wrote to Governor Julien Schmaltz regarding problems of 
indiscipline among the rank-and-file soldiers under his command.  
However, Guillet was less concerned with the African soldiers under his 
authority and much more worried about the “spirit of insubordination and 
indiscipline” found among the troops of the colonial battalions, which were 
typically made up of disciplinaires troops. Guillet claimed that there were three 
types of men in France who ended up in the colonial battalions: sons who 
brought dishonor and shame to their families, men arrested as disturbers of the 
peace, and corrupt soldiers who proved impervious to punishment and were 
thus banished to the colonies. These were the men Guillet described as forming 
the First Africa Battalion.23 
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Guillet’s concern for the discipline of these troops also entailed 
uncertainties about the officers commanding them, who he thought might have 
difficulty maintaining discipline and avoiding familiarity with rowdy elements. 
In fact, it seems to be familiarity that concerned Guillet the most. He worried that 
corporals and NCOs “remember their origins and maintain, if not openly, at least 
particularly a familiarity with their subordinates, which will always be fatal for 
discipline.”24 This might interfere with their ability to maintain order on behalf of 
the officer class, which Guillet believed was a vital component of a successful 
battalion. Guillet thought the best possibility would be to obtain from the 
Minister of the Navy at least 24 corporals and 12 sergeants from the foreign 
legion.25 Guillet hoped that a patient, firm, and skilled leader might be able to 
force undisciplined troops to develop “good habits” though he despaired they 
would be less likely to adopt “good principles.” Guillet maintained that even if 
these good principles were out of reach, at least “the influence of habit is not 
without strength.”26  
In a note that accompanied Guillet’s letter, the Deputy Director of the 
Corps of Engineers Courtoie wrote specifically about the enlistment of more 
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African troops in the French ranks. Courtoie wanted these soldiers enlisted as 
sapeurs (sappers) so that they could be employed in hybrid roles as soldiers and 
workmen, digging trenches or performing similar building tasks.27 Like most 
rank-and-file of the colonial military, they would be commanded by French 
officers and NCOs within the Engineering Corps. Courtoie hoped the French 
would be able to recruit two full companies of 100 men a piece for the 1st Africa 
Battalion. These men would be put to work primarily building forts for French 
outposts throughout the colony. Courtoie also requested that their rations be 
equal to those of Senegalese laptots, putting them on equal footing in terms of 
payment and food costs.28 
RACHAT AND EARLY FRENCH ATTEMPTS AT CONSCRIPTION 
One solution to the colonial administration’s quandary was the employ of 
engagés à temps, African indentured laborers acquired through the process of 
rachat.29 Rachat, literally “redemption” but often translated as “ransom,” was 
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employed by French administrators and merchants to “redeem” men from 
captivity. In fact, men who were purchased from slave brokers or directly from 
their patrons were immediately enlisted in a burgeoning colonial military to 
serve terms of up to 14 years. As Martin Klein has written, the official French 
policy in the rachat system was to “free the slaves of their enemies, but to deny a 
refuge to the slaves of their allies.”30 Rachat transactions often dictated a period of 
indentured servitude followed by emancipation though, in reality, most people 
bought and sold through the process of rachat were captives in all but name.31  
In this way rachat was also a reiteration of the earlier conscription of the 
servants of the habitant community under Governor Blanchot at the outset of the 
19th century. It is possible that the French during at least the early period of 
rachat were purchasing the majority of these men from the upper Senegal River, 
the territory between Bakel and Médine, in the former kingdom of Galam, where 
men were available due to a number of jihāds raging in Eastern Senegambia.32 
These men regularly deserted French officers claimed that the recruits showed 
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little discipline or enthusiasm in acquiring military training.33 It is also possible 
that these men simply placed low importance on serving French interests and, 
due to their knowledge of the physical terrain, were able to return home 
relatively easily.  
Either way, in 1819 the Governor of Senegal, Captain Julien Schmaltz, 
expressed his concerns about the possibility for French recruitment in Senegal. 
Writing to Minister of the Navy and Colonies Pierre-Barthélémy Portal, Schmaltz 
referenced prior “volunteer” forces but complained that “it would be possible to 
recruit some men of color and free Blacks in Saint Louis, but in very small 
numbers.” Instead, he wrote, “the only means to form Black companies is to 
purchase (racheter) slaves and to free them following an enlistment of 10 to 12 
years.”34 Schmaltz echoed the requests of Guillet and Courtoie to replace the 2nd 
battalion of French soldiers with two African companies of 100 men each. He 
also repeated Courtoie’s argument that these men should be organized similarly 
to sappers due to “the Blacks of this part of African being intelligent and likely to 
learn in a short period of time the trades of masons, carpenters, joiners, 
blacksmiths, etc.”35 
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Assumedly his request to the minister was granted. Eight months later 
Schmaltz ordered Commander Hubert at Gorée to buy up to 30 men for military 
service up to the cost of 400 francs per person. These men were to make up the 
garrison at the fort at Galam, near Bakel.36 Shortly thereafter, Schmaltz was 
replaced as governor by Captain Louis-Jean-Baptiste Le Coupé. In October of 
1820, Le Coupé reported the strength of the Africa battalion as 383 men, 23 of 
whom were Africans recruited from the colony. He wrote Portal that: 
Blacks who have been racheté to serve as engagés are those who almost all 
speak different languages; resultantly, it is very difficult to instruct them 
and to put them in a position to be good at something. They are, 
moreover, almost all of a mature age…less susceptible to bend themselves 
to new uses, to embrace a trade and attach themselves to it. Six of them 
who were sent to Galam have already deserted and it is possible that we 
will lose others in the same manner…We can, however, encounter among 
them the qualities necessary to make good soldiers, but before being able 
to serve at a post, we must put them in a position to understand the 
instructions they must observe.37 
 Two years later the number of African soldiers at the garrison at Bakel 
was down to 14.38 This problem would have been of great concern to both 
colonial administrators and military personnel, as the Galam fort was the most 
dangerous for Europeans. Deep in the interior of Senegambia, in an area endemic 
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with malaria and other mosquito-borne illnesses, for many French soldiers the 
posting was equivalent to a death sentence. In 1825, the detachment sent to Bakel 
had a very small number of Europeans, among them two sergeants, four 
corporals, and two musketeers (fusiliers), along with an African drummer and 18 
African soldiers.39 Governor Roger, who returned to that position at the end of 
1825, instructed the Commander at Gorée to engage in rachat for up to 10 “young 
slaves of 14 to 18 years of age” and declared his intention “to attach these young 
men to the battalion and then to train them as drummers and soldiers to recruit 
other Black soldiers.” They were to serve 14 year terms of enlistment.40 
 It seems no matter how high or low French colonial officials set the age 
bar for enlistment, they could not retain Senegalese soldiers for the garrisons at 
Gorée, Saint Louis, and Galam. Roger wrote to the Commander of Gorée in late 
1826 and early 1827 that men who were forcibly conscripted through rachat were 
not long for French military service. This problem was not specific to any 
particular fort, as Roger lamented two soldiers, one from Bawol, and one from 
Siin, were racheté from Gorée, transported to Saint Louis and incorporated in the 
battalion. Shortly after their arrival, the new “recruits” deserted with weapons 
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and equipment, which led the governor to argue that any man over the age of 14 
would have to be racheté from beyond the Gambia River Basin.41 
Later in April of 1827, Minister of the Navy and Colonies Christophe de 
Chabrol wrote to the interim governor of Senegal, Hyacinthe-Benjamin 
Gerbidon, regarding the formation of an African battalion. Gerbidon was 
charged with the examination of the “native population” to discover the 
recruitment situation for a special battalion of around 600 men, with one part 
serving in the colony of Senegal, and the rest spread between French Guyana 
(Cayenne) and Madagascar.42 Among the questions Chabrol hoped Gerbidon 
would answer were: the possibilities of a reduction of European troops, whether 
European troops should be dissolved into the African battalions, whether 
African troops could serve as corporals and NCOs (there was no doubt that 
Europeans should retain all officer positions), what incentives might be offered 
to African recruits serving in Senegal versus those who would serve far from 
home, and a strategy for annual recruitment. Further topics of interest concerned 
rations, equipment, uniforms, pensions, and the duration of service. In the 
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formulation and solicitation of ideas for the regulation of this force, there were 
very few definite goals or set ideas.43  
 In May of 1828, the commission developed an initial report to advise the 
government on “the dress, equipment, arms, rations, payment, and bedding for 
Black soldiers incorporated into the 1st battalion of the 16th light infantry 
regiment.”44 One strategy suggested to ensure what the committee called the 
“accountability” of soldiers was to provide for “a certain number of women” 
who would be charged with food preparation for the indigenous troops. The 
French believed it to be “impossible” to charge the soldiers with food 
preparation themselves, which would be against their manners and customs. 
French officials also believed that the presence of women, who would be 
excluded from the men’s barracks, would be amenable to “surveillance and the 
maintenance of discipline” for Senegalese troops.45  
Though the commission first declared that the arms and equipment for 
Africans would be “the same as that of white soldiers,” it asked for one possible 
change to armaments for Senegalese soldiers. The commission proposed that 
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African infantrymen would, instead of a standard order infantry musket, carry 
one “surmounted with a long bayonet.”46 The reason given for this change was 
that a bayonet-mounted musket “is more appropriate than the other, in the type 
of war common” to the region. The report continued to note that the 
musket/bayonet combination favored the “agility” of the African troops, which 
was of high importance for these tirailleurs, who would find themselves “in every 
attack against the natives who never present themselves in line.”47 This is a clear 
reference to the preferred mode of attack in the region, where troops engaged in 
asymmetrical warfare instead of pitched battles fought on an agreed upon 
battlefield.     
The report of May 1828 also claimed there would be financial incentives 
for the French to maintain a majority African force. At the end of the report, the 
tallied costs for a European soldier came to 539 francs and 25 centimes versus 313 
francs and 51 centimes for an African soldier. The commission report was signed 
by Governor Jean Jubelin, as well as Commissaire of the Navy Gaultier de la 
Ferrière and Sous-Commissaire of the Navy Roussin.48  
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 The following month the colonial government of Governor Jubelin 
released a subsequent report to address the topics discussed in the May 1828 
commission study. The report was issued following a meeting on June 4, 1828 to 
lay out a framework for the recruitment, training, and policies regarding a new 
African force, as yet unnamed.49 French officials continued to refer to it in 
abstract as the “compagnie de noirs,” literally the “Black company.” In 11 articles, 
the colonial government led by Governor Jubelin envisioned the future of the 
company. It featured several key points: first, the company would require a 
“special cadre” of officers for the company. Until this special cadre had been 
identified and trained, officers assigned to lead the new troops would come from 
the 3rd company of the 1st battalion of the 16th light infantry. They would be 
outfitted with the same weapons as European troops, though their payment 
would be lower, at 20 centimes per day for infantry, and 25 centimes for 
corporals. There is no mention of different equipment to be carried by these 
troops, a subject referenced in the May commission report. Rations allotments for 
the proposed company included rice, salt, fresh meat, and brandy. Troops who 
entered from pre-existing companies would stay at their current rates and 
rations. Only those who joined the battalion following May 1, 1828 would be 
                                                 
49 “Code du Sénégal,” no. 101, June 5, 1828, Sénégal XVI 3, ANOM. 
115 
subjected to the terms outlined above. Again, there was no mention of providing 
women to cook for these troops, as mentioned in previous commission reports.50  
 It does not seem that many of these questions were answered or concerns 
met. By the early 1830s, government officials in France and its colony were still 
discussing a possible framework for African troops under French authority. The 
process of rachat was also threatened by British ships in the region that were 
patrolling the waters for clandestine slave trading and the transport of enslaved 
persons. One proposition to circumvent British detection was proposed by Baron 
d’Haussez, who served as minister of the navy and colonies from 1829 to 1830. 
D’Haussez requested two companies of African soldiers from Senegal for 
military service in Madagascar. He expressed a desire to pursue this process of 
conscription on the Senegal River to avoid detection on the Gambia River and its 
tributaries. The minister also suggested that though government agents could 
conduct the trade themselves, they might consider using the Compagnie de 
Galam as an intermediary.51 
 Governor Brou’s response to the request for soldiers provides a clue as to 
contemporary methods of recruitment and perhaps a greater understanding of 
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Senegalese military culture. It was unfortunate, Governor Brou communicated, 
that the minister had not written him sooner: 
Our business would have been even more beautiful had your excellency’s 
orders reached me two months earlier; instead of two, I could have 
formed six beautiful companies without spending a cent, using prisoners 
that I had or had made at M’Bilor and that I got rid of in order to avoid the 
responsibility for feeding them. This deportation, moreover, would have 
had a marvelous effect on the aborigines and, once alienated from their 
country, these men would have been safer and of better service than new 
Blacks.52  
RECRUITMENT THROUGH CONQUEST: THE VOLONTAIRES METHOD 
 The Battle of M’Bilor referenced by Governor Brue took place in early 
1830. In his account of the conflict, Captain Antoine Vène of the engineering 
corps described the military situation from 1828 to 1830. He wrote about the 
small army made up of Africans from Saint Louis and Waalo, and some 
European troops, formed under Governor Jubelin in 1828. This army staged an 
attack against the troops of Waalo, managing to capture camels, oxen, and 
around 100 captives who they transported back to Saint Louis.53 Two years later, 
the Muslim prophet Moïse II raised a jihādist force in the territory of Waalo, 
amassing a force so large that the Brak of Waalo felt threatened enough to flee to 
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Saint Louis and ask the government for help. The current governor, Pierre-
Édouard Brou, ordered Captain Quesnel to arm three ships: the Serpent, the 
Autruche, and the Actif. Quesnel was to take an expedition of the 16th light 
infantry and 150 laptots and confront the troops of Moïse II. Vène noted that the 
laptots were commanded by “two native chiefs” he called Byrame-Cohou and 
Manbaye. Leading up to the Battle of M’Bilor, Brou’s army encountered the 
brothers Ziégler, European traders stationed near Dagana. Vène wrote that the 
brothers requested a few Europeans to reinforce their own “Black soldiers.”54  
Prior to the assault, a number of chiefs from Waalo as well as the Sëriñ of 
Dagana arranged a meeting with Brou to discuss a joint military assault.55 The 
Waalo chiefs and Eliman Boubacar, the chef du canton of Dimar, who led the 
troops, had at their disposal 300 cavalry and 600 to 700 infantrymen; these troops 
were to lay in wait near M’Bilor, closing off any escape route following a French-
led frontal assault. However, following morning prayers the following day, a 
great number of troops from Waalo, Dimar, and Dagana, particularly the 
infantrymen, refused to march into battle against Moïse II. Instead, Boubacar and 
the chiefs of Waalo set out only with their “own slaves” to demonstrate good 
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faith.56 Arriving near M’Bilor, the laptot commanders Byrame-Cohou and 
Manbaye instructed their soldiers to assemble in a firing column, though their 
success was hampered by “the poor quality of their muskets.”57  
 The experiences of Vène leading up to and following the Battle of M’Bilor 
show the importance of the employ of indigenous troops on all sides, as well as 
the control exercised by members of the infantry who chose not to march against 
Moïse II. Clearly these men did not live in fear of their leaders, providing reason 
to believe they may have been professional soldiers who had little to gain from 
this battle. Those who did stay with the chiefs of Waalo were captives, possibly 
ceɗɗo, and the great heroes of the day were the laptot commanders Byrame and 
Manbaye. French officers were able to fully depend on their Senegalese troops 
for professionalism and discipline. There is little reason to believe any of these 
traits were adopted from French military training, which had not yet been 
standardized for West Africa. It is more likely they were conscripts or 
professional soldiers. 
 In his correspondence to France, Governor Brou was clearly aware of the 
practice of the forced reenlistment of defeated soldiers into victorious armies in 
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the region. In fact, he lamented his inability to engage in the practice himself, and 
France’s loss of talented troops who would need less training than fresh recruits. 
Having received the minister’s communiqué too late, Brou was unable to benefit 
from “French” success at M’Bilor, and would have to search elsewhere for troops 
for the Madagascar expedition. At the same time, the former governor of 
Senegal, Jean Jubelin, requested Senegalese soldiers for a garrison in the French 
colony of Cayenne. On July 16, 1830, Baron d’Haussez, the minister of the navy 
and colonies, ordered one company of African soldiers into the battalion of the 
16th light infantry in Senegal, and the second company to Cayenne.58 
 Vène, who published an account of the Battle of M’Bilor, penned a report 
regarding the organization of “native troops” in 1831. In his commentary, he 
posed three major questions: the first related to the supply of rations for African 
troops; the second purpose was to examine the benefits or problems with 
integrating European and African troops into the same companies, or 
maintaining separate companies for each group; and finally, a two part question 
regarding the arming and equipment of soldiers determined by the local order of 
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July 12, 1830, and one regarding the treatment of African soldiers already serving 
in French forces in Senegal.59 
 In one of many observations by French colonial officials recognizing the 
importance of Islam for Senegalese people in general, but soldiers in particular, 
the report acknowledged that Muslim soldiers in large part abstained from 
drinking their rations of brandy. However, Vène did not suggest that this ration 
be eliminated because this was not the case for all African soldiers in the force. 
Instead, Vène focused his concern on another staple of Senegalese consumption: 
millet. Vène described a difference in consumption habits between laptots and 
“Black soldiers,“ writing how “the laptots of St. Louis usually live on millet,” but 
this was not the same case for African soldiers, “who in large part prefer rice 
which has been a lifetime staple.”60 Though the question of serving soldiers 
millet versus rice may seem to be a small issue, it is one way to demonstrate the 
level of understanding that military officers had for their Senegalese troops. 
Though difficult to know with any certainty, this awareness could have led to 
greater cooperation between officers and the rank-and-file soldiers under their 
command. 
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Seemingly unrelated to troop movements or drills, Vène had another 
reason for rationing rice instead of millet: the sound of the mortars and pestles 
used by the women who cooked for the troops. According to Vène, “the mortar 
and pestles would be dangerous in the presence of the enemy as a result of the 
loud, resounding noise they make…this loud noise renders it impossible for 
troops to move in secret.”61 Thus Vène had a dual purpose for this argument. 
First, in order for troops to better conceal their movements, it would be better to 
switch from millet to rice. And second, switching to rice afforded the French 
military the possibility of preparing their own rations, instead of depending on 
women living nearby for meal preparation. Indeed, Vène thought that moving 
from millet to rice would allow the Senegalese troops to “imitate European 
soldiers, preparing their rations themselves or having a cook responsible for the 
prepared food.”62  
 Another major issue addressed by Vène in the report of March 1831 dealt 
with the integration of African soldiers and European troops in the companies 
that would constitute the new battalion. According to Vène, “it seemed natural at 
the time where Blacks were a small number” to divide them between European 
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companies, “but it should no longer continue now that they [African soldiers] are 
the majority.” Instead, Vène gave three reasons for his argument to segregate 
European and African infantry: diet, health, and uniforms.63 Due to differences in 
uniforms and the rations assigned to French versus Senegalese troops, Vène 
claimed it would be impractical to fully integrate the companies of the newly 
constituted battalion.  
Evident throughout the French documentary record, one major upside to 
using African troops instead of European was seen to be the economic benefits. 
One of those benefits was to adopt cheaper uniforms for the Senegalese troops in 
West Africa. However, this would be “disagreeable” and “unsightly,” according 
to Vène, if the troops were integrated throughout the force.64 Vène’s argument 
about uniforms delved much deeper than a simple question of economics. 
Instead, his main concern dealt with group cohesion and the view of African 
soldiers by Europeans and vice versa: 
Though the Black in the state of slavery is reduced to the condition of a 
domesticated animal, he still maintains a sense of pride, which he 
manifests all the times that force cannot repress it. It is this sentiment that 
slavery itself susceptible to. Do you think it can be stifled by the Black to 
whom you have given weapons? Do you think that he will see without 
being offended, the periodic recycling of the clothes abandoned by the 
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[European] soldiers, who considers these soldiers like slaves, the kind 
whose position is fixed by their birth and therefore exist below him, 
because he is nothing but a slave or a prisoner of war.65  
 Instead, Vène contended, the colonial military should avoid dressing 
Senegalese soldiers in French hand-me-down uniforms, instead assigning these 
new troops uniforms similar to those worn by African soldiers in Madagascar, 
with possible adjustments for differences in climates between the two zones. The 
difference in uniforms went hand in hand with the difference in diet for 
Senegalese troops, and Vène argued that it would be expensive and inconvenient 
to provide for two different sets of daily meals in order to accommodate both 
French and Senegalese preferences. From a health standpoint, Vène claimed that 
it would be dangerous to have European troops as the sole guards at French forts 
and posts along the Senegal River. Instead he suggested that men from different 
companies should be furnished to these posts, where the “mixing of diverse 
companies” would both benefit “discipline” and provide for “good service.”66  
Later in his report, Vène reiterated his suggestion that European troops 
should be “concentrated in one or two companies without integrating Black 
troops.” Instead, African troops would be joined together, regardless of whether 
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they previously served alongside Europeans in earlier iterations of the French 
colonial army. Further, these European companies would be stationed at Gorée 
instead of Saint Louis “where the mortality rate is much more considerable.” 
Vène noted that mortality rates in Saint Louis from 1825 to 1828 were one-in-five 
for European soldiers (84 out of 100 survived during that time), whereas in Gorée 
the rate was closer to one-in-twelve.67 Vène did not mention the mortality rate at 
Galam, but it would likely have been even higher. 
 The final issue considered by Vène was the treatment of Senegalese 
soldiers who were currently serving alongside European troops. Vène was in 
disagreement with the current minister of the navy, Admiral Henri de Rigny, 
claiming that French troops, “should be considered a particular type of elite 
troop” when compared to the troops of the new force. This same minister had 
apparently voiced concerns that moving seasoned troops into the new companies 
would “frustrate their hopes and their expectations of the rights they had 
acquired and perhaps even give rise to claims that it was unwise to bring up.”68 
Vène vehemently disagreed with this assessment, stating that “without 
exception” all African troops should be combined into new, segregated 
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companies within the new battalion, and that European troops would serve 
together, again in one or two companies that would be stationed at Gorée.  
Vène claimed that he understood the point of the current governor of 
Senegal, Thomas Renault de Saint-Germain, that there would be pushback 
against stationing the vast majority of European soldiers at Gorée, but that it was 
a necessary move, continuing to stress the importance of climate and health in 
his decision making process. It seemed that, further, Governor Saint-Germain 
had not yet seen Gorée, and Vène hoped to give him a better understanding of 
the island when he came to see it with “his own eyes.” Though it might be an 
unpopular choice, Vène wrote, he hoped that the governor would come to agree 
with him on this point once the fort was finished.69  
 As in previous reports, Vène aimed to give an assessment of how much 
money would be saved by increased recruitment and employment of Senegalese 
troops instead of the continued reliance on European soldiers. Vène engaged in a 
lengthy comparison of the costs of rations, uniforms, wages, etc. for both African 
and European troops. For European troops, Vène used the 16th light infantry as a 
touchstone for the cost of maintaining French troops in Senegal. According to 
Vène, European troops cost a total of 700 francs per soldier. In contrast, African 
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soldiers at the time cost a total of 342 francs and 69 centimes per year. With the 
changes in uniforms and rations advocated by Vène and those who agreed with 
his assessment, each Senegalese soldier would only cost the French government 
245 francs and 84 centimes per year.70  
 A report to King Louis Philippe I in 1832, written by Minister of the Navy 
de Rigny, also took up the importance of replacing European soldiers with 
African soldiers, again mostly for health reasons. Doing so, the minister wrote, 
was “in the interest of humanity” due in large part to the danger of continuing to 
expose European soldiers to the “insalubrious” climate of France’s Senegalese 
territories.71 According to de Rigny, who served as minister of the navy and 
colonies for a brief period in 1830 and then from March of 1831 until April of 
1834, the French currently had 115 African soldiers composing half an infantry 
battalion that together with 68 artillerymen made up a Senegalese garrison. De 
Rigny noted that troops raised on the African continent were also carrying out 
missions and guarding French possessions in Madagascar and Cayenne.72 
 De Rigny reiterated the typical talking points by those who advocated for 
the replacement of European troops with African counterparts. The advantage, 
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he wrote, was twofold: first, fewer French soldiers would lose their lives; second, 
the lower cost of African troops would allow the Department of the Navy to cut 
costs without losing manpower in France’s colonial garrisons. He also mentioned 
the French recruitment strategy of using soldiers bought through the rachat 
system. For example, he noted that “the Black company found at Cayenne was 
established in Senegal in 1830 and 1831, by means of buying slaves from 
captivity and enlisting them as French soldiers upon the purchase of their 
freedom.” The total expenditure for the freedom of these men, their uniforms, 
and equipment totaled 65,624 francs and 70 centimes.73  
 In a letter to Governor of Senegal Louis Pujol in January of 1835, three 
officers who would later constitute the administrative council for the new 
battalion laid out their concerns.74 Following 18 months of conflict against the 
kingdom of Waalo and the Trarza Moors, they put forward a number of 
observations. Concerned about expenses and accounting responsibilities, they 
relayed their worry that there were not enough European officers to fully staff 
the four companies serving in Senegal. “It often happens,” they wrote, “that 
because of the number of officers stationed on the river, companies are left 
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without leaders. In this case, who is liable for errors or miscalculations that might 
slip into the accounts?”75   
 Further, they expressed concern that the difficulties for European rank-
and-file were at least as extreme as those for the officer class, with soldiers 
serving in guard units for extended periods of time. They urged the formation of 
a fifth company, staffed only by African men, to augment the four companies of 
Europeans currently serving. Though it was important for African soldiers to 
serve separately, the officers wrote that they should have the same weapons as 
European troops, and be organized in similar fashion, though their payment and 
rations would be a lower rate, tied to the amount of a yearly local tariff.76  
 Similar to de Rigny’s report, in June of 1835 the minister of the navy and 
colonies, Admiral Guy-Victor Duperré, wrote to Governor Pujol about “Yoloff 
soldiers” who were to be stationed throughout French-held territories.77 He 
ordered the majority of Wolof soldiers in Madagascar to return to Gorée, though 
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25 of these men would make up a detachment to be sent to Cayenne.78 Duperré 
noted that there were 113 “Wolof” soldiers currently stationed in Sainte Marie, 
Madagascar who were recruited in Senegal in 1827 for 14 year enlistments. 
Though they were still six years from the end of their enlistment periods, most 
would be reassigned to Senegal. The minister allowed that the Governor of 
Bourbon (Réunion) would be allowed to retain the service of 15 to 20 men if there 
were a real necessity for their continued presence in the colony.79 
 In his response to the minister, Governor Pujol wrote that of 93 possible 
Wolof soldiers returning to Gorée, only 90 disembarked from Madagascar. Of 
that number, only 83 were available for service upon their return to Senegal. He 
also noted that a setback had taken place, presumably one of the regular military 
conflicts between the French and indigenous troops in the region. “War, illness, 
and desertions” reduced troop numbers from 105 to 85, requiring the entire 
Madagascar contingent of “Wolof” soldiers to remain in Senegal. Pujol pleaded 
with the admiral to keep the “Wolof” soldiers for an increase in the “native 
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detachment” of 150 men despite his complaint that the men were poorly trained, 
though in good health.80  
 Throughout the month of March 1836, a number of colonial officials 
convened a discussion on the organization of a “special company of natives in 
Senegal.” Civilian and military leaders, including Governor Pujol, Deputy 
Commissioner of the Navy Guillet, and Captain Girardot of the 2nd naval 
regiment all took part. The materials discussed were studies prepared by Guillet 
and Infantry Captain Caille, but many of the ideas regarding recruitment of 
indigenous soldiers into the French force came from Montagnies de la Roque, a 
trader (négociant) and council member who would later serve as governor of 
Senegal. In particular, de la Roque proposed to add to the means of recruitment a 
process tantamount to rachat: conscription.81 
 The draft for those considering this subject was prepared by Guillet 
following the arrival of a number of African soldiers from Madagascar and the 
concern of where to assign them upon their return. Another group of soldiers, 
making up the 3rd naval regiment, also had to be taken into consideration for 
reassignment, particularly as these integrated companies contained both 
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Senegalese and European soldiers. Writing on behalf of the colonial government 
of Senegal, Governor Pujol laid out the reassignment of Senegalese and French 
soldiers within the colonial forces. These soldiers would be segregated going 
forward, with the Europeans of the 3rd company moved to the 1st and 2nd 
companies, and the African soldiers from the 1st and 2nd companies serving 
solely in the 3rd company, but continuing under the command of European 
officers. The 3rd company would then be renamed the “Special Company of 
Senegal.”82 
 The next missive from Governor Pujol, No. 47, dated March 30, 1836, 
detailed the proposed organizational design for the newly reorganized troops. 
Pujol first referred to a ministerial decree from a full year earlier: March 6, 1835. 
This dispatch declared that it would be advantageous to assign all indigenous 
soldiers to a special company “for the regulation for [military] service, the 
discipline, and the development of instruction for the native soldiers.” Military 
officers who authored the informing reports claimed that it was difficult for 
Senegalese soldiers to serve in European companies because of their different 
lifestyles. This seems to have been a major impetus to designate a special “native 
                                                 
82 “No. 46,” March 21, 1836, Sénégal XVI 3, ANOM. 
132 
company” where African soldiers could, at least to a degree, maintain similar 
dietary and religious practices to those they engaged in the non-military sphere.83 
 The newly created compagnie du Sénégal would bring together men from 
the 2nd naval regiment stationed in Senegal and those arriving from 
Madagascar. The company would be made up of 187 men in total: Europeans 
would serve as captain, lieutenant, 2nd lieutenant, and sergeant major; five 
Europeans and one Senegalese man would serve as sergeants; seven Europeans 
and five Senegalese men would serve as corporals; infantry troops, denoted here 
as fusiliers (musketeers), would be entirely Senegalese and number 160 in total. 
French officers, NCOs, and corporals would be drawn from the 2nd naval 
regiment in Senegal, presumably due to their prior engagement with Senegalese 
troops. Their final appointment, however, would depend on the decision of the 
governor of Senegal, Louis Pujol.84 
 Articles 5, 6, and 7 of the official report discussed the always thorny issue 
of recruitment. Despite a variety of efforts made by French military officials, 
voluntary recruitment into Senegal’s Naval regiments failed to provide enough 
troops to meet quotas. In addition to voluntary enrollments of seven years, 
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Article 5 declared that “recruits” from the interior gained through ransom 
(rançonnés) would serve 14-year terms. Though described as “ransom,” there is 
little practical difference between the ransom process and rachat-style 
recruitment. Regardless of origin and system of enrollment, new recruits were to 
be between 18 and 25 years of age and at least one meter and five centimeters 
(five feet, one inch) tall. In addition to these requirements, the government 
would establish a commission to delineate “required qualities to perform proper 
military service.”85 Once admitted into the compagnie du Sénégal, recruits would 
take an oath of allegiance. Colonial officials agreed that oaths would be taken on 
a Bible by those men who professed Christianity, but all non-Christians would 
take their oaths on the Qur’an before a Tamsir. Tamsirs (occasionally, tafsir) 
provided exegeses of the Qur’an, serving as interpreters of its meaning.86   
 Senegalese soldiers would be kitted out in blue, red, and gray, and wear 
shoes without nails, which would prevent rust and the deterioration of their 
footwear in wet environments. They were to be provided with a musket with 
bayonet attachment (1822 model), ammunition, and loading and cleaning 
materials for their muskets. Corporals and NCOs would also receive infantry 
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swords. All muskets, bayonets, and swords were to be marked with numbers. 
Replacements would receive the numbered weapon of soldiers who were killed 
in battle, died from disease, or deserted. Thus, each weapon could always be 
accounted for, lest one soldier or another decide to try to sell their musket for 
money or other goods.87 To further protect these weapons from general 
circulation, those without current though temporary owners and those belonging 
to men in the hospital would be kept in the depot, under care of the 2nd naval 
regiment’s gunsmith. The gunsmith would also be in charge of any maintenance 
or repair concerns.88 
 An attached report written by Captain Guillet, who had at this point been 
in and out of Senegal since at least 1819, around 17 years, and was serving as 
deputy commissioner of the navy, explained in further detail his reasoning for 
the above considerations. Though its subject was “Report on the organization of 
a special native company in Senegal,” Guillet began with a brief mention of the 
African soldiers who recently returned from Madagascar, members of one of the 
aforementioned “Yoloff” companies. Those soldiers, who returned on the small 
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warship la Nièvre, numbered 85 in total. One man deserted in Madagascar and 
one died on the journey back.  
 According to Guillet, the arrival of these men in Senegal seemed to mark 
the beginning of the special company’s formation, where these men would adopt 
“a discipline, a mode of dress, quartering, and a dietary regime in harmony with 
the customs of their civilian lives.”89 Guillet believed that the soldiers would now 
have their own ésprit de corps, released from serving within European companies 
where they were “condemned to humiliating comparisons to an isolation that 
harms their zeal and the development of their intelligence.” Guillet also claimed 
that the prejudice against Black soldiers in the European companies led African 
soldiers to seek out more subordinate roles in order to escape this scorn and 
ridicule, and that the special company would lead to “a more rapid advancement 
of the civilizing of Black soldiers.”90 
 The one major obstacle to the creation of the special company was the 
expression of what Guillet claimed were “isolated opinions” that concentrating 
power and weapons in the hands of Africans could make it easier for an uprising 
against the French in Senegal. This fear was not shared by Guillet, who believed 
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Senegalese people to be “very gentle and highly flexible.” More importantly, 
Guillet pointed out, there was no guarantee that Senegalese soldiers would be 
any less dangerous divided up into three companies than if they were 
concentrated in one. Instead, he noted that this belief was a result of the failure of 
civilians to understand the daily realities of Senegalese soldiers’ lives. For 
example, Senegalese soldiers were already occupying the same quarters, despite 
serving in different companies, due to the different sleeping arrangements set 
out by the French colonial military. Thus, they were “constantly isolated from the 
culture of European soldiers.”91 
 Guillet also claimed that any revolt would be easily put down due to the 
relationships the French colonial government had established with, as he put it, 
“the chiefs of the north and the south, men for the most part honest and 
courageous, who exert an absolute influence over the entirety of the Black 
population.”92 Guillet then relayed the regulations Captain Caille prepared for 
the committee’s deliberation. Caille based his decisions about the breakdown of 
recruitment practices, uniforms, and diet; and on the general regulations of the 
French navy and the continental army, with special consideration of local needs 
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in Senegal. The argument about recruitment seems to have stemmed from 
Caille’s acknowledgement that recruiting soldiers from the interior of Senegal 
worked in the past, and that this recruitment method was no less useful in 
Senegal than in French Guyana or its “Indian” holdings. Guillet and Caille 
claimed that the colonial military could not rely on voluntary enlistment, and 
that the interior recruitment method was “entirely appropriate” for the 
Senegalese population.93  
 Despite the terminology, “recruitment from the interior” truly meant the 
process of rachat, purchasing or “ransoming” captives and enlisting them directly 
in French forces.94 The argument put forth by Caille and Guillet in their report 
seemed to be directed towards future conversations with abolitionists or those 
hostile to the French colonial project. The officers claimed that the rachat system 
“has nothing that does not agree with the most enlightened philanthropy, as it 
wrests the unfortunates from slavery in order to confer upon them the status of 
free men after a certain term of military service.”95 They also threatened that any 
renunciation of what they argued to be “the only means of recruitment 
practicable today” would hamper the strength of the company of Cayenne, 
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which could only be recruited from Senegal. Once all companies were at full 
strength, however, the colonial military could reconsider its approach to 
“recruitment.” Finally, the authors hoped that the ongoing recruitment of 
Senegalese troops would lead to broader voluntary enlistment by laptots, 
Senegalese sailors serving in various capacities throughout the Saint Louis region 
in particular. Guillet and Caille believed that the changes in lifestyle proposed 
for the special company would lead laptots to find commonalities with 
Senegalese soldiers. Though unmentioned here, laptots also tended to command 
higher wages than infantry, so assumedly newer laptot recruits into the French 
colonial military would perform the same work but at a lower cost.96 
 Finally, the report reiterated the importance of having new conscripts 
swear their oath of allegiance on the Qur’an. Again this was important to French 
officials, many of whom believed similarly to the authors that Muslims would 
not be bound by any oath sworn without their most holy text. A later clause on 
promotions declared that Senegalese soldiers should be promoted to fill all NCO 
positions once they attained the military and educational training laid out by the 
colonial military.97 
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 The report submitted by Guillet and Caille described the importance of 
the proper outfitting of Senegalese soldiers. The style of dress they envisioned 
was based on the uniforms adopted by the “Wolof” company in Cayenne, 
though it is possible that similar uniforms were worn by the other known 
“Wolof” company of this time period, serving in Madagascar. Quoting a report 
from August 28, 1834, the authors repeated the administration’s belief that 
changing certain aspects of the continental uniform was both in the interest of the 
soldiers and that of the French treasury department. Thus Senegalese troops 
would wear blue pants instead of the pantalon garance, the bright red trousers 
that signaled a French soldier’s presence. The 1834 report also suggested 
replacing the schako, the heavy helmet worn by continental soldiers, with a small 
cap similar to those worn by soldiers in Algeria. Guillet and Caille also suggested 
the issuing of the most manageable arms and equipment.98 
 The French military in Senegal had at least some success recruiting 
African men in the years following. From 1836 to 1839, the company increased 
from 150 to 200 men, and reached 181 by 1842. By that year, Senegalese soldiers 
were stationed in Saint Louis, Bakel, and Gorée, but also Richard Toll and 
Dagana, on the Senegal River in the north of the region, and at Sédhiou, on the 
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Casamance River in the south. Governor Montagnies de la Roque lamented the 
state of affairs, however, complaining the firearm most men were equipped with, 
the 1777 Charleville musket, was of poor service to them. He was also concerned 
about the mortality of Africans from “the highlands” who he claimed were dying 
at a high rate in Saint Louis as a result of the sudden change in climate and diet.99 
 Despite a variety of claimed attempts at creating a better environment for 
Senegalese soldiers, desertions continued to plague the French colonial 
establishment. Under Governor Pons Guillaume Bazile Charmasson de Puylaval, 
who would go from Senegal to serve as governor of French Guyana, the French 
government in Senegal ordered greater punishment for deserters and higher 
rewards for those who caught them. In an emission put out with incoming 
interim Governor Pageot des Noutières, Governor Charmasson described the 
payments for the capture of deserters of the engagés à temps, who were worth two 
guineas for any person who stopped them and brought them back to Saint Louis. 
The authors wrote that this measure should have the effect of “preventing the 
desertions that for some time have recommenced with a high frequency.”100 The 
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governor declared that the costs would be recorded and the practice of payment, 
similar to the payment for the return of runaway slaves in the United States.101 
 Desertion was also a concern of the subsequent governor, Édouard Bouët-
Willaumez, a lieutenant commander in the French navy, who assumed office in 
1843. Early in his tenure, he expressed great concern with the state of affairs in 
Senegal and with the paltry number of African soldiers at French garrisons. He 
claimed that those soldiers enlisted from the upper Senegal River, the area 
between Bakel and Médine, were “unintelligent, clumsy, apathetic” men and 
complained that they suffered from illness once stationed in Saint Louis at least 
as often as Europeans.102 Governor Bouët-Willaumez complained of the ease with 
which captives from Kajoor and Waalo deserted, stating that in a recent event 
one-third of the African soldiers at the new garrison at Mérinaghen, located 
northeast of Louga, “fled into the Fouta, with weapons and equipment.” Bouët-
Willaumez proposed studying the situation to discover whether, 
among the laptots of Saint Louis, there are any willing to join a company of 
Yoloffs, based on the Zouave troops. For these troops, no barracks, no 
Prussian exercises, the Zouave uniform…a daily payment of one franc, 
enlistments of three years, the ability to live with their families on the 
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island and the certainty of manning its garrison exclusively, except in the 
case of river expeditions.103   
 It does not seem that any of these suggestions were followed up with 
action at the time, though following the institution of the tirailleurs sénégalais 
many of these ideas would be implemented to great success. Instead, in the 
1840s, French officials continued to struggle with the rachat process and the 
search for African troops for their growing garrisons in Senegambia. 
 In 1843, Field Marshal Rostolant wrote a report on the “native company.” 
Within this report he described the problems of “Black soldiers” in Cayenne, and 
stated that they were afflicted by the same problems as the “compagnie d’indigène” 
in Senegal. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the “Wolof” company of 
Cayenne was first installed under the former governor of Senegal Jean Jubelin in 
1830. The problems, according to Rostolant, were that the officers in charge of the 
forces regularly changed, preventing the building of trust from the soldiers 
under these assumedly European officers’ command. Instead, Rostolant 
suggested that “acclimatized” officers should be assigned to the “native 
regiments” for long-term assignments, which would allow them to be able to 
understand how to best lead the men under their authority. He also wrote of the 
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importance of training African troops in order to reserve European regiments for 
moments of grave danger when he believed they would be more effective.104 
 In the opinion of Rostolant, one of the best practices for the colonial 
military going forward was to treat soldiers of African descent in a similar 
manner to European soldiers. He noted the problems inherent, for example, in 
the treatment of some African soldiers as little more than planters’ slaves in 
uniforms, particularly in the countryside. As Rostolant put it: 
How can these soldiers be persuaded that Blacks and whites must all 
contribute to the same goal and hold no prejudices except against a 
common enemy, when they see with what difference the Black soldiers are 
treated in every respect: dress, lodgings, category of service, meals, 
respect, surveillance.105 
 Rostolant also expressed his belief that African soldiers should be trained 
in the same manner as European troops. He argued that the companies of 
African soldiers should be reorganized and drilled in infantry maneuvers. He felt 
in particular that it was important for these men to receive instruction at the école 
des tirailleurs, in methods of drill and basic instruction. Rostolant believed that 
such a group of trained African soldiers, 300 in total, who received the 
aforementioned instruction and were commanded by an energetic captain 
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acclimatized to the environment and society in which he operated could 
maintain strategic routes and waterways in Cayenne. This would allow for 
European troops to remain on alert but otherwise function as reserves, only put 
on active duty during moments of crisis.106 
 Another request for Senegalese soldiers came in July of 1845 from French-
administered territory in Gabon. A letter of response was sent to the minister of 
commerce and agriculture from Rear Admiral Jean-Baptiste Montagnies de la 
Roque. De la Roque, who previously served a short stint as governor of Senegal, 
wrote that it would be virtually impossible for the French government to send 
troops to Gabon. The initial request asked for enough men to double the size of 
the force in Gabon. After a change in leadership in Senegal, the government 
believed it could not spare a man, having been previously but no longer 
provided 100 “recruits” per year by the Galam Company. This exemplifies the 
ongoing importance of Senegalese troops not only in Senegal but throughout 
French colonial holdings in Africa and beyond.107  
 Despite an increase in the request for troops from the region for 
campaigns in Senegambia and overseas, French officials continued to make little 
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headway and in 1848 they were challenged by another governmental shift 
coming from Paris: a reinstitution of the abolition of slavery in all French-
administered territories. The most concerning aspect of abolition for 
administrators in Senegal was Article Seven, which stated that any slave would 
be liberated once he set foot on French soil, including that of French colonial 
territories like Saint Louis. However, the abolition of the slave trade and 
subsequent emancipation did not end local demand in Senegal for captives. 
French officials were confronted with the difficulty of conforming to French 
policy and preserving good relations with the ruling classes of Senegal, many of 
whom were dependent on servants and captives in their households and 
kingdoms.108  
 The 1848 decree negatively affected the lives of the habitant community of 
African and Euro-African traders whose “wealth was heavily invested in 
slavery.”109 Thus, abolition undermined their dominant status in the Saint Louis 
community and diminished their power over the social order. However, after 
abolition the habitants retained power because they owned both large quantities 
of land and the majority of the colony’s ships and construction equipment. 
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Therefore, though their servants were nominally free, they generally remained 
with their patrons, resulting in little change in the social order.110  
 In relation to recruitment and conscription, the 1848 abolition decree was 
a matter of concern to the governor of Senegal, Captain Auguste Baudin, who 
wrote to the colonial administration in France that it would impede the official 
policy of rachat. Naively, Baudin felt that it would be possible to gain recruits 
from within the free population of Saint Louis as long as they were treated 
similarly to European soldiers, claiming that this enlistment could lead to the 
formation of three companies of 120 men under the command of French officers 
and NCOs.111 However, just over one year later it seemed Baudin had taken a 
more measured approach to recruitment policies. In a response to the abolitionist 
politician Victor Schœlcher, Baudin wrote that Senegalese soldiers would not eat 
European rations. Instead, they would “sell or exchange them for millet, their 
typical diet, which results in embarrassment and disorder.”112 Further, many 
“Muslim” soldiers refused their wine rations, though some preferred brandy and 
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others drank only water. Baudin also believed that some men took advantage of 
the new French policy on abolition. He wrote: 
A large number of captives approached Lieutenant Colonel Ducheau, 
promising that as soon as they were freed, they would enlist as soldiers if 
we were to treat them in the same manner as the whites…But they did not 
follow through with these good intentions and once they received their 
freedom, they fully returned to their complete repulsion for soldiering.113 
 Only one month later Governor Baudin expressed his conviction that the 
entire Muslim population would rather “leave the country than be subjected to 
the rules of the barracks and the military uniform.”114 Indeed, Baudin had 
already received threats from political and military leaders throughout the 
region regarding the abolition of slavery and the possible violent outcomes of the 
institution of this practice in French territories. Kajoor and Waalo had threatened 
war against French outposts if the abolition decree was carried out in all the forts 
under its control.115 Though Baudin tried to mitigate the situation, the military 
situation in Senegambia, resulting from threats in Kajoor and Waalo and in the 
jihādist movement rising in Fuuta Tooro, was becoming tenuous for French 
political operatives, the subject of the following chapter. 
                                                 
113 Baudin to Schœlcher, September 5, 1849, ANS. 
114 Auguste Baudin to the Minister of the Navy and Colonies Victor Destutt de Tracy, October 8, 
1849, 2 B 30, ANS. 
115 Klein, Slavery and Colonial Rule, 27. 
148 
Conclusion 
Failed French attempts to provide enough European soldiers for its 
missions in the region forcused on the use of disciplinaires, penal troops sent to 
the colonies as penance for their crimes. More successful endeavors involved the 
recruitment of laptots, who were in a certain manner the first Senegalese recruits 
into the predecessors of the tirailleurs sénégalais force. French officers continued 
the difficult search for African soldiers, particularly for the compagnie noire. 
However, due to constant manpower shortages, the colonial military relied on 
auxiliary Senegalese troops for military success for its small campaigns in the 
first half of the 19th century.  
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CHAPTER THREE: The Struggle for Military Supremacy, 1850-1880  
“The environs of Saint Louis furnish for our expeditions volontaires who are accustomed 
to the country and cause less worry than if we were to replace them with an equal 
number of regular troops. This custom, used first near the capital, has been imitated at 
other outposts of our possessions in Senegal, and we see that wherever it is instituted, the 
governor rallies on the spot a certain number of auxiliaries.”1 
 
“During the war with Cayor [Kajoor]…I did not hesitate to send against our enemies 
masses of volontaires. The situation has become very dangerous for it. The volontaires are 
undisciplined, they do nothing but what they desire.”2 
 
INTRODUCTION: A REGION AT WAR 
The second half of the 19th century was a tumultuous period for the states 
of Senegambia. Kajoor was engaged in a civil war starting in roughly 1860, while 
Fuuta Tooro was enmeshed in a struggle for control between the Muslim 
prophet Al-Hajj Umar Taal and its current political leadership. Both of these 
widespread and long ranging conflicts were greatly impacted by the rising 
interference of a French colonial government with an imperialist resolve. France 
annexed Waalo and parts of Fuuta Tooro in the 1850s and 1860s, mainly through 
treaties, but French control over these territories was only maintained through 
                                                 
1 F. Hugonnet, “Sénégal: Guerres et Expéditions Militaires de 1855 à 1861,” Le Spectateur Militaire 
35 (1861): 70-90, 76-77. 
2 Governor Faidherbe, “Solution donnée à quelques difficultés politiques soulevées par la guerre 
du Cayor,” March 21, 1864, Sénégal IV 47, ANOM.  
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the payment of tribute to local authorities and nobility. However, sustained 
control of the waterways and advances in tropical medicine made it possible for 
Europeans to travel further into the interior beginning in the 19th century, with 
at least some French personnel using quinine as a malaria prophylactic in the 
1840s.3 
 Despite manpower deficiencies and a lack of resources, in 1852 the 
Ministry of the Navy authorized French incursions on the banks of the Senegal 
River.4 The control of the Senegal River trade would allow French colonial forces 
to penetrate further into the interior of the “Western Soudan,” what is today 
Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. To staff these missions, however, the French 
government needed an exponential increase in military personnel and the 
capabilities to confront and outdo their indigenous adversaries. In preparation, 
Governor Louis Léon César Faidherbe, one of the architects of the French 
imperialist mission who was appointed to that position in 1854, hired 
interpreters from among prominent Muslims living in Saint Louis. French 
officials in Saint Louis adopted Arabic as their official language of 
                                                 
3 Curtin, Economic Change, 129. On the importance of medical advances in malaria prophylaxis for 
the project of imperialism, see Daniel R. Headrick, Power over Peoples: Technology, Environments, 
and Western Imperialism, 1400 to the Present (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 226-
237. 
4 Thompson, “Colonial Policy and Family Life,”425- 430. 
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communication with Senegambian rulers.5 They would also co-opt a number of 
military strategies from both allies and enemies. 
                                                 
5 Tamba M’Bayo, Muslim Interpreters in Colonial Senegal, 1850-1920 (New York: Lexington Books, 
2016), 3. 
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Figure 3.1 Governor Louis Léon César Faidherbe, pictured in Den Ka ̈mpfern im Krieg und Sieg, 
by Julius Krais (Tu ̈bingen: F. Fues, 1877). 
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One factor that seems to have played a major part in French success or 
failure in its military campaigns in Senegambia is access to and control of the 
Senegal River.6 Despite the difficulty of the “extreme heat” and the “rare 
availability of means of transport,” one contemporary author wrote that the 
French were able to achieve particular success due to “the practice of war in this 
part of Africa.” He claimed that it was possible to carry out military missions by 
using the river, “which bypasses the territories against which it is necessary to 
act,” providing “an easy and quick way to transport a small number of troops.”7  
Though firearms of growing lethality were manufactured throughout the 
course of the 19th century, their employ in battle was not preordained, with 
many European officers and military traditions focused around cavalry charges 
and a combination of infantry tactics that used firearms but, more commonly, 
bayonets to deliver the final blow to the enemy.8 Beginning in the mid-19th 
century, major advances in military technology led to the development of breech-
loading rifles in the 1860s, magazine rifles in the 1880s, smokeless powder in 
                                                 
6 Headrick, Power over Peoples, 213. See also Ousmane Traoré, “State Control and Regulation of 
Commerce on the Waterways and Coast of Senegambia, ca. 1500-1800,” in Navigating African 
Maritime History, edited by Carina E. Ray and Jeremy Rich, 57-80 (St. John’s, Newfoundland: 
International Maritime Economic History Association, 2009). 
7 F. Hugonnet. “Sénégal: Guerres et Expéditions Militaires de 1855 à 1861,” Le Spectateur Militaire 
35 (1861): 70-90, 76-77. 
8 John Ellis, The Social History of the Machine Gun (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1975), 50. 
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1885, and rapid-fire artillery in the 1890s.9 French approaches to military 
technology shifted slightly following the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 to 1871, 
when the French army released its crank-operated machine gun, the Montigny 
mitrailleuse. Despite their deployment of this weapon, however, French officers 
were unable to use it to their advantage, outmatched by Prussian artillery.10 In 
fact, the French army did not regularly employ machine guns until 1910, long 
after the bulk of its Africa campaigns were over.11 
Scholars who have addressed the development and adoption of firearms 
in West Africa have argued that, for the most part, weapons technology was not 
a decisive factor in 19th century conflicts, though there is some debate over the 
possibility that rapid-fire rifles made more of an impact in the 1890s and the first 
decade of the 20th century.12 One difficulty for researchers is the use of vague 
terms employed by officials and travelers in the region, who often referred to the 
                                                 
9 Ellis, Social History, 51. 
10 Ellis, Social History, 63-64. 
11 Ellis, Social History, 113. 
12 Gavin White, “Firearms in Africa: An Introduction,” Journal of African History 12, no. 2 (1971): 
173-184, 173; Barton C. Hacker, “Firearms, Horses, and Slave Soldiers: The Military History of 
African Slavery,” Icon 14 (2008): 62-83, 65 and 71. For an overview of the firearms trade in 
Senegambia and French attempts to control access to these weapons, see Sokhna Sané, “Guerres 
de conquête et contrôle de la circulation des armes à feu et des munitions en Afrique Occidentale 
sous domination française (1834–1903),” French Colonial History 9 (2008): 175-190; and Sokhna 
Sané, Le contrôle des armes à feu en Afrique occidentale française, 1834-1958 (Paris: Karthala, 2008). 
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guns carried by indigenous troops as fusils or mousquets.13 This broad 
characterization of firearms can make it difficult to pinpoint which weapons 
were in use during conflicts in the region. For the most part, French forces and 
their African counterparts were using smoothbore muskets from their 
introduction through much of the 19th century. In the French military, they were 
phased out between the 1820s and the 1840s as European militaries came to 
adopt rifles, so named for the “rifling” process that creates grooves in the bore 
walls, improving the precision and range of the weapon. By the inauguration of 
the tirailleurs sénégalais force in 1857, rifled guns were in use throughout the 
French Empire.14 
Breech-loading rifles went into production in the mid-19th century, and 
the French military adopted the breechloader known as the Chassepot in 1866 
and the Gras rifle in 1874, a breechloader that incorporated a metal cartridge.15 
Magazine rifles were introduced between 1886 and 1893. The Lebel 1886 model 
was the first rifle to utilize a small bore and smokeless powder. It was updated in 
                                                 
13 Occasionally these accounts use identifiable terms like fusils à pierre, carabines, and arquebuses. 
The weapons mentioned in this chapter have been identified as specifically as possible. 
14 Nouveau dictionnaire militaire par un comité d’officiers de toutes arms sous la direction d’un 
officier supérieur (Paris: L. Baudoin, 1892), 334. 
15 White, “Firearms in Africa,”177-178; Sané, Le contrôle des armes à feu, 27; Nouveau dictionnaire 
militaire, 335. Chassepot and Gras rifles are also referred to as fusil modèle 1866 and fusil modèle 
1874, respectively. 
156 
1893.16 In Europe the trajectory of the adoption of these weapons is relatively 
easy to trace. In Senegambia it is difficult to identify when certain firearms were 
shipped into the region, even for French forces, much less when they were 
adopted by African troops in Senegambian states. For example, following an 
inspection in 1869, the report declared that the military installation at Saint Louis 
“would soon receive instruments for the inspection of Model 1866 rifles.”17 It 
does not reference how many rifles were in the armory or whether any of these 
weapons were already in use.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 White, “Firearms in Africa,”177-178; Sané, Le contrôle des armes à feu, 27; Nouveau dictionnaire 
militaire, 335-337. 
17 “Inspection Générale de l’Artillerie en 1869,” February 15, 1870, 5 D 6, ANS. 
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VOLONTAIRES AND THE FRENCH IMPERIAL PROJECT 
As will be noted throughout this chapter, the French military post-1854, 
similar to its previous iteration during the less expansionist period preceding it, 
was highly dependent on auxiliary forces known as volontaires. In his history of 
Senegambia, titled simply Le Sénégal, Governor Louis Faidherbe would later 
write about the French decision to use auxiliary troops against the larger forces 
of France’s African adversaries along the banks of the Senegal River and 
subsequent campaigns against the inland states of Kajoor, Siin, and Saalum. 
Figure 3.2 Map of the Populations of Senegambia, 19th Century, in Esquisses sénégalaises: 
physionomie du pays, peuplades, commerce, religions…, by Abbé David Boilat  
(Paris: P. Bertrand, 1853). 
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These volontaires, “volunteers,” should not be confused with those mentioned in 
Chapter Two, conscripts raised by the habitant community of Saint Louis for its 
defense against British and Senegalese troops. In Faidherbe’s account of French 
military organization leading up to the Battle of M’Bilor in 1830, for example, he 
wrote that volontaires were “people from Saint Louis” who “helped the governors 
on their expeditions.”18 As detailed throughout this chapter, they clearly served 
more as mercenary forces of auxiliaries to smaller French-led columns of infantry 
and cavalry, and were compensated for their service.  
Faidherbe wrote that in his discussions with the leaders of volontaires 
forces in the 1850s, “they were made to understand that they could no longer, as 
in the past, haggle over their aid” and further, “they would not be allowed to 
discuss any further expedition” prior to their completion of the task at hand.19 
Faidherbe also lauded their service, noting that “they showed all the proper 
obedience…showed courage and devotion in many circumstances, and rendered 
very good service, especially in skirmishes.”20 Though many of these 
“volunteers” may have been from the environs of Saint Louis at the onset of the 
                                                 
18 Louis Léon César Faidherbe, Le Sénégal: la France dans l’Afrique occidentale (Paris: Hachette, 
1889), 128. 
19 Faidherbe, Le Sénégal, 128. 
20 Faidherbe, Le Sénégal, 128. 
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1850s, this process expanded throughout Senegambia in the 1850s and 1860s. 
One author claimed that volontaires were “accustomed to the country and caused 
less worry than ‘regular troops.’” Further, though the process began near Saint 
Louis, he wrote that it had “been imitated at other outposts of our possessions in 
Senegal and we see that wherever it is instituted, the governor rallies on the spot 
a certain number of auxiliaries.”21  
An account by Captain Auguste Baudin exemplifies this practice. In 1849, 
Baudin, both governor of Senegal and a captain of the French navy, led an 
expedition to Fanaye in Northern Senegal, roughly halfway between Richard 
Toll and Podor. In the extant documents from his mission, it is clear that the 
majority of his troops were Senegalese men, including laptots and volontaires 
sénégalais. In a list of “natives” who were injured taking the town of Fanaye, 
many of the names of these soldiers are written as one word entries: Macandet, 
Alsandaney, Thoumané, though some, like Demba Diop, are rendered with first 
and last names. This makes it difficult to identify the possible ethnolinguistic 
background of each man, or learn whether or not some may have had familial 
ties or shared hometowns.22 A separate manifest lists the troop strength and the 
                                                 
21 F. Hugonnet. “Sénégal: Guerres et Expéditions Militaires de 1855 à 1861,” Le Spectateur Militaire 
35 (1861): 70-90, 77. 
22 Capitaine commandant de la premiere colonne to Auguste Baudin, July 21, 1849, 1 D 4, ANS. 
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divisions of Senegalese troops fighting with the French: laptots du nord, laptots du 
sud, Bambaras, laptots de Guet N’Dar, volontaires, Peuls.23 In addition, each of the 
above designations had its own African leader, listed as chefs de laptots, “laptot 
chiefs.” Finally, two interpreters accompanied the troops: “Baka Diaye” for the 
north and “Baka Sar” for the south. One notable distinction is that all laptots were 
assigned “native rations,” la ration d’indigènes, while the laptot commanders and 
the volontaires were to receive European rations, la ration d’Européens.24 A review 
of the manifest shows that laptots greatly outnumbered volontaires in the 
expeditionary force: the three sections of laptots numbered 67, 81, and 32, for a 
total of 180; one group of 34 “Bambaras”; and 33 volontaires. 
Following the military engagement against the town of Fanaye in July of 
1849, the commanding officer, Captain Deyris, wrote a report to sum up the 
events that took place.25 Fanaye was at this time located in Dimar, a territory 
inhabited by both Wolof and Tukulor peoples and bordered by Waalo and Fuuta 
Tooro. According to Deyris, it had been multiple decades since a previous 
expedition against Dimar ended with the destruction of French forces at the 
                                                 
23 Guet N’dar is a reference to an area near the French settlement at Saint Louis, known in Senegal 
by its pre-colonial name: Ndar. 
24 “L’aviso à vapeur l’Erèbe,” July 13, 1849, 1 D 4, ANS. 
25 Captain Deyris to Governor Auguste Baudin, July 26, 1849, 1 D 4, ANS. 
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hands of the inhabitants of the region. In the ensuing years, the French focused 
on the river for transit and did not make an effort to return to land-based routes. 
Deyris claimed that this caused the residents of Dimar to become overconfident 
and believe that “their aggression would go unpunished.” So much so that they 
sent a formal challenge to the French colonial government, writing that the 
French were too weak to resist the people of Dimar and only had enough 
courage to remain vigilant on their ships.26  
According to Captain Deyris, this was insult enough for the people of 
Saint Louis, who rose to support the colonial troops. These men vowed to 
“avenge the death of their fathers,” and 300 asked for arms to engage the forces 
of Dimar. As noted in the manifest, soldiers and military professionals identified 
in the expedition enlisted volontaires, “Bambaras,” and laptots that Deyris referred 
to as “national guard” units from the north, south, and Guet N’Dar, a 
neighborhood of Saint Louis that exists today. Deyris wrote that the 3rd naval 
infantry (366 men), spahi cavalry (44 men), and a naval artillery unit (36 men) also 
took part in the expedition. He totaled the number of combatants at 739, with 10 
non-combatants including surgeons and nurses. 
                                                 
26 Deyris to Baudin, July 26, 1849, ANS. 
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After their journey, Deyris claimed they managed to conceal their artillery 
from the enemy. The pieces of artillery were hidden from view by four columns 
of soldiers led by cavalry. The four columns were joined on each side by two 
additional columns of “Senegalese.”27 These “tirailleurs,” as Deyris described 
them, flanked the bulk of the force in case it was necessary to signal to the 
porters and reserve troops at the rear of the formation. Two plans of attack were 
formulated by then Captain of the Engineering Corps Émile Pinet-Laprade, who 
would later serve as governor of Senegal from 1865 until 1869. French 
reconnaissance had shown that to outsiders the town of Fanaye had a 
labyrinthine appearance, with narrow passageways that crisscrossed each other, 
often culminating in dead ends. In preparation for a French attack, Deyris 
claimed, the people of Fanaye built a narrow bridge across the lower Senegal 
River. However, the bridge was not yet fully complete. To further fortify their 
town, its inhabitants dug ditches and created wooden barricades with 
intermittent breaks in the barriers to facilitate their own fire against invaders. 
Finally, the chiefs of neighboring towns and villages sent their elite warriors to 
support the troops of Fanaye.28  
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The French began their attack with fire from two obusiers, smoothbore 
cannons often referred to elsewhere as Howitzers. The hope was that the 
opening salvo would set some of the houses, built mainly of earth and straw, on 
fire and fill the air with smoke, forcing the residents of Fanaye to leave their 
fortified town and face French troops head on. Instead, Fanaye’s inhabitants held 
their ground and laid down heavy fire against the French allied forces, calling 
out to the invading force and challenging them with “high pitched cries.”29 One 
flank of tirailleurs skirted the river bed around the side of the town in order to 
surprise the enemy, while the main body of troops advanced against incoming 
volleys. The artillery continued to have little effect on the troops of Fanaye. 
Deyris claimed that frustration with the soldiers’ ability to hold out against the 
French and their allies led their troops to attempt to tear down the barricades 
while under fire from the town, complicating the artillery assault. Pinet-Laprade 
then attempted to re-engage the cannons, but was shot in the leg in the process.  
It seems that at this point, the movement of French-allied troops caused 
some of the soldiers in Fanaye to believe that their attackers were initiating a 
retreat, and the defenders of Fanaye came out from behind their fortifications in 
order to pursue the tirailleurs that made up the bulk of the force. This led Pinet-
                                                 
29 Deyris to Baudin, July 26, 1849, ANS. 
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Laprade and his second in command, Captain Masson, to order a column to 
breach the palisades built around the town.30 The tirailleurs managed to overrun 
the town’s fortifications. Soldiers and other inhabitants of Fanaye attempted a 
retreat by way of the bridge they had begun building prior to the attack. French-
allied combatants fired directly on the fleeing troops, including with their 
artillery, and the escaping residents attempted to swim or otherwise make it 
across the water, in which countless drowned. The river was menacing and the 
water level high enough that the cavalry were unable to pursue those fleeing 
Fanaye. Upon its desertion, French-allied troops set fire to the town, and Deyris 
clocked the engagement at two and a half hours.31   
Interestingly, Deyris then noted that the sénégalais auxiliaries refused to 
agree to Pinet-Laprade’s plan to pursue the retreating defenders of Fanaye and 
continue the military campaign against other areas of Dimar. Their 
representatives told the commanding officer that “they had taken up arms only 
to avenge the death of their fathers and to punish the insolence of a populace that 
defied the head of the colony.”32 These Senegalese soldiers claimed that their 
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31 Deyris to Baudin, July 26, 1849, ANS. 
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actions had provided a rough lesson to the inhabitants of the region that proved 
the superiority of the tirailleurs-led forces. They said further that if anyone else in 
the region was “audacious” enough to permit further insults against their troops, 
they would return en masse with their allies, who would number at least 500 to 
600 more. Pinet-Laprade and other French officers presumably had little option 
but to accept this message from the men supposedly under their command, 
though the record here goes silent and we know only that the commanding 
officers and French allies returned to Saint Louis.33 
 In another report on military readiness in Fuuta Tooro, describing the 
situation at Podor in early 1854, the author wrote that European troops were 
armed with both muskets (fusils) and rifles (carabines). As noted in the previous 
chapter, at this point the core of French troops were still made up of European 
soldiers, though this expedition included 74 “natives,” 300 volontaires, and 150 
laptots. Eight companies of infantry totaled 750 men, comprised of 646 European 
troops and the 74 African soldiers mentioned above. A number of European 
tirailleurs were armed with rifles.34  
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In a short note a few months later, Commander Ropert, who held the 
interesting title “commandant des volontaires,” commander of the “volunteers,” 
wrote that he was authorizing passage from Podor for a number of troops. These 
men were identified as volontaires with different geographical and ethnic 
affiliations: “du Nord,” from the North; “du Sud,” from the South; Bambara; Peul; 
de Guett N’dar; de la Fatimata.35 In a report on the state of the fort at Podor shortly 
thereafter, Ropert gave the following numbers for troop strength for the 
volontaires under his command: 100 Nord; 100 Sud; 50 2eme Arrivage, “second 
arrival,” which seems to correlate to those referred to earlier as “Fatimata”; 47 
Guet’-n’-dar; 44 Bambaras; 17 Peuls.36 The fragmentary record does not grant full 
access to the details of these men’s enlistment and their positions within French 
forces. However, there is no delineation between “ordinary” volontaires and 
officers, which may mean that these volontaires in particular were not led by 
indigenous officers, or simply that this detail was not a matter of importance to 
the French commanding officer.  
                                                 
35 Commandant des volontaires Ropert, ”Camp de Podor,” April 25, 1854, 1 D 7, ANS. Fatimata 
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The growing French presence in Northern Senegal and the construction of 
the fort at Podor led to tensions with the inhabitants of the region, culminating in 
a number of conflicts in the first half of 1854. In the official French account, the 
Annales Sénégalaises, the Battle of Dialmatch illuminated aspects of the French 
victory and its dependence on volontaires to secure its success.37 The fort at Podor 
was finished on May 1, 1854, under the command of Louis Faidherbe. The 
governor at the time, Auguste-Léopold Protet, left Saint Louis to inspect the fort 
and to counter Tukulor resistance in the Fuuta Tooro polity of Dimar. Tukulor 
forces had taken a French officer prisoner and threatened to kill him if Governor 
Protet marched on Dialmatch.  
In response, forces from Saint Louis landed at Fanaye on May 6. The 
troops marched over land to Dialmatch, near Podor, which the chroniclers 
claimed was “reputed to be impregnable.”38 Around 2000 defenders armed with 
muskets manned the battlements, assisted by two cannons. The French also had 
                                                 
37 Annales Sénégalaises de 1854 à 1885, suivies des traités passés avec les indigènes. Ouvrage Publié avec 
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some measure of artillery which they used to attack the fortifications. Infantry 
gathered to form assault columns. Incendiary shells set off a few fires but the 
French continued to receive regular salvos from the defenders of the city.  
Volontaires from Saint Louis allied with the French advanced on the 
fortification, firing muskets, but were unable to “dislodge the defenders.”39 Fifty 
volontaires were killed before they withdrew from their advance. In the 
meantime, the French infantry assembled around 200 meters from the tata 
(fortification) and advanced in three columns under heavy fire.40 Halfway there 
they paused, and a number of infantry from the center column continued to the 
tata in an attempt to breach its walls. Soon after, more troops pressed forward 
and eventually managed to overtake the walls of the structure. In the process, the 
French and their allies lost 175 men out of 600.41 
The report of the captain of the naval infantry, a man called Colomb, 
described the battle similarly but was less vague about its intended purpose. 
Colomb wrote that a major cause for the conflict was the French colonial 
military’s desire to “extend the reputation” of French armaments, and to strike a 
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41 Annales Sénégalais, 3-4. 
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decisive victory against the inhabitants of the region, lest it lead to further 
assaults on French officers and military installations along the Senegal River.42 
Colomb wrote that the French troops were made up of two battalions of naval 
infantry and fantassins, regular infantry; a squadron of spahis, Senegalese cavalry; 
and an unknown number of volontaires. The French, according to Colomb, also 
brought four obusiers to fire on the tata of Dialmatch. Otherwise, the battle 
proceeded similarly to its description in the Annales: three columns advanced on 
the tata under heavy fire, the French artillery was unable to do more than cause 
some small fires, and Dialmatch’s defenders had two cannons that they used to 
fire on French and allied troops.  
There is a slight discrepancy between the numbers provided in the 
Annales and those of Colomb, who claimed that Dialmatch was defended by 
around 3000 men, not 2000, and that the French had 650 regular troops in 
addition to cavalry and volontaires. After the European soldiers and their African 
allies breached the walls of the tata, Colomb wrote, the cavalry advanced on the 
fleeing defenders of the city. Spahi troops fired directly at retreating soldiers 
using double-barreled muskets they shot while on horseback.43 Following the 
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conflict, Colomb maintained that it was of high importance to remain vigilant at 
French posts along the Senegal River. This was of particular significance during 
the dry season when the river was too low to be navigable by French ships. 
Colomb stressed the need to maintain surveillance at Podor and vowed that the 
“season of high waters” would allow the French to engage in “terror, even on the 
most remote villages” of Fuuta Tooro.44  
The above battles outline the intermittent warfare conducted by French 
forces and their allies against infantry and cavalry units in Waalo and Fuuta 
Tooro during the late 1840s and early 1850s. The appointment of Louis Faidherbe 
as governor of Senegal in 1854 marked a new period of escalation. French officers 
looked to increase troop strengths and build alliances in order to dominate the 
gum trade on the Senegal River and, later, the peanut market in the territory of 
the former Jolof Empire. Only a few months following his posting to Saint Louis 
in late February of 1855, Faidherbe moved against the kingdom of Waalo. 
Hugonnet, a historian of French campaigns in the 1850s and 1860s, wrote that the 
queen of Waalo was surrounded by “a band of villains who are called captives of 
the crown, a type of lower-class praetorians, with whom she regularly gets 
drunk, and who are linked to the Trarza,” a clear reference to the presence of 
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ceɗɗo.45 In the published account of the 10 day campaign, its chronicler noted that 
Faidherbe’s unit, made up of around 1,000 men, included only 400 French 
soldiers. His goal was to entrap the enemy between two columns, but this 
approach was stymied by the presence of compact, hostile militias who impeded 
their advance. The troops of Waalo and its allies used reconnaissance missions to 
prepare for the French advance, lying in wait near a forest through which the 
French needed to pass in order to reach Nder. Waalo-allied forces lost around 30 
men, with many others wounded, and the French soldiers and allied volontaires 
took 150 prisoners following the conflict.46  
In his account of the Battle of Nder, Faidherbe wrote that the morning of 
February 25, 1855, French troops and their allied auxiliaries came upon the 
combined forces of Waalo and Moor troops. Like the version written by 
Hugonnet, Faidherbe described the encounter at the entry point to the forest near 
Nder. According to him, Waalo and Moor troops stationed their cavalry in the 
center, flanked by two large infantry units. French forces also detected the 
presence of a number of hidden detachments waiting to surprise the French 
advance from points of concealment in “six foot high” grass.47 Another corps of 
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Moorish troops, both cavalry and infantry, were positioned to one side to 
establish a flanking position upon the French approach. French officers ordered 
the advance of the volontaires and one company of tirailleurs armed with carabines, 
shorter, lighter rifles. As they pressed forward, Faidherbe ordered artillery fire 
on enemy positions from French obusiers, and the advancing infantry managed to 
dislodge many soldiers from their hidden positions in the tall grass, fighting in 
close combat. During the assault, Captain Latouloubre led the contingent of spahi 
cavalry onto the field of battle. Faidherbe wrote that they were armed with 
sabers that they used to “behead” the enemy infantry.48 
Following the cavalry charge, another corps of infantry approached the 
Moor forces in their flanking position. At this point Waalo troops and their allies 
began to retreat. Faidherbe claimed that French adversaries sustained at least 30 
fatalities, with many more wounded, while the French only incurred three losses: 
an infantry sergeant, a spahi, and one volontaire. Following the battle, Nder was 
“pillaged” and burned by the volontaires allied with the French. Faidherbe 
singled out one man in particular for bravery: Amadou Sar, the “flag bearer” of 
the “Southern volontaires.” He wrote that Sar guided his soldiers into enemy fire 
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“with great enthusiasm.”49
 
Figure 3.3 Racine Taal, Officer in the Jihādist Army of Al-Hajj Umar Taal, in Voyage dans le 
Soudan Occidental (Sénégambie-Niger), by M. E. Mage (Paris: Hachette, 1868). 
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AL-HAJJ UMAR TAAL AND THE WAR FOR SPIRITUAL CONTROL 
As mentioned in Chapter One, Islam came to Senegambia along the trans-
Saharan trade routes, culminating in the conversion of the ruler of Takrur to 
Islam in the early 11th century. By the 15th century, indigenous practices 
coupled with Islamic principles formed the practice of Islam followed in the 
Senegambia region.50 However, a number of reformist jihāds were started by 
Qadiriyya marabouts in the late 18th and early 19th centuries and by Tijaniyya 
clerics in the early to mid-19th century. The most famous and widespread 
religious uprising was led by Al-Hajj Umar Taal. Many of these jihādist 
movements were spurred by a belief among Muslim clerics that political leaders 
were straying too far from the teachings of Islam. Most took place in Fuuta 
Tooro, beginning in 1776, and Fuuta Jalon, starting in 1725.51 Jihādist movements 
were also characterized by the wide use of conscripts and captives, despite 
prohibitions against enslavement in Islamic thought.52 Jennifer Lofkrantz has 
argued elsewhere that some jihādist movements were fought to protect the rights 
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of freeborn Muslims, not necessarily their dependents.53 This reasoning allowed 
for the continuation of certain controversial practices like rachat, or ransoming, of 
war captives. Under Taal, ransoming was used as a strategy to free captives 
while providing for a greater military force, as opposed to freeing these men 
outright. 
Umar Seydu Taal was born in Fuuta Tooro in 1797 to a marabout father in 
a clerical caste, toroɓɓe family. In one interesting mischaracterization of Taal, a 
French account declared he was born to “a family of tièdos,” the French 
transliteration of ceɗɗo, though the author noted in the same sentence that 
“[Taal’s] father, Seidou, a well-educated marabout, taught him the rigid principles 
of the Muslim faith from an early age.”54 The account also claimed that his first 
soldiers were actually his “slaves,” gained through marriage, and that many 
became powerful military and political figures within his retinue. Though little 
of this is true, it points to the French image of Taal as a political and military 
leader and ties him to slavery at a time when the French were asserting their 
commitment to abolition in their growing empire.  
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In reality, Taal joined the Tijaniyya brotherhood when he made his 
pilgrimage to Mecca in the 1820s. He returned to Senegambia after journeying 
through many Islamic states in West Africa, including Sokoto and Masina.55 
Taal’s commitment to social reform is not seen, however, as a desire to create an 
equal society. Like those before him, Taal was concerned with what he saw as a 
corrupted Muslim regime in his homeland of Fuuta Tooro, no longer adhering to 
the Islamic faith tradition. He sought to create an Islamic state in Senegambia 
and began his movement shortly after his return to Fuuta Jalon in 1836. The 
jihādist period lasted from 1848 until a short time after his death in 1862 and was 
fought in what is today Senegal and Mali. 
In the militaries of the almamates of Bundu, Fuuta Jalon, and Fuuta Tooro, 
bowmen and cavalry were important subsets of Tukulor and Fulbe troops. 
Though these elements certainly were influential in expanding control, 
conscripts played a part in all major military organizations in the region.56 Al-
Hajj Umar Taal relied at first on religiously motivated talibé (religious students) 
and sòfa infantry. His army was organized around a nucleus of elite cavalry from 
Fuuta Tooro. It also included Fulbe cavalry armed with lances, recruited locally 
                                                 
55 Klein, Islam and Imperialism, 66. 
56 Brooks, Eurafricans, 35-36. 
177 
in Fuuta Jalon. As noted in Chapter One, the preferred firearm of troops in the 
Senegambia region at this point was the double-barreled musket. Cavalry troops 
were able to shoot from horseback. The army of Al-Hajj Umar Taal incorporated 
many of these cavalry specialists who called themselves “masters of the two 
barrels.”57 However, the army was majority infantry, including many sòfa who, 
according to Richard Roberts, were “mostly of Bambara origin.”58 After a victory, 
it was common for soldiers in the defeated army to enlist in the Umarian ranks. 
This was, as has been noted earlier, common for most soldiers in the Senegambia 
region. The re-enlistment of soldiers in rival militaries appears throughout 
primary source accounts of European travelers and French colonial officials. By 
the end of his career, continuous warfare decimated the ranks of talibé forces, and 
Taal was dependent on a majority sòfa army. Military discipline was difficult to 
maintain in an organization without its own independent food supply for many 
of its campaigns. For the most part, the Umarian military was unable to sustain 
itself without regularly resorting to razzia tactics like raiding and the forcible 
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appropriation of livestock and agricultural products. This breakdown was 
responsible for at least one military defeat, at Sinsani in 1863.59  
Though Taal recruited some men of slave caste origins in the early years, 
jaam or maccuɓe, he was “careful not to offend the sensibilities of slave owners.”60 
Supporters of Taal were required to contribute garrisons to the army and to send 
conscripts for the infantry regiments stationed near their villages and towns.61 In 
fact, to entice chiefs to bring their entourages and fight in the Umarian campaign, 
Taal’s envoys assured village leaders that traditional hierarchies would be 
respected, given gifts of captives, and promised additional rewards. Taal built 
his movement with “the educated but dissatisfied men of…Fulbe societies.”62 His 
goal was not to protect “persecuted minorities,” but to destroy “the offensive 
temples of infidelity.”63 His society was an “opportunity for the truly faithful to 
start afresh, with a new community, land, slaves, and position.”64 Those who 
joined his society were “offered the chance to acquire slaves and other forms of 
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wealth, obtain military and religious distinction, and become a court official or 
chief of a new settlement.”65  
However, the constant campaigns led by Taal resulted in scores of battle 
deaths and Umarian forces needed constant replenishment. Because superior 
weaponry could in some cases compensate for numerical inferiority in battle, 
Taal also needed a constant supply of weapons and ammunition. This could be 
bought with captives, or with salt and kola nuts, commodities often purchased 
through the slave trade. Captives were also used to buy horses.66 On more than a 
few occasions, Taal sold captives taken during his war in Fuuta Jalon to buy 
arms from Sierra Leone and the surrounding territory.67 There is little argument 
that Taal had servants and captives in his entourage. In his comprehensive study 
of the jihād, David Robinson notes that Taal was accompanied by a large caravan 
including his wives and disciples, their servants, and a large quantity of “slaves” 
who were received as “gifts” when he left Nigeria in 1839.68 Taal and his 
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successors were always surrounded by wives and concubines, griots, artisans, 
and servants “who remain obscure in the sources.”69 
The Umarian movement did offer possibilities for social mobility. 
Devotees came from all over West Africa, including “freed Aku and Yoruba 
slaves from Sierra Leone,” who were drawn by Taal’s “reputation for learning, 
integrity, and piety.”70 The captives given to Taal in Nigeria became “highly 
trusted members of the early community and often received important 
assignments in the new state.”71 Taal chose Mustafa Keita, a former captive “who 
distinguished himself in the conquest,” as the governor of Kaarta.72 Keita was a 
barber and personal servant of Taal’s. He later gained Taal’s trust and his own 
freedom, and went on to distinguish himself as a military leader during the 
Umarian campaign.73 
The accumulation of captives was also used as a method of recruitment 
into the Umarian army and, after Taal’s 1857 defeat at Médine, the hijra, the 
Umarian exodus from Fuuta Tooro. Slaves captured in his campaigns were 
distributed as rewards to those who joined his forces. His problem in recruitment 
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after the retreat from Médine in 1857 was that he “had no rewards for the new 
masses for whom he had evoked such a glorious future.”74 Umarian recruiters for 
the hijra arriving in the Senegal valley came with entourages of numerous 
servants who cared for their horses and performed other chores.75  
Similar to the ceɗɗo of the Wolof states, the sòfa were civil servants, 
“recruited initially from slaves captured in war and free men seeking the security 
of the state,” who also played a military role. As a key social institution among 
the Bambara, upon the death of the king, the sòfa played “a large role” in 
determining his successor.76 Again like the ceɗɗo, sòfa warriors could “make or 
break candidates for royal office.”77 The sòfa of Kaarta were “royal slaves” who 
“functioned as a standing army” for Kaartan rulers. They were reputed to be 
non-Muslim and praised for their “loyalty and courageous fighting,” forging “a 
corporate identity expressed by distinctive clothing and consumption of beer in 
large quantities.”78 Most sòfa in the Umarian forces were of Bambara or 
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Mandinka origin.79 Eventually, all of the conscripts in the Umarian army were 
known as sòfa and these regiments eventually made up a substantial percentage 
of the Umarian army. 
Descriptions of sòfa soldiers echo contemporary accounts of the ceɗɗo, who 
were also often described as non-Muslims conspicuous in their alcohol 
consumption. Battalions comprised of former captives in the Umarian army are 
typically referred to as the jomfutung, literally “the meeting of slaves,” and it was 
made up predominantly of male prisoners captured in battle. Soldiers were 
called sòfa or tónjon, depending on their origin. Tónjon is generally defined as an 
“association of slaves,” though, as noted in Chapter One, the term “slave” belies 
the important military and political role of these men. Again, it is most likely that 
this group originated as a hunting association of both free men and their 
subordinates among the Bambara. Eventually this group was transformed into a 
standing army, “recruiting new membership through capture,” and capable of 
political action.80  
In 1848, Taal helped put down the Hubbu revolt “in which slaves, Jalonke 
farmers, Pulli and dissatisfied Fulbe struck out at the privilege of the ruling 
                                                 
79 Robinson, Holy War of Umar Tal, 183, 160n61. 
80 Curtin, Economic Change, 143. 
183 
class.” This revolt, which took place while Taal was living as a guest in Fuuta 
Jalon, demonstrated to his upper class allies his “support of the existing social 
order.”81 This act greatly facilitated recruitment for his future armies. Later, in 
Eastern Senegambia, Taal seized the Bambuk settlement and appropriated its 
subservient population, signaling “that he was no advocate of class revolt, that 
he accepted the existing social order and would replicate it in his dominions.”82 It 
is likely that Taal sent some of these captives to the ruling classes of the areas 
from which they earlier escaped in order to facilitate their further participation in 
his jihād.83 
 As his war progressed, Taal tried to purchase weapons directly from 
French posts in Senegambia, including from Governor Protet in 1853 and from 
M. Rey, the commander of Bakel, in 1854.84 In August of 1854, the French 
administration under Protet attempted to block the sale of weapons and 
ammunition into the region and thus prevent access to firearms by the military of 
Al-Hajj Umar Taal. Governor Faidherbe continued this policy when he took 
office in December of that year, though Taal managed to purchase guns from 
                                                 
81 Robinson, Holy War of Umar Tal, 120. 
82 Robinson, Holy War of Umar Tal, 153. 
83 Klein, Slavery and Colonial Rule in West Africa, 51. 
84 Yves Saint-Martin, “L’artillerie d’El Hadj Omar et d’Ahmadou,” Bulletin de l’Institut Français 
d’Afrique Noire 27, no.s 3-4 (1965): 560-572, 561. 
184 
French traders in Médine and also obtained weapons through looting.85 Around 
this time, those firearms were more likely to be smoothbore muskets than rifles, 
which could not have been introduced into the region until late 1854 at the 
earliest.86  
The Annales Sénégalaises, the official French interpretation of its military 
engagements in Senegambia, provides an extensive overview of the Umarian 
jihād. The authors wrote of Taal’s preparation with his talibé to pursue victory 
over states like Kaarta, Kajoor, Bawol, and Siin, claiming that the Battle of 
Dialmatch in 1854 was an early provocation in the mind of Taal and his 
followers.87 However, due to preparedness or other priorities, Taal focused 
instead on the Eastern and Southeastern areas of the region, moving from his 
headquarters in Fuuta Jalon to Tambacounda and other Bambuk provinces 
including Farabana and Makhana. Noted above, Taal had amassed one of the 
largest infantry forces in the region at the time. At a strength of around 12,000 
men, recruited and conscripted from the regions of Bundu, Fuuta Jalon, and 
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Fuuta Tooro, Taal’s army moved at the end of 1854 toward Bakel, which was 
currently under the command of M. Bargone, a 2nd lieutenant in the naval 
infantry.88 At the time, the garrison at Bakel was staffed by 25 men. Louis 
Faidherbe, then a captain, directed the updating and repair of the fort and its 
artillery, including the doubling of supplies. Further, the traders working near 
the fort were organized into a militia. All of these were precautionary measures 
against a possible siege.89  
In early 1855, Taal began exhorting his followers to engage in raids against 
French installations and French trading agents near the upper Senegal River. He 
also sent word to the inhabitants of Saint Louis, exhorting them to join him in 
fulfilling his religious, social, and political mission throughout the Senegambia 
region. In fact, Taal managed to attract a broad support base. Though the 
majority of his early followers were Haalpulaar from Fuuta Tooro and Fuuta 
Jalon, including Tukulor and Fulbe men, at the height of his influence following 
defeats in the Eastern region, Taal also counted a number of Sarakule and 
Bambara civilians and soldiers in his entourage.90 The authors of the Annales 
wrote that the majority of Tukulor soldiers fought on foot instead of on 
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horseback and the nobles had double-barreled muskets, as opposed to the rand-
and-file soldiers, who were armed only with smoothbore muskets.91 
In July of 1855, Faidherbe, who ascended to the governorship in late 1854, 
wanted to see the situation in Bakel for himself. Aboard the Serpent, French 
troops faced few provocations. They did encounter some resistance in the area 
between Matam and Bakel, then known as Damga. On the banks of the Senegal 
River, a number of armed men “gestured menacingly” toward the French convoy 
and yelled threats at those on board. Faidherbe responded by firing on them 
directly. Eventually, Tukulor soldiers on the banks shot at the procession, with 
French forces waiting for the fire to subside before returning with their own 
volley. In the process, the French lost two laptots. The report claimed that because 
Tukulor soldiers were used to “fighting in the open,” they suffered numerous 
losses.92 This seems to be a reference to the distance between the soldiers on the 
riverbanks and the French military traveling on the river. It could also relate to 
the presence of trees and other obstructions between the combatants. As noted in 
previous chapters, the military culture of the region was characterized by pitched 
battles fought in open fields, often with little cover from forested areas. Though 
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combatants often engaged in surprise attacks, training for naval warfare and 
marine skirmishes was virtually nonexistent in this period. 
Frédéric Carrère and Paul Holle described the military situation in Eastern 
Senegambia in terms that would be familiar to anyone acquainted with the 
armed forces of Kajoor, Waalo, and other states of the former Jolof Empire. 
Carrère, a judge and lawyer for Senegal’s appeals court in Saint Louis, and Holle, 
a métis trader who would later serve as commander of the fort at Bakel, wrote an 
account depicting the movement of Al-Hajj Umar Taal as a threat to the 
community of Saint Louis. Their narrative was written at least in part to advocate 
for French military intervention against Taal’s forces in Fuuta Tooro and 
Bundu.93 Holle would eventually put his beliefs into practice. He died at the 
second Battle of Médine in 1862, fighting against the Umarian army. 
In their account, Carrère and Holle observed that in Kaarta, the territory 
was ruled by the Massassi dynasty, but the most powerful figures were the king 
and the “chief of the captives,” who had power of relative equivalence to the 
king.94 This “chief” was most likely a sòfa general. He was in command of the 
army, in charge of tax collection, and served as a kind of minister of finance, 
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according to the authors. In their description of Kaarta’s army, they wrote that 
the country maintained a “regular army” composed “exclusively of captives 
belonging either to the kingdom or to the Massassi princes” that was “always 
ready to enter a campaign.”95  
The king, other members of nobility, and high-ranking captives 
constituted the cavalry. The Massassi princes and the generals of the cavalry 
were identified by “a large ring of gold that seems to be suspended from the 
right ear, but which is actually retained by a strap knotted around the head.”96 
Those of lower ranks, called ton, served as infantry, “fighting on foot.” Building 
upon earlier accounts of tónjon, Carrère and Holle wrote that the army was made 
up of four divisions with a hierarchy of three commanding officers. Each 
division, called a “main,” was made up of 1,000 men. The authors claimed that, in 
battle, the ton infantry engaged the enemy first, followed by the cavalry who 
charged with “long lances.” These “Bambara” soldiers were “very brave” but 
prone to “impetuous” attacks. The Massassi army was supported by auxiliary 
troops engaged by the crown from neighboring territories. This service cost the 
government of Kaarta 40 horses per main.97 Not long after Carrère and Holle’s 
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visit to Kaarta, the Massassi reign ended at the hands of Al-Hajj Umar Taal and 
his army, which at the time of their writing had expanded into Fuuta Jalon, 
Fuuta Tooro, and Bundu, but not yet to Kaarta.  
On the subject of Taal, the authors wrote that he managed to take the tata 
of Tambacounda in Bundu by force of arms, breaching the walls of the city’s 
fortifications. They provided few additional details, preferring instead to focus 
on the threat Taal posed to the region and describing him as a fanatical and 
violent political leader.98 Robinson writes that the Massassi employed a 
“defensive strategy which had proven successful in their earlier conflicts with 
Segu and Masina.”99 However, they withdrew within their walled towns based 
on the assumption that their fortifications could hold against and assault and 
their adversaries would retreat with the onset of the dry season and the intense 
heat that accompanied it. Because each Massassi lineage “defended its own 
garrison,” Taal’s army included at this point a majority of soldiers from the 
“middle valley” of Fuuta Tooro. Against the Massassi in 1854, the army engaged 
in a divide-and-conquer approach. They first focused on Yelimane, then Médine, 
and finally Nioro, the most fortified position held by the reigning king. Taal’s 
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forces were sustained by access to a regular food supply and superior 
weaponry.100 After Taal’s success at Nioro, he formed a fourth battalion in his 
army, already composed of battalions named after the three Fuuta provinces that 
provided the largest number of his recruits: Ngenar, Yirlabe, and Tooro.101 As 
mentioned above, after a victory it was common for defeated soldiers to enlist in 
Umarian ranks. Following Taal’s triumph at Kaarta, about 2,000 sòfa were 
incorporated into the jomfutung unit of Taal’s army.102 Sòfa and tónjon soldiers 
also gained high status in the Umarian army. San Mody, a Bambara sòfa, became 
the commander at Konyakary. Kurubatu Demba, a Massassi tónjon, joined the 
jihād at Kholu, and later distinguished himself in the Masina campaign.103 
In 1855 and 1856, the Umarian military also had a great number of troops 
from Khasso, particularly Médine and Sero. The talibé of Fuuta Jalon were 
fighting in the Yirlabe battalion by 1856. Robinson has addressed the problem of 
the expansion of Taal’s forces following military successes at Kaarta. The army in 
the mid-1850s was less unified than that with which he embarked on his initial 
campaign in 1848. Though it continued to benefit from its numerical strength and 
                                                 
100 Robinson, Holy War of Umar Tal, 181. 
101 Robinson, Holy War of Umar Tal, 183. 
102 Klein, Slavery and Colonial Rule, 51; Hanson, Migration, 31; Searing, West African Slavery, 
237n133. 
103 Robinson, Holy War of Umar Tal, 195. 
191 
“maintained a decided edge” in firearms and some artillery, their main battles 
took place on open terrain, leading to hand-to-hand combat and cavalry charges. 
Many soldiers had little experience beyond “riding and raiding.”104 Military 
needs were complicated by political difficulties in maintaining control over the 
new subject populations in the East. Recognizing this problem, and following the 
desertion of “some Bundunke and Khassonke recruits,” Taal sent recruiters back 
to Fuuta Tooro, and “maintained a constant pressure on all of his Senegambian 
sources throughout 1855 and 1856.”105 
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Figure 3.4 Depiction of the Battle of Médine, 1857, in Voyage dans le Soudan Occidental 
(Sénégambie-Niger), by M. E. Mage (Paris: Hachette, 1868). 
 
The conflict between Umarian forces and the French government 
culminated in the Battle of Médine in 1857, where the French emerged victorious. 
One consequence of this victory was Taal’s eventual decision to encourage hijra, 
the Umarian exodus from Senegambia. The scene was set for a confrontation at 
Médine years earlier, following French concerns about the Umarian army’s 
positions near Bakel, further north on the Senegal River. Bakel was accessible via 
the Senegal River during the rainy season, roughly July to September. The 
location of the Bakel post was a subject of ongoing unease among French officers, 
193 
due to the fluctuations of the Senegal River and the ensuing inaccessibility of the 
fort when the river was low. This would leave the fort’s defenders at the relative 
mercy of the surrounding population, which was believed to be vulnerable to the 
call of Al-Hajj Umar Taal and rife with his supporters. One major point of 
concern for the French officers at Bakel was the possibility of espionage and the 
transmission of military communications to forces allied with Taal’s army. 
Particularly of interest were France’s “Black soldiers” and laptots, many of whom 
were practicing Muslims. Lieutenant Bargone’s determination was to fortify the 
post at Bakel and to clear the surrounding territory as much as possible of 
anyone who might join the jihād.106 At the time, however, Taal was still fighting 
for control of Kaarta.  
In the meantime, the French military under Faidherbe’s orders engaged in 
a scorched earth policy against anyone who might consider attacking the fort at 
Bakel, burning a number of nearby villages including the town of Tuabo.107 Due 
to continuing conflict in the region, Faidherbe decided it necessary to create a 
new garrison at Médine, and arranged for one of the largest transports of 
military personnel at the time. The steamships Epervier, Rubis, Grand-Bassam, 
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Marabout, Serpent, and Basilic, under the command of Lieutenant Desmarais, 
transported 300 infantry, 150 laptots, 40 spahis, 600 volontaires from Saint Louis, 
100 African engineers, as well as four cannons and a variety of other personnel to 
Médine. Prior to the convoy’s arrival at Médine, officers discovered that an 
Umarian detachment recently left the area, presumably after learning of the 
expanded French presence. When they landed, French troops heard that a depot 
left by Al-Hajj Umar Taal’s army was located two leagues from Médine. Second 
Lieutenant Flize departed with a squadron of spahis, 200 volontaires, and 150 
soldiers provided to him by Sambala, a local ruler who declared himself an 
enemy of the Umarian forces.108  
After building the French fort at Médine, Governor Faidherbe signed a 
peace treaty with the chiefs of Khasso. He decided that the large force should 
return to Saint Louis, but not before a show of strength near Kayes, where French 
ships opened fire on Gagny (Guidimakha) with their cannons and destroyed the 
town. Before they departed Médine, French troops discovered from a purported 
ally, Bubakar Saada, the son of the previous Almaami of Bundu, that the 
Umarian army had defeated Kaarta. Governor Faidherbe proposed that Bubakar 
Saada ally himself with the French against Al-Hajj Umar Taal, taking “the role 
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that Fara Penda played in Waalo.”109 Following their agreement, French and 
Bundu troops attacked a number of villages reputed to be faithful to Taal. 
In February of 1856, 250 volontaires commanded by the Senegalese officer 
Alioun Sal destroyed the village of Déthié, a Bundu enemy. The next month, a 
detachment of the Umarian army led by two Fuuta marabouts, “Belli” and 
“Tierno-Alliou,” returned from Kaarta and exhorted the population to revolt 
against the recently French-installed Almaami Bubakar Saada and French forces. 
Taal’s soldiers took the village of Bordé but were defeated by French forces led 
by Alioun Sal and Ndiay-Sour. Bubakar Saada followed with 300 to 400 troops 
and demolished the town of Débou.110 
One of the tactical advantages held by the French was their control of the 
Senegal River, which they regularly patrolled between Bakel and Kayes with the 
ship Galibi. It withstood numerous attacks by Umarian troops, who were based 
on land and thus only able to occasionally pick off soldiers and laptots aboard the 
vessel, even when their forces greatly outnumbered those of French military 
personnel, including April 13, 1856 when they were attacked by an estimated 
contingent of 2,000 Umarian soldiers. Taal’s army, organized in two columns 
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(one upstream and one downstream), was unable to dislodge the French from 
their position. They also received fire from a nearby tata and were unable to find 
safety on land, forcing a withdrawal after sustaining heavy casualties.111 
Bubakar Saada’s incursion into Fuuta Tooro stretched at least as far as 
Njuum, a town his forces burned to the ground in addition to two other villages. 
Following the attack, the French believed their allies had subdued the bulk of the 
population of Northern Senegambia. But at the start of 1857, Al-Hajj Umar Taal 
turned westward following the defeat of his troops at Masina.112 Taal managed to 
overwhelm a number of French-allied villages and towns. The French learned of 
his army’s approach on Médine on April 19th of that year. In preparation for a 
possible assault, Faidherbe sent two gunboats to Fuuta Tooro, posted Paul Holle 
to Matam, and stationed three garrisons in Western Fuuta to stymie recruitment 
in Wolof territories.113 Paul Holle, the commander of Médine, moved from 
Matam to prepare for the attack, which began on April 20th. In the early 
morning, around 15,000 jihādists stormed the fort at Médine and the tata of 
French ally Sambala, then containing a population of around 10,000 people. 
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Robinson argues only perhaps 1,000 could be considered soldiers.114 The 
Umarian army approached, divided into three columns: one followed the river to 
approach the tata of Sambala; the second approached the tata overland, where 
the tata met the fort of Médine; the third column marched through the ravine of 
Mokho-Fakha-Kholé in order to attack the tata head on. This initial assault 
inflicted substantial casualties on the Umarian troops, who were marching under 
heavy fire in their attempt to breach the walls of either or both structures. They 
carried bamboo ladders, which they managed to transport to the walls of the tata, 
but Taal’s soldiers were picked off by the flintlock muskets of their adversaries 
before they could amass enough soldiers to take one of the walls of the structure. 
Despite their heavy losses, for much of the approach the Umarian army 
advanced, tightening ranks while under fire.115 The tactic of tightening formation 
during an advance bears close similarity to French tactics taught 
contemporaneously in Europe.116 
The next major offensive by the Umarian army took place on May 11th. It 
was led by commander Cerno Jibi Ban. A division of the army conducted a 
surprise attack on an islet 150 yards from the fort at Médine and the 30 defenders 
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of the islet fled, leaving the Umarian forces in control. Taal’s soldiers assembled 
on the far slope to avoid enemy fire from the fort. That morning, the bulk of the 
army surrounded the Médine fort in an attempt to again breach its walls. A small 
French contingent, supported by laptots and Senegalese soldiers and led by 
Sergeant Desplat of the naval infantry, boarded a ship under heavy fire in order 
to dislodge the Umarian contingent on the islet. They approached the far side of 
the islet where the Tukulor soldiers found shelter from the artillery fire of the 
Médine fort, leaving these men without a ready escape route. Many were 
wounded and the rest attempted to flee to the mainland. The Umarian army was 
again unable to breach the walls of the fort and retreated to safety. The siege of 
the fort continued as Taal attempted to prevent food and supplies from reaching 
Médine.  
To prevent supplies from reaching either the fort or the tata of Sambala, 
the siege of Médine lasted for at least six weeks, and the soldiers contained 
within ran dangerously low on ammunition in addition to food and water.117 The 
fort and tata were reinforced with high walls that the Umarian army was never 
able to fully scale. Exacerbating the complications encountered by the jihādists, 
fresh recruits from Bundu and Fuuta Tooro were unable to reach Médine. This 
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inevitably lowered the morale of Taal’s troops, who slowly watched their 
numerical strength decline and who were frustrated from the lack of direct 
combat conducted on open ground.118 Used to long sieges, in the past the army 
was eventually able to force capitulation and, had the siege continued only one 
or two weeks longer, it may have been possible to break through. However, in 
July of 1857, Governor Faidherbe managed to reach Médine by the Senegal River 
with reinforcements and supplies for French and allied troops. Defeated at 
Médine, Taal continued to exhort his followers to thwart French aggression, as 
he faced eastward to focus on the territory still under his control. 
The Umarian army found greater success upon its return, through the 
hijra, to the former Soudanic kingdoms of Segu and Masina. In 1860 Taal’s forces 
marched on Segu with “an army of 30,000 cavalry and infantry.”119 Following an 
initial skirmish, Taal ordered a full frontal assault at Koghe and emerged 
victorious. As a result, surrendering tónjon troops in the Segu army were 
absorbed into the sòfa battalions, but the Umarian army would not return to 
Senegambia until after Taal’s death in 1864.  
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French concerns over their ability to control commerce in gum on the 
Senegal River were allayed by the Médine victory. The pacification of the 
riverbanks allowed France to readily access its posts at Podor, Matam, Bakel, and 
Médine. However, in the 1850s peanuts began to eclipse the gum trade as the 
most important Senegambian export. With the relative pacification of Fuuta 
Tooro, the governments of Faidherbe and his successor Jean Jauréguiberry 
turned their focus toward the peanut basin encompassed by the kingdoms of the 
former Jolof Empire, particularly the state of Kajoor. 
LAT JOOR AND THE WAR FOR TEMPORAL CONTROL 
A French agent in 1860 surmised that the Damel (ruler) of Kajoor at the 
time, Makkodu Faal, possessed “an armed guard of 650, including 500 cavalry 
under his direct control.”120 Reformist Muslims engaged in a rebellion against the 
Damel the previous year numbered 2,000 infantry. Armed with flintlock 
muskets, they outnumbered the Damel’s ceɗɗo and jaami-bur forces. Despite their 
numerical superiority, they were defeated by “several hundred cavalry” who 
followed up their victory by burning “dozens of Muslim villages” in the 
province of Njambur.121  
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The period of the 1860s has been described by James Searing as a civil war 
between the Wolof kingdoms of Kajoor and Bawol. Though Muslim peasants 
were sporadically agitating against aristocratic rule from the 1790s through 
1830s, French meddling and a succession crisis fueled the unrest of mid-century 
Kajoor.122 Lat Joor Joop belonged to the Geej matrilineage that long ruled the 
kingdom. Born in 1842, he was heir to the throne of the Geet province and prior 
to the 1860s was not a serious contender for the crown of Kajoor.123 His candidacy 
was organized and supported by the ceɗɗo warrior Demba War Sall. Lat Joor was 
not a Faal like Makkodu and his predecessors, who could trace their “descent to 
the first king of Kajoor” Lat Sukaabe Faal. However, his grandfather was a 
famous royal convert to Islam, and his mother was married to Sëriñ Kokki, who 
played a part in the Muslim revolt of 1859.124  
Leading up to the 1860s, Wolof armies based their military strategy 
around cavalry troops and infantry units, both armed with single or double-
barreled muskets, sabers, and daggers, who were used to fighting in hand-to-
hand combat. Firearms were used at various distances and were even valued in 
close combat situations. As in Fuuta Tooro and Eastern Senegambia, Wolof states 
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built tatas to withstand sieges against forces whose numerical strength dwarfed 
their own.125 Searing estimates that in the early 1860s the kingdom of Kajoor 
could muster a maximum of 2,000 cavalry if it drew upon the entire population. 
However, cavalry units fought like mounted infantry. This style of combat was 
prevalent throughout the former Jolof Empire, where cavalry and infantry 
approached one another on open ground, discharged weapons, and engaged in 
this manner until one side gained some level of advantage and the opposing 
force retreated from the field of battle. Cavalrymen could fire their weapons 
while on horseback, making use of double-barreled muskets.126 Hugonnet, the 
historian of France’s military campaigns in the 1850s and 1860s, wrote that the 
ceɗɗo of Kajoor, “captives of the crown,” were the only standing army of the 
kingdom. He claimed that their leaders rode small horses and the rest fought on 
foot. They were armed with spears, daggers, and long guns.127 It is likely the 
“long guns” to which the author refers are flintlock muskets, given other 
contemporary accounts. 
In addition to their campaign to alert the Saint Louis community to the 
dangers of Al-Hajj Umar Taal in Northern Senegal and Southwestern Mali, 
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Frédéric Carrère and Paul Holle noted many details about military organization 
in Kajoor and the ceɗɗo forces that protected the Damel in the early 1850s.128 In 
their telling, the term “kiédo” was synonymous with “soldier” and the ceɗɗo 
were warriors who served both the Damel and the princes of Kajoor. They 
fought “on foot or on horseback” and formed “their masters’ guard.” In times of 
peace, ceɗɗo served as a local police force and as spies who watched the general 
populace and made regular reports to the Kajoor aristocracy. Carrère and Holle 
claimed that the inhabitants of Kajoor dreaded the ceɗɗo due to their position as 
informants and as agents of state power entitled to engage in state-sanctioned 
plunder. Ceɗɗo were led by the “diarraffseuff,” the minister of defense for Kajoor 
and the high commander of the guard.129 The jaraff suuf could not leave the king’s 
residence without permission, though he was also one of the few residents of 
Kajoor with unfettered access to the Damel. His status, the authors claimed, 
differed “essentially from that of a typical slave.” He “would certainly not 
exchange his position for that of an ordinary diambour.”130  
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 According to Carrère and Holle, when the Damel declared war he called 
upon the Wolof nobility, “princes and hereditary chiefs,” who were obliged to 
rendez-vous with their ruler after assembling the ceɗɗo and jaami-bur forces in 
their service. Any who refused were subject to banishment from the kingdom 
after having all of their property confiscated by the Damel. The authors also 
wrote that the badoolo, or free peasantry, could form an infantry militia that 
“fought on foot” but that their presence “was neither obligatory nor desired.”131 
Nobles who assembled their ceɗɗo armies fought under their own flags, and 
brought their own weapons, food, and supplies. On the march, the forces of 
Kajoor were led by cavalry units. The Damel rode with the rear guard among the 
“reserve corps,” which was under the command of the jaraaf suuf.132   
 Carrère and Holle specified that the armies of Kajoor were armed with 
flintlock muskets (fusil à silex) and that military engagements ensued in the style 
of a military parade: one side approached, took aim, and fired on the enemy, 
then withdrew; then opposing forces engaged in the same maneuver. This 
continued until one side managed to gain ground or inflict enough casualties to 
cause a full retreat. Once the engagement neared completion, the Damel or his 
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opponent approached with the reserve guard and made a final volley against the 
enemy. Retreating troops were pursued by cavalry. Many would be taken 
captive by the victorious army. Carrère and Holle were careful to stress that 
cavalry rarely engaged in combat alone, but instead were used following infantry 
assaults. Cavalry soldiers were armed with spears and muskets, though some 
had pistols. Their primary task seems to have been the prevention of escape by 
enemy troops fleeing the Damel’s attack.133 
In January of 1862, forces loyal to Lat Joor deposed the Damel Majoojo, a 
French ally from the Faal lineage. Lat Joor’s forces clashed against Majoojo’s 
army at Kokki and the Damel retreated to French-held Lompoul. Governor 
Jauréguiberry commanded a force of 550 soldiers from Saint Louis to reestablish 
Majoojo’s position. A new treaty was signed between Lat Joor and the rebelling 
nobility and Majoojo was reinstated, but his reign would be short-lived. In May 
of that year Lat Joor was again proclaimed Damel, supported by numerous 
factions of ceɗɗo.134 
 In February of 1863, Captain Flize wrote to Governor Jauréguiberry and 
described the situation at the outpost of Nguiguis, the seat of Kajoor. He claimed 
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that Lat Joor and many of his forces fled from the troops of Majoojo and their 
French allies. It is clear from Flize’s letter that French troops were accompanied 
by an untold number of volontaires or, as he depicted them, “innumerable 
auxiliaries from all the countries of the right bank” of the Senegal River. The 
volontaires from Waalo, Flize wrote, “will depart this evening.”135 He noted the 
presence of around 6,000 volontaires in the armed pursuit of Lat Joor and 
suggested that many “diambour,” or jaami-bur, captives of the crown, would 
submit to Majoojo and pledge their fidelity to his rule.136 
When Faidherbe returned to the governorship of Senegal in July of 1863, 
his first concern was what to do about the political and military situation in 
Kajoor.137 Faidherbe departed Saint Louis shortly thereafter. Upon his arrival at 
Nguiguis, he learned that Lat Joor and his forces recently departed to Bawol to 
avoid a direct military confrontation. Faidherbe sent Colonel Émile Pinet-
Laprade after Lat Joor’s army with a column of around 800 soldiers. Pinet-
Laprade was only able to catch up to the rear guard of Lat Joor’s forces before the 
full army reached Bawol, at Ndary, where Lat Joor experienced losses at the 
hands of French troops. Lat Joor found success against the French when his 
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forces engaged in surprise stalking attacks, attacking from “concealed positions 
that provided cover.”138 The royal guard fired at close range and then engaged in 
hand-to-hand combat. 
In his description of the “column of Cayor” he led in pursuit of Lat Joor’s 
army, Pinet-Laprade discussed the makeup of his forces in support of the Damel 
Majoojo. It was composed of the following: 100 naval infantry; 100 disciplinaires, 
penal troops; 40 “natives” of the engineering company; 250 tirailleurs sénégalais; 
75 naval artillery soldiers; and 35 spahi cavalry. In addition to these men, Pinet-
Laprade had at his disposal 100 volontaires from Gorée, 150 “Peuls” from Saint 
Louis, or possibly Waalo, and the armies of Majoojo and Silmakha Dieng, 
comprised of 1,500 infantry and 500 cavalry, another example of France’s high 
level of reliance on auxiliary troops.139 On the trail of Lat Joor’s forces, the parties 
engaged at Ndary. French-allied forces overwhelmed those of Lat Joor, 
particularly the 500 cavalry of France’s allies and the squadrons of tirailleurs 
sénégalais who advanced on Lat Joor’s army and “enveloped the enemy, leaving 
many corpses on the field of battle.”140  
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The victorious combined forces of Majoojo, Silmakha Dieng, “Peuls,” 
volontaires, and other troops reached Nguiguis on December 14, 1863, and found 
the defense of the town well underway, commanded by Captain Lorans. After 
ensuring the security of Majoojo and welcoming the forces of his ally Samba 
Maram Xaay to Nguiguis, Pinet-Laprade disbanded the volontaires from Gorée 
and the “Peul” units from Saint Louis who, he wrote, had been participating in 
the campaign for at least one month, “meriting the highest praise.”141 Pinet-
Laprade himself continued to Taiba, where he found “the chiefs of all the villages 
of Lagnakhor” who “accepted all the positions imposed on the populations 
annexed to the colony,” without exception.142 
 Governor Louis Faidherbe wrote to Pinet-Laprade later in December of 
1863. On the 28th, he told his captain of the discovery of Lat Joor’s troops near 
Nguiguis. Lat Joor himself was reputed to be stationed at Ndiagne, close to 
Kokki, planning an attack on Majoojo at Nguiguis. Faidherbe ordered his 
subordinate to send Captain Bolot, “who must be the most senior” officer there, 
or “whomever you think better” to head a column against the forces of Lat 
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Joor.143 He also suggested sending one or two infantry units from the disciplinaires 
or the engineering company. These soldiers would garrison Nguiguis “until 
further notice.”144 Faidherbe noted that Captain Flize was en route from the 
Kajoor province of Njambur, also in pursuit. He expressed concern about the 
cavalry of Lat Joor, noting that allies of the French column were made up of 
“badolos,” Wolof peasants, who “have not shown much energy so far” in 
military campaigns, and the soldiers of Silmakha Dieng who “had a singular 
performance.”145 
In the final days of December 1863, French forces suffered defeat at 
Ngolgol. In Faidherbe’s account, he insisted that Captain Lorans, the commander 
of the garrison at Nguiguis, was convinced by French allies Majoojo and Samba 
Maram Xaay that the garrison’s forces in combination with their own would be 
enough to defeat Lat Joor’s army.146 At the end of December, they departed 
Nguiguis with a company of tirailleurs, 25 spahis, one cannon and eight cannon 
operators, and an unknown number of soldiers loyal to Majoojo and Samba 
Maram Xaay. Faidherbe claimed that the defeat was due to the poor skills of 
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Majoojo’s army, and the numerous cavalry of Lat Joor who surrounded their 
foes. Of around 140 men who participated in the attack, only 20 spahis, two 
officers, and six tirailleurs returned, in addition to an unknown number of 
Majoojo’s and Samba Maram Xaay’s men.147 This account glosses over the 
conspiracies and fears that marked this experience for French officers, some of 
whom for the first time realized the danger of their dependence on auxiliary 
forces. Archival records of this event, the Battle of Ngolgol, and the 
correspondence that followed detail the French loss and their struggle to strike 
back quickly and decisively against Lat Joor and his army. 
On December 29, the French post at Lompoul sent a short message of 
concern to Governor Faidherbe. Lompoul was “in a state of defense.”148 They had 
received word of an act of “treachery” by Samba Maram Xaay though they did 
not believe that news had yet been shared with “the supporters of Majoojo.” No 
one had any news from either Captain Flize or Captain Lorans at Nguiguis. They 
feared the worst. One hundred men were sent from Lompoul in pursuit of 
Samba Maram Xaay.149 Arriving at Nguiguis on December 30, Colonel Pinet-
Laprade immediately sent a dispatch to Governor Faidherbe. He relayed that he 
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arrived at Nguiguis with his column intact, having had only a small skirmish 
with Lat Joor’s cavalry en route to the fort. He was informed the previous day by 
M. Flautir of “the frightful event that happened to the column that departed 
Nguiguis.” Captain Lorans and the French officers Chevril, St. Victor, and Tymé, 
four spahis, and 74 of 78 tirailleurs sénégalais were among the many fatalities.150 
Pinet-Laprade claimed that Samba Maram Xaay led the column “into a trap.” 
“As soon as the firing started,” he recounted, “Samba Maram Xaay and his 
cavalry turned their weapons against the column and fired at point blank 
range.”151 As a result, many people rallied to the cause of Lat Joor who was 
reputed to have at least 1,200 cavalry riding with him. Pinet-Laprade cautioned 
against further use of auxiliary troops at this juncture. “They are to be feared 
rather than used,” he warned. And he expressed a further concern that Silmakha 
Dieng and Sëriñ Kokki were also implicated in the conspiracy to ambush French 
soldiers.152 
 This account was countered by a Senegalese informant to the post at 
Lompoul, Cialao Demba Ngooné, who gave his own account of the Battle of 
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Ngolgol.153 Ngooné asserted that the forces of Majoojo and Samba Maram Xaay 
only retreated “after two and a half hours of combat,” leaving Captain Lorans 
and his column behind. The officer at Lompoul, however, claimed that despite 
protestations that Samba Maram Xaay continued to support the kingship of 
Majoojo, his soldiers left Lompoul without informing French officers. Suspicion 
increased following this unannounced departure.154 The treachery of Samba 
Maram Xaay, whether real or imagined, made an impact on French officers 
stationed at outposts throughout Kajoor. Captain Flize also sent a dispatch from 
Nguiguis on December 31, 1863. He told the governor that he was no longer sure 
he could count on the people of “Dioloff.” Though he did not think an attack was 
imminent, the morale of his Senegalese troops was low. He requested more 
information on when he might receive the column from Saint Louis, and asked 
about its route and the number of troops contained within.155 
 Despite fears expressed about auxiliary troops following the French defeat 
at Ngolgol, Colonel Pinet-Laprade led a large force made up predominantly of 
French allies south toward the army of Lat Joor, which had sought refuge in the 
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state of Bawol. French officers worried about treachery, but they had no other 
clear option for military success than their dependence on these auxiliary armies. 
Pinet-Laprade wrote to Faidherbe that he left the 3,000 volontaires accompanying 
him to Bawol at Khaoulou in Kajoor to avoid “uselessly exciting” the 
“population of Bawol“ against the invading army, who had engaged in “looting” 
as they marched toward an eventual confrontation.156 Pinet-Laprade was 
informed “over the course of several days” that Lat Joor was preparing for a 
battle at Loro. Pinet-Laprade decided to wait until January 12th to attack in order 
for his troops to rest from the long march. He believed that Lat Joor’s plan of 
attack would be similar to the Battle of Ngolgol: the use of cavalry to compel the 
masses of volontaires to retreat, leaving behind the smaller force of the French 
column; to surround that column; and to easily defeat it with Kajoor cavalry.157 
 On January 12th at six in the morning, French allied troops were 
dispatched from their position at M’Basiin in the following order: scouts from the 
cavalry of Silmakha Dieng; a platoon of laptots deployed as tirailleurs; a 
detachment of “natives” from the engineering company; five naval infantry 
platoons, flanked by two obusiers; two platoons of disciplinaires organized to flank 
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the column of naval infantry; two more obusiers; one battalion of tirailleurs 
sénégalais; and finally the squadron of spahis preceding the cavalry of Diolof and 
all of the volontaires “on foot.”158 Pinet-Laprade described their approach to the 
field of battle as they surveyed the organization of Lat Joor’s forces. French 
troops marched toward a valley. Across the expanse stood the infantry of Lat 
Joor, ready to shoot on the French advance from an elevated position. The 
infantry was flanked on both sides by “numerous cavalry.” Pinet-Laprade 
stopped the advance 400 meters from the enemy’s location, in order to stay out of 
range of oncoming musket fire. He ordered artillery fire from the obusiers while 
three platoons of naval infantry advanced through the valley. Returning fire, the 
soldiers of Lat Joor were unable to reach the French and their allies.159 
 Lat Joor’s cavalry charged the flanks of the French position, most likely to 
surround the enemy. They managed to threaten the flanks and the rear guard of 
the French and their allied volontaires armies. However, Pinet-Laprade ordered 
the column forward against the forces of Lat Joor. The spahis and allied cavalry in 
conjunction with 3,000 infantry overwhelmed the infantry of Lat Joor. Pinet-
Laprade estimated that of the 8,000 troops engaged in the Battle of Loro, the 
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forces of Lat Joor lost around 300, while the French sustained “insignificant” 
losses. Considering the troop strengths provided in the official report, it seems 
that French troops and their allies outnumbered the combined cavalry and 
infantry forces of Lat Joor. Thus it was not their access to better weapons or 
firepower that improved French chances of success, so much as their continued 
dependence on auxiliaries. Following the Battle of Loro, the French also for the 
first time began awarding medals to volontaires who distinguished themselves in 
combat. Among the medals conferred for service at Loro, 11 were awarded to 
volontaires, including gold medals of the 1st order to Malo-Birahim-Dir, chef du 
cercle in Waalo; Samuel Dupuis, habitant of Gorée; and N’gour Coumba N’Dar, 
commander of the volontaires from Saint Louis. Gold medals of the 2nd order 
were presented to Samba Fal, interpreter; Sangoné N’diaye, village chief of 
Rufisque; and Sidi N’Diaye, nurse.160 
Despite the importance of volontaires, or perhaps because of it, Faidherbe 
remained highly skeptical of their employ in fighting wars in Senegambia. He 
expressed that though, during the war against Lat Joor in Kajoor, he “did not 
hesitate to send against [French] enemies masses of volontaires,” he found that the 
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situation had “become very dangerous” as a result. He claimed that volontaires 
were “undisciplined, they do nothing but what they want.”161 Faidherbe 
presented as an example of this danger the case of some volontaires who, upon 
hearing that certain Moors were plotting to side with Lat Joor against French 
forces, began to loot Moor caravans throughout Kajoor despite the governor’s 
reproaches. Further, following the French victory at Loro, “a band of volontaires” 
killed a Moor and his sister who they found among those fleeing the area.162  
Faidherbe was not the only one to express concerns about volontaires. This 
issue continued to worry French military officials well into the 1860s and 1870s. 
In February of 1870, General Pelissier wrote a summary of the political and 
military situation in Senegal following the conflicts of the 1850s and 1860s.163 
Pelissier claimed that the 1869 Battle of Mekhé against Lat Joor served as a test of 
the resolve of volontaires. French forces and their allies were made up of a column 
of 500 European soldiers and 3,000 to 4,000 volontaires, including 800 cavalry 
under the command of Captain Audibert. However, Pelissier wrote, the 
volontaires retreated “after the first shot, leaving their leader dead on the 
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battlefield.” The spahi cavalry pursued Lat Joor’s soldiers but they could not be 
subdued, disappearing into the surrounding territory. This sent a dangerous 
message to those who hoped the reputation of French military might would keep 
local populations from rising up against French officials and traders, or even 
worse, side with jihādist or other insurrectionary forces. In a further blow to 
French morale, Governor Émile Pinet-Laprade died of cholera in August of 1869. 
The spirits of French military officers were lifted slightly in September of 
that year. A convoy escorted by a column of 500 soldiers led by Lieutenant 
Colonel Lecamus managed to break through an enemy ambush at Louga to 
provision the French military installation at N’Diagne.164 This joy was short-lived, 
as the column was called back to Saint Louis after its supply mission was 
complete, instead of being allowed to further pursue the forces of Lat Joor. 
Upon the installation of a new governor in Saint Louis, Colonel François 
Xavier Valière, the military situation in Senegambia entailed possible French 
participation in two fronts: Kajoor and Eastern Senegambia, which was now 
under the control of Al-Hajj Umar Taal’s successor Amadu Seku Taal. Pelissier 
wrote that the Tukulor of “the country between Dagana and Bakel” called the 
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French “tiédos, that is to say pillagers, because we levy taxes upon them.”165 
Another reason, of course, is that Tukulor men and women saw the French as 
looters and experienced them mostly in terms of military strength, associating 
them with the military aspects of ceɗɗo culture. 
Pelissier stated that the French were aware there might be a new offensive 
led by Lat Joor in Kajoor due to “the large quantity of fusils being sold to him.” 
He also controversially acknowledged the problem stemming from France’s 
installation of local authorities whose lineages were unequal to those they 
deposed. “The Blacks have respect for the aristocracy of birth,” he wrote:  
These leaders have never enjoyed any authority in the cantons. They are 
suffered by their people. Further, the chiefs are jealous of one another and 
an invasion threatens them, as they do not know how to unite in common 
action.166 
 Instead of suggesting a major change in France’s political approach to 
Senegambian authorities, Pelissier opted for a pragmatic view toward French 
military posts: eliminate those too difficult to maintain, and reissue resources 
to areas easier to protect from indigenous forces. He suggested the 
elimination of the posts at N’Diagne, Kaoulou, and Kermandoubé Kari, all 
posts in Kajoor, which were both difficult to resupply and located in 
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dangerous territories, surrounded by enemies. Worse, their garrisons were 
not large enough to withstand a long-term siege. Pelissier suggested instead 
establishing a post at Ndande, roughly halfway between Saint Louis and 
Dakar, and stocking it with enough provisions for “one or even two columns 
of 300 to 400 men each.”167 The garrison itself, like many other French forts, 
would have only 10 men stationed there. 
Conclusion 
Case studies of the battles fought between French forces and 
Senegalese armies demonstrate the dependence of French officers on 
auxiliaries for military missions during the course of the 19th century. As the 
French worked to establish posts along the Senegal River and later in the 
peanut basin of the former Jolof Empire, Senegal’s governors and colonial 
elites relied on alliances with local forces to gain a military edge over their 
indigenous adversaries. This was the situation in both the jihād against Al-
Hajj Umar Taal and the conflict between France and the kingdom of Kajoor 
under Lat Joor Joop. French officers continued to study recruitment patterns 
and military strategies implemented by jihādist and royal armies and 
incorporated certain tactics into their own organizational structure.   
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CHAPTER FOUR: From Compagnie Noire to Tirailleurs Sénégalais: French 
Recruitment Strategies 1850-1890  
INTRODUCTION: THE ONGOING QUEST FOR MILITARY MANPOWER 
As demonstrated in Chapter Two, French colonial military officers 
undertook a number of futile schemes to increase enlistment in the first half of 
the 19th century. Vacillating between the implementation of integrated regiments 
and the separation of battalions of European and African soldiers, French 
strategies focused on conscription to meet required troop strengths. Chapter 
Three examined the various military strategies employed by the French in the 
second half of the 19th century, particularly their dependence on allied troops, 
typically referred to in official records as volontaires, “volunteers.” This chapter 
turns back the clock to examine the internal dynamics of the tirailleurs sénégalais 
and reiterates some of the external factors from the military campaigns in 
Senegambia during the same period. 
Despite the best intentions of colonial officers and ambitious military 
governors like Jean Jubelin and Louis Faidherbe, by the 1880s the tirailleurs 
sénégalais had failed to achieve the numerical strength, autonomy, and ésprit 
militaire envisioned by its creators. In fact, most French battles against African 
adversaries in Senegambia, as noted in the previous chapter, were won and lost 
depending on the strength of French alliances and the military acumen of 
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auxiliary volontaires troops. This chapter helps to illuminate the reality that, for 
the majority of the 19th century, the tirailleurs were one part of a multi-ethnic 
army made up of Europeans, Algerians, and African officers, cavalry, and 
infantry. Both French and Senegalese infantrymen participated in conflicts 
throughout Senegambia and in some cases further abroad. Indeed, it was often 
the French infantrymen, particularly disciplinaires, who were a cause of concern 
on the battlefield. 
Though often a challenge, by the 1850s the need for troops grew 
exponentially, a direct result of the French expansionist project led by a series of 
governors in Saint Louis. Even a brief survey of the biographies of the governors 
who held office from roughly 1850 to 1880 shows that the vast majority had 
military backgrounds.1 Indeed, it was only in November 1882 when the first 
civilian governor of Senegal, René Servatius, took office. By that time, the French 
expansionist project was well underway.  
Following abolition in 1848, little actually changed for the recruitment of 
African troops into the compagnie noire, the precursor of the tirailleurs sénégalais. 
Despite more favorable terms for voluntary enlistment, it seems few men were 
interested in signing up for the colonial army. The three years after 
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emancipation, only three volunteers came forward to join the French forces. 
According to Martin Klein, “by 1851 the army was buying slaves again and 
freeing them in exchange for an indenture contract of twelve to fourteen years.”2  
As noted in previous chapters, other scholars have written extensively 
about the use of captives and conscripts as soldiers, supporting the position that 
this type of enlistment “was an African practice, taken up by the French and 
continued after the slave trade itself had ended.”3 The army typically received 
recruits for the tirailleurs from the population of captives, with an enlistment 
subsidy at anywhere between 50 to 300 francs, “depending on the length of term 
and other factors.”4 The recruitment subsidy paid to enlisting troops was 
“approximately equal to the market value of a slave in the hinterland.”5 As a 
result, nearly all of these recruits are argued to have been “slaves.”6 The “vast 
majority” of enlisted French soldiers were captives purchased from traders. This 
subsidy was paid to the recruit or, more often, to a notable “who claimed the 
recruit as his son or dependent, rather than to the man himself.” The recruitment 
                                                 
2 Klein, Slavery and Colonial Rule, 28 and 74. 
3 Curtin, Economic Change, 194. 
4 Robinson, Chiefs and Clerics, 113-114. 
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bonus was raised whenever recruitment dropped and this subsidy was “in fact, a 
fee paid directly to slave dealers and owners.”7  
However, at the end of 1853, five years after the ostensible abolition of 
slavery in French territories, there were only 310 men serving in the colonial 
force made up of the compagnies du Sénégal. Free men served seven year terms 
while men who had been conscripted through the rachat process served 14 year 
enlistments.8 In his report to Emperor Napoleon III on December 3, 1853, 
Minister of the Navy and Colonies Théodore Ducos wrote about the decision to 
create a second company of African soldiers in Senegal. The request to create a 
second company had come directly from the governors of a number of French 
colonies, according to Ducos, interested in replacing the soldiers of the naval 
infantry with “native militias.”9 Further, Ducos argued that it was not only in the 
interest of economic savings, but more importantly humanitarian concerns to 
follow through with these changes. Ducos described Senegalese soldiers’ 
reputation for seriousness, courage, and military expertise that he alleged 
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improved “day after day through contact with European troops.”10 But even 
more importantly for Ducos, the acclimatization of Senegalese soldiers was 
above all the key to military success. They were immune to “the deadly 
epidemics that afflicted Europeans, making them precious subjects in the 
protection and defense of our African holdings.”11 
Ducos suggested bringing the number of troops up to 450 Senegalese 
soldiers, divided into two companies of 225 men each. He lauded their conduct 
in recent conflicts near the Senegal River, declaring that their bravery and 
heroism led to French successes over indigenous armies. However, European 
officers would be needed to lead them. Ducos asked to double the number of 
officers, NCOs, and corporals in order to provide the same number of officers to 
each company of Senegalese men. Like many officers and colonial administrators 
before him, Ducos claimed that the diminishing mortality rate in replacing white 
soldiers with Africans would lead to monetary savings.12 In this case it seems he 
was alluding in particular to the established French practice of quartering 
European soldiers in Gorée and Saint Louis to lessen their exposure to tropical 
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illnesses endemic to the region like malaria. Shortly thereafter, Ducos would 
receive an important ally in Senegal. 
A NEW ARCHITECT FOR THE IMPERIAL PROJECT 
One of the most obvious catalysts for the creation, expansion, and 
professionalization of the Senegalese colonial army, the soon-to-be-named 
tirailleurs sénégalais, is the appointment of then colonel of the engineering corps, 
Louis Léon César Faidherbe, to the governorship of Senegal in 1854, and his 
decision to continue in the steps of his predecessor Auguste-Leopold Protet. 
Faidherbe first arrived in Senegal in 1852 and was charged with constructing the 
fort at Podor, in Fuuta Tooro, to assert French authority over trade on the 
Senegal River. Prior to his time in Senegal, Faidherbe served in Guadeloupe and 
Algeria, and was familiar with Arabic and Islam.13 He was also a committed 
imperialist who moved quickly to challenge Waalo, Kajoor, and block the 
advance of Al-Hajj Umar Taal in Fuuta Tooro, and he dominated the political 
landscape of Senegambia with terms as governor from 1854 to 1861 and again 
from 1863 to 1865. Faidherbe benefited directly from the merit-based system of 
promotion in the French military, rising through the ranks of the engineering 
corps from lieutenant colonel to colonel just before he took over the 
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governorship. He would attain the rank of brigadier general following his 
military success in Senegambia. 
Upon his assumption of the governorship, Faidherbe began a process to 
increase the number of Senegalese troops serving in French colonial forces. 
Under his command, the number of African men under arms would increase. He 
also presided over the growth of a European and métis officer class. Métis men of 
European and Senegalese descent trained at the prestigious military academy at 
Saint Cyr, located near Paris, and returned to Senegal following their military 
education.14 The promotion of métis soldiers may also have been based on French 
policies in Algeria, with which Faidherbe would have been familiar as a result of 
his prior experience in North Africa. Writing in support of Faidherbe’s request 
for Algerian cavalry for the conflict in Kajoor, Minister of Algeria and the 
Colonies Prosper de Chasseloup-Laubat shared his thoughts on the matter. “Care 
should be taken,” he wrote: 
to finalize the number of native officers returning to each company and 
preferably include, if possible, officers of color. The presence of these 
officers in Senegal would be highly useful to excite the emulation of the 
native population among whom we have only to this day found soldiers. 
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We have not yet installed within the tirailleurs sénégalais battalions a native 
officer, and yet those officers would be very useful to command posts in 
the interior within which European officers can only with great difficulty 
live multiple years in succession.15 
Tirailleurs, spahis, and volontaires from the Senegambia region, however, 
rarely advanced beyond the ranks of non-commissioned officers.16 
Faidherbe strongly believed in the necessity of a continuous supply of 
indigenous Senegalese troops for colonial expansion. It is important to remember 
that he was engaged in a number of conflicts over the same period in which he 
hoped to increase the size of his army. Faidherbe continued earlier recruitment 
policies, attempting to recruit free men as well as former war captives and 
indentured servants into the tirailleurs.17 However, as noted in Chapter Two, 
tirailleurs recruitment was constantly plagued by the absence of enough men for 
regular duty. Thus, at the same time that he was lobbying Paris for royal support 
of an all African force, Faidherbe sent an update on the status of Senegalese 
troops to Minister of the Navy and Colonies Alphonse Hamelin. He told 
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Hamelin that he would continue to do his best to avoid “taking on those men 
from the current Black company and others, like slaves, who have attached to 
them a negative lens in the eyes of the Blacks.” However, he continued, “I do not 
intend to deprive myself completely of this excellent resource.”18 It is possible 
that Faidherbe was simply restating informal French policy up to 1857. French 
officials, immediately after the passing of the 1848 emancipation decree, assured 
the chiefs of neighboring states that emancipation would have no effect on 
slavery outside French jurisdiction and “received authority from Paris to expel 
unwanted runaway slaves from the colony.”19 
Of the 225 men currently serving in the colonial military, Faidherbe wrote 
that there were at least 100 who were excellent soldiers, men who were married 
with children and who should continue to serve locally, as opposed to being 
stationed abroad. Faidherbe stressed the importance of enlisting and retaining 
officers who spoke local languages, particularly Wolof, for the compagnie de 
formation, which was entrusted with the training of indigenous troops.20 
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Faidherbe continued that he only had one man on hand, a Captain Coquet, fit to 
command the compagnie de formation, though he also suggested the promotion of 
two French officers, Provost and Benech, to 2nd lieutenant and 1st lieutenant, 
respectively.21 Unfortunately, Faidherbe did not enter into greater detail about 
the language skills of the officers he proposed to lead the compagnie de formation, 
but this focus on learning local languages was a hallmark of his colonial career. 
As a result, during the 1860s and 1870s Faidherbe would study and publish 
works on the languages he found most important for the Senegambia region: 
Wolof, Seereer, and the Tukulor dialect of the Pulaar language family.22 
The battalion of tirailleurs sénégalais was established by imperial decree on 
21 July 1857 under the direction of Napoleon III and his minister of the navy and 
colonies, Admiral Alphonse Ferdinand Hamelin.23 The battalion would be made 
up of four companies led by three officers each. All other companies would be 
dissolved to create the battalions of tirailleurs. That included the compagnies 
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22 Louis Léon César Faidherbe, Vocabulaire Wolof, Poular, Soninké (1860); Louis Léon Faidherbe, 
Étude sur la Langue Sérére (1862); Louis Léon César Faidherbe, Essai sur la Langue Poul: Grammaire 
et Vocabulaire (Paris: Maisonneuve, 1875). 
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indigènes, the “native companies,” that until 1857 provided the greatest military 
support in Senegal. Any soldiers who were not reassigned to the tirailleurs 
sénégalais would be sent to “native companies” in Africa, the Caribbean, and 
elsewhere in the French Empire. At the outset, all awards, pensions, regulations, 
and statutes of military justice would be identical to those of French infantry 
regiments. However, it would be up to the minister of the navy and colonies to 
outline the specificities of payment, organization, uniforms, weapons issued, and 
general discipline.24 
In addition to the original decree, a more detailed document was prepared 
to fully outline the framework of the new force. Penned by Hamelin, 21 articles 
were added to the original four, on topics that ranged from recruitment 
questions to uniforms and rations.25 Within the new set of regulations, Article 
Two stated that recruitment would be voluntary and for two year terms, 
reenlistment would entail four year terms, and Senegalese soldiers could be 
dismissed for poor conduct or “unfitness for service.” The third article outlined 
the oath of allegiance. Swearing allegiance to the emperor, recruits would take 
their oath in the presence of the battalion commander, an interpreter, and two 
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other soldiers who would serve as witnesses. Muslim soldiers would swear their 
oath on the Qur’an.26  
Articles Four through Eight detailed a variety of regulations regarding 
officers and NCOs, including the stipulation that, regardless of seniority, 
Senegalese corporals and NCOs would always be subordinate to their European 
counterparts. Officers would be chosen from among the ranks of the naval 
infantry. In the early stages following the creation of the tirailleurs, the governor 
of Senegal could grant NCO and corporal appointments to “natives” who spoke 
French.27 If there were not enough to fill the vacancies, it was acceptable instead 
to confer these positions upon European soldiers from the naval infantry 
divisions, preferably those with local language skills. Noted only as “langue du 
pays,” it is unclear if there was a language preference for Wolof, Mandinka, one 
of the Pulaar dialects spoken in the region, or Bambara, the language that would 
serve as the lingua franca of tirailleurs forces in the 20th century.28 
The next series of articles covered uniforms, equipment, and arms. 
Military medals and other decorations would be similar to those of the naval 
infantry. Infantry would be outfitted with double-barreled muskets, and 
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28 “Règlement…de Tirailleurs Sénégalais,” July 21, 1857, SHD. 
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corporals, NCOs, and first class infantry would also carry the 1816 model 
infantry saber. Soldiers who fought in the compagnies indigènes would return their 
uniforms for a refund and receive new uniforms created for the tirailleurs. 
Outside of uniforms, however, tirailleurs were to be subject to the same 
regulations governing pay, assessments and reviews, military justice, and 
discipline of the naval infantry. Further, tirailleurs were to be sent to and treated 
in the same hospitals as European officers and rank-and-file soldiers. The 
governor of Senegal was provisionally authorized to change any of these 
regulations, subject to conditions in the colony. The final article reiterated the 
primacy of European officers and troops over Senegalese soldiers, noting that “in 
all cases where European troops serve with tirailleurs sénégalais, they will rank 
above them, in accordance with article four of the regulation on the armed 
services on campaign.”29   
Throughout the first year of the tirailleurs sénégalais’ official existence, 
Governor Louis Faidherbe wrote a number of letters and reports about questions 
of training and recruitment. For example, in September of 1857 Faidherbe 
followed up on his earlier reports about the new tirailleurs force.30 In his letter to 
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Minister Hamelin, Faidherbe expressed his concern about disbanding the “white 
companies” before the tirailleurs were ready. At this time, he claimed that the two 
initial companies of tirailleurs were made up of 128 men each, a strength that 
could only replace the “compagnie noire,” or “Black company.” Faidherbe argued 
that he should be able to maintain the two European companies until a third and 
fourth company of tirailleurs were established to replace them. He expected he 
would be able to phase out the compagnie noire by January of 1858. At the time of 
his writing, the corps was below full strength, made up of around 190 men. This 
would prove financially beneficial for the French colonial military, as the soldiers 
from the compagnie noire, once integrated into the tirailleurs forces, would not 
receive an enlistment bonus and would no longer receive annual bonuses as 
tirailleurs. Faidherbe also asked the minister to allow him to retain certain 
members of the compagnie noire as laptots, sailors who served in commercial and 
military roles highlighted in Chapter Two, singling out those men who had two 
years or less left on their 14 year contracts and stating that “it would be cruel to 
send to distant countries men who have served for 12 years and who have for the 
most part their wives and children here.”31 
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A dispatch Faidherbe sent to Hamelin in November of 1857 provides 
some insight into the makeup of the tirailleurs and volontaires through an unlikely 
topic: the subject of wine rations and alcohol consumption by indigenous 
troops.32 Faidherbe opened by stating his understanding of the Senegalese view 
of the military: that recruitment was difficult in a territory where military service 
was often perceived as dishonorable. To find volunteers for the tirailleurs, 
Faidherbe noted, required the adaptation of living and working conditions for 
the peoples of Senegambia.33 He wrote that steps had been taken over the past 
three months to bring changes about, including modifications to armament, 
uniforms, and rations. For example, many prospective Senegalese soldiers were 
interested in the double-barreled muskets carried by tirailleurs. The French 
military saw it as effective to use these weapons against similarly armed 
indigenous forces, and Faidherbe claimed that Senegalese men did not endanger 
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de Tirailleurs Sénégalais,” November 16, 1857, 4 D 1, ANS.  
33 Faidherbe to Hamelin, November 16, 1857, ANS. 
235 
themselves or mishandle these weapons because they did not drink heavily like 
European troops.34  
However, the problem of alcohol consumption created further problems 
for the relationships between French soldiers and their Senegalese counterparts. 
Faidherbe complained that Senegalese soldiers were selling their wine to 
European NCOs, corporals, buglers, and others, leading to widespread 
drunkenness and dysentery among French troops, even leading to up to 50 
percent of their deaths.35 He suggested replacing wine rations with monetary 
compensation of 15 centimes. This may have stemmed from French policy in 
Algeria at the time, where tirailleurs in France’s Algerian units were given two 
rations of coffee instead of brandy or rum, an acknowledgement of their 
adherence to Islam.36 Another possible conclusion is that by this time the French 
military was receiving few soldiers from ceɗɗo forces and more Muslim soldiers, 
or that ceɗɗo warriors were no longer engaging in the same drinking behavior 
that identified them in the prior century. 
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One month later, Faidherbe sent a further update. He wrote to Hamelin 
that the first two companies of tirailleurs would be complete by the end of 1857, 
creating a division of 256 Senegalese men, 160 of whom were previously enlisted 
in the compagnie indigène but had not finished out their 14 year enlistments.37 
Faidherbe then repeated the oft mentioned complaint of French officers that 
African soldiers were being used as laborers, performing menial tasks like 
watering gardens and taking care of livestock instead of drilling and patrolling. 
He noted that most soldiers were scattered around French territory in 
detachments of 30 men or less, though recruits in Saint Louis were also given the 
more “unpleasant chores” instead of European soldiers. He wrote that the 
officers from the naval infantry regiments were partly to blame. These men had a 
low opinion of Senegalese soldiers and refused to allow African sergeants or 
corporals authority over European troops, including punishing French soldiers 
who insulted them.38 
This treatment of Senegalese soldiers was causing a breakdown in 
discipline and institutional integrity, as these men were no longer a military 
corps, Faidherbe wrote, so much as African laborers. He noted that for one of the 
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recent expeditions on the upper Senegal River, Captain Duroch brought many 
small detachments of tirailleurs to Podor. These men had “forgotten all 
discipline…finding it extraordinary that others wanted to give them orders” and 
there was a riot on board the ship Duroch commanded.39 Faidherbe argued, 
however, that these soldiers had in them the potential to be fine soldiers, and it 
was simply the failure of their commanding officers to treat them as military 
professionals that led to breakdowns in discipline. But men like Captain Duroch 
were presenting Senegalese soldiers as “true savages,” undermining the 
relationship between French officers and their subordinates.40 
Instead, Faidherbe suggested that tirailleurs be separated in duties from 
laptots or other African workers who would complete tasks that French soldiers 
would not, in addition to a detachment of European soldiers to garrison each 
post or fort in the colony. Then tirailleurs would have their time free to train 
under the orders of their commanding officers, to go on expeditions, form 
military installations, and carry out campaigns in the regions in which they were 
stationed. If a French post required reinforcements, one or two of the newly 
formed companies, or a section of one company, could be dispatched. These 
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bands of soldiers would always be under the command of their officers and, as a 
result, would eventually become more like the French companies they were 
created to replace. Further, Faidherbe argued, they could be deployed more 
rapidly than European troops.41 
After 1857 the number of recruits increased, but it is likely that some were 
“either slaves purchased for military service or recently freed slaves who chose 
military life over the insecurities of freedom.”42 The French administration 
continued to use the policy of rachat to obtain recruits during the conflicts of the 
second half of the 19th century.43 They also used the abolition of slavery in 1848 
to their advantage. Faidherbe’s policies allowed France to “ally itself to slavers 
and to tolerate slavery while seeming to be hostile to it.”44 To link his actions to 
abolitionists’ goals, Faidherbe stated that the slave trade would be suppressed 
only when it was eradicated in areas that provided captives. Thus, true abolition 
was linked to the conquest of further territory in Senegal.45 His 1857 circular, one 
of the most important texts elaborating his colonial policy on slavery, limited the 
extent of the 1848 law. In it, Faidherbe stated that when France was at war with 
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an African state, runaway captives and “slaves” would be freed and welcomed 
by officials in French-controlled territory. Those fleeing states at peace with the 
French would be expelled “as vagabonds dangerous for order and public 
peace.”46 This included servants who sought freedom while accompanying their 
masters on official visits to Saint Louis. Faidherbe felt no need to justify his 
policy on humanitarian grounds.47 He stressed that the circular was a private 
communiqué, not a publicly issued ordinance. In it, he “reaffirmed the French 
policy of allowing French subjects, as opposed to citizens, to retain their slaves.”48  
During the jihād of Al-Hajj Umar Taal, Faidherbe recruited Mande men as 
workers and soldiers and encouraged Umarian followers to defect and join his 
forces.49 As early as 1856 the commandant of Podor offered inducements to 
Mande captives to join the French army, “on the assumption that their hatred for 
the Tokolor [allied with Umar Taal] would make them reliable soldiers.”50 After 
the Battle of Médine, Faidherbe gave specific instructions to the captain and post 
commanders to entice “Umarian slaves to desert while returning the slaves of 
allies; and intensive recruitment of workers and soldiers, especially among those 
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who had just been enslaved in Kaarta and brought to Senegambia.”51 
Emancipation was administered selectively by the French. Faidherbe “used 
emancipations to punish ‘enemies of France’ but turned a blind eye to the slave-
holdings of African allies.” Many former captives ended up in the army as 
tirailleurs.52 Under Faidherbe, these forces could “inflict the flow of weapons 
towards friends and away from foes, ‘liberate’ some slaves, and return, indeed 
sell, others.” This conquest was facilitated by his “opportunistic manipulation of 
official policy toward slavery.”53   
The policy directive issued by Faidherbe was kept in place by succeeding 
governors. In 1869 an officer at the French fort at Salde was advised to “do 
nothing to displease the people with whom we are friends,” and return the 
captives of France’s African allies. This approach was effectively French policy 
throughout the late 19th century.54 Unfortunately, due to the ramp up in military 
campaigns during the 1850s and 1860s, information on the expansion of the 
tirailleurs sénégalais forces is limited. As a counterpoint, requests for tirailleurs 
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from the far reaches of the French Empire demonstrate the growing reputation of 
tirailleurs troops and the difficulty in finding new recruits. 
Governor Faidherbe’s January 1864 response to a request to send 
Senegalese tirailleurs to Mexico demonstrates both the reputation and limitations 
of tirailleurs forces. In the letter, Faidherbe claimed that at the present, tirailleurs 
were “easily recruited.” However, he continued, in the recent past “there was, 
for a moment, an uncertainty of success. It was scarcity in the country that tipped 
the scales in favor of the battalion. They enlisted because they were dying of 
starvation.”55 This passage makes two things clear: first, despite the shift to 
complete voluntary enrollment (at least officially), joining the tirailleurs did not 
naturally heighten in appeal to Senegalese men; second, interest in becoming a 
tirailleur was so low that only famine was bringing men to enlist.  
Further, Faidherbe claimed that there were reasons specific to the region 
that made enlistment unlikely for overseas positions. He noted that if voluntary 
enlistment increased in recent years it was because “the service of the battalion is 
well known throughout the country,” that “the longest absences imposed on 
tirailleurs are the one year absences at the lower coast,” and that, excepting those 
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absences, “at all other garrisons, tirailleurs are joined by their wives.”56 In 
contrast, the request sent late in 1863 by Minister of the Navy and Colonies 
Prosper de Chasseloup-Laubat for soldiers for military campaigns in Mexico 
suggested a minimum of four year engagements for tirailleurs. Faidherbe 
expressed reservations that tirailleurs could be convinced to leave their wives for 
that length of time.57 
Faidherbe’s letter contains two additional points of interest. First, he noted 
that it would be a major cultural issue to bring a large number of tirailleurs to 
Mexico, for religious reasons. “Almost all of our tirailleurs are from Fouta, that is 
to say, Muslims,” Faidherbe claimed. He suggested it might be a risky move 
politically to bring these soldiers to a “Spanish country” because “African 
Muslims, for the Mexicans, resemble entirely moros [Moors, or Muslims], against 
whom there is such intense national hatred.”58 Second, he briefly mentioned 
another wrinkle in providing soldiers for the Mexico campaign: the loss of 
around 80 men, with 70 killed at Ngolgol. This is a reference to the December 
1863 battle against Lat Joor Joop in Kajoor discussed in the previous chapter. 
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A few days later, on January 30th, Faidherbe sent a follow up letter to 
Minister of the Navy and Colonies Chasseloup-Laubat reasserting his claim that 
the tirailleurs sénégalais forces were still down at least 70 men. After hearing back 
from his subordinate in Podor, Faidherbe wrote that there was only one way to 
have as many recruits as would be necessary to replenish the tirailleurs ranks: 
accepting runaway captives.59 However, Faidherbe claimed that this would only 
provide a sufficient number for Senegal. The quantity of troops needed for 
Mexico was too great for this to be a feasible recruitment option. Faidherbe 
declared that adopting this means of recruitment:  
would bring great disorder and a general war, and we would likely be 
obligated to send two more battalions to Senegal in support of this war. 
There would then be no benefit in implementing this operation.60  
Faidherbe claimed that emancipation was progressing in Senegal on a 
daily basis because the French were employing it only “in wise and honest 
ways.”61 
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THE PROFESSIONALIZATION OF THE TIRAILLEURS SÉNÉGALAIS 
Requests for tirailleurs regiments for French colonies continued 
throughout the middle to late 1800s. Another entreaty from far afield came from 
Cochinchine, French Indochina (today part of Vietnam), in 1867. The response, 
penned by Lt. Col. Millet and addressed to Inspector General of the Naval 
Infantry Sarolet de Puligni, contained much information about the state of the 
tirailleurs forces, particularly in terms of recruitment.62  
Responding to a question about the availability of African troops for 
French colonial missions in Indochina, Millet responded that putting together 
new companies could be done without difficulty, drawing European officers 
from naval infantry regiments. He claimed these men were well versed in 
working with “native subjects” and had the knowledge to create the new 
company, or five or six more.63 Half of the corporal positions would be awarded 
to Senegalese troops who spoke French, and the other half would go to European 
tirailleurs. In the case of insufficient availability for these positions, the French 
military would depend on filling vacancies from the naval infantry and the line 
infantry (infanterie de ligne, similar to light infantry regiments). One-third of 
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sergeant appointments would be reserved for Senegalese troops, with the other 
two-thirds, as well as positions of quartermaster, sergeant-major, and adjutant 
endowed to European corporals and NCOs, and possibly Africans who were 
able to meet the “conditions of fitness required by regulations.”64 However, 
African officers would wear the same uniform as tirailleurs, differentiated only 
by the decorations sewn onto their uniforms.65 
Millet discussed other practical concerns like weaponry, where he claimed 
that tirailleurs preferred double-barreled muskets. These firearms “inspired” their 
confidence, which he said was the guns only true benefit. Otherwise they were 
expensive, fragile, and very difficult to maintain. Even worse, the process to 
reload them was long and difficult, and they had a very short range with low 
accuracy. They were particularly questionable in humid conditions and would 
not be able to long withstand the weather of Southeast Asia. According to Millet, 
this meant that tirailleurs in French Indochina would need at the very least 
Chassepot rifles. Another benefit was that by this time Chassepot rifles cost less 
than double-barreled muskets and needed half the maintenance.66  
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When it came to finding Senegalese troops for the endeavor, Millet wrote 
that it would be much more difficult to only allow voluntary recruits in the 
tirailleurs given the direction taken after the 1857 decree. Two major impediments 
necessitated that enlistees be free men and that all men who joined sign up in 
Saint Louis, in front of the commissaire aux revues, who was in charge of military 
payments. This reduced the availability of men for service. Millet noted that 
recruitment only truly concerned the neighboring populations of Saint Louis, 
which he estimated at around 80,000 people. Of the 80,000 residents, servants 
and other household dependents would not be allowed to leave their patrons or 
the professions in which they worked, nor would the military appeal to those 
men who had enough money or professional success to maintain their and their 
families’ lifestyles. No, claimed Millet, only those who were “without shelter and 
the means of existence” were available for service, providing men who were 
“lazy subjects, drunks, and thieves.”67 Further, Millet wrote, men were only 
available during years of famine or drought, and religious calm. This was, he 
said, because of their religious fervor and love of liberty. Thus, men were more 
likely to join in jihādist than colonial efforts, and rarely enlisted in the tirailleurs if 
they had any other recourse. 
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The greatest enlistment numbers came, according to Millet, following the 
wars with the kingdoms of Kajoor and Waalo and after extensive devastation 
and famine in 1864 and 1865, when locusts plagued much of Northern 
Senegambia. However, by 1866 there were already problems maintaining the full 
strength of the tirailleurs battalion, and in 1867 the activism of Maba Jaxu Ba in 
Saalum further depressed the number of men willing to sign up for French 
service. The colonial military had to draw from outside sources to replace 
casualties. Millet believed that without extenuating circumstances, the 
recruitment of free men would be a constant stumbling block to French efforts to 
build a majority Senegalese force in West Africa. 
In contrast, Millet argued that there were two possibilities in addition to 
hoping for calamitous events to provide new recruits. The first idea Millet 
expressed was to search for men outside of the Saint Louis area, further into the 
“remote populations.”68 He believed that allowing on-site enlistment in far-flung 
localities would allow for greater recruitment closer to Gorée and the Atlantic 
coast, as well as further west along the banks of the Senegal River. He also 
maintained that the cost of travel was too high for many men who would 
otherwise join. Hiring them and providing free transport for their official 
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enlistment in Saint Louis was Millet’s suggestion. However, Millet later noted 
that the commander of the Gorée fort reported that he was unable to find recruits 
as “all the young people [were] busy with cultural activities.”69 Millet relayed the 
information sent to him from other subordinates: at Bakel, Captain André 
reported that during the previous month he had not been able to find a single 
volunteer; Captain Maurial claimed that for three months he had also been at a 
loss to find recruits. This problem was widespread, not limited simply to 
recruitment efforts for tirailleurs, and affected the naval infantry and engineering 
troops, despite the heightened salaries offered to new recruits.70 
Millet’s second suggestion was to reinstate the enlistment of former 
captives, which he claimed was “the only way to ensure for the battalion certain 
and numerous recruits.”71 Millet believed the previous system of recruitment was 
overly criticized and poorly appreciated, and that it would become evident that 
returning to this system of recruitment would lead to a higher level of esprit 
militaire, “military spirit,” within the rank-and-file. In fact, he argued that 
combining the enlistment of captives and the recruitment of free men in Senegal 
would equate to military practices in France. Further, Millet asserted that the best 
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soldiers bequeathed to the tirailleurs were “brave Bambaras” who during battles 
at Ngolgol and Tiofat “died with their weapons in their hands, rather than 
surrender.”72 He also believed that a conscript-style army would allow for 
greater mobility and maneuverability comparable to that of European troops. 
The forces would eliminate the need to bring women along when soldiers went 
on extended expeditions. Instead, having instituted the French policy of 
ordinaires, troops would be provided meals in their barracks. It is unclear why 
eating in the barracks as opposed to eating communally would negate the need 
for women to cook food for the soldiers, but this was not a point upon which 
Millet greatly elaborated. Contracts would be for a “voluntary” engagement of 
14 years and enslaved men would be given money by the French to buy their 
freedom and immediately enlist. This contrasts with the enlistment terms for free 
men, which at this point numbered a total of four to six years upon the initial 
engagement.73 
Another interesting assertion by Millet was that soldiers of “slave” status 
who joined would not be viewed as inferior by their “free” comrades. Thus there 
were no concerns about lowering morale or placing a damper on voluntary 
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recruitments if the French allowed in soldiers marked by captivity. He also wrote 
that Fuuta Jalon would provide the best soldiers. Recruits could be found 
cheaply there: 120 francs to 280 francs in payment, or an annuity of 14 francs and 
30 centimes for each man, compared to voluntary enlistments that cost 25 francs 
per man. One reason for the lengthy initial enlistment term of 14 years was the 
unlikelihood of reenlistment. Millet wrote that most tirailleurs only reenlisted if 
they did not have the means to retire after their initial term.74 
Millet wrote Senegalese men often enlisted out of a desire to see France or 
to afford the hajj, the pilgrimage to Mecca that all practicing Muslims hope to 
complete during their lifetimes.75 Though the latter is much likelier than the 
former, it is possible to extrapolate from this claim that, at the very least, 
Senegalese men continued to enlist as a way to create livelihoods for themselves 
and their families. Taking this to a different but related conclusion, Millet 
thought the French could recruit more soldiers for engagements in French 
Indochina by providing the pilgrimage to Mecca en route from Senegal to 
Southeast Asia. He believed enlistments would go up once Senegalese men 
learned of their compatriots’ journeys, so much so that he outlined the ideal 
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route. Tirailleurs would be transported via the Red Sea, arriving at Jeddah, to 
make a 90 kilometer journey, stay briefly in Mecca, and return to their ships for a 
trip of eight or nine days total.76 Leading the tirailleurs on their journey would be 
African officers. Upon their return they could wear green caps or “turbans,” 
signifying their status as hajji. In Senegal the pilgrimage would have also been 
marked by men’s adoption of the title al-hajj. The desire to provide this 
possibility for Senegalese soldiers may have related to French understandings of 
why these men served in jihādist conflicts likes that of Al-Hajj Umar Taal. In 
offering to sponsor the hajj, French military officials hoped to deny one incentive 
for recruitment while also displaying a tolerance for religion within the ranks of 
the tirailleurs forces. 
Governor Pinet-Laprade wrote a follow up to Millet’s letter on February 1, 
1868 to the Minister of the Navy and Colonies Charles Rigault de Genouilly. He 
noted that from the time of its inception in July of 1857 until Lt. Col. Millet 
became the commander in charge of the tirailleurs sénégalais, voluntary enlistment 
had been the order of the day, with four year contracts and a signing bonus of 
100 francs.77 In that time, Pinet-Laprade relayed, Millet was “easily worn out by 
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the exclusive use of voluntary enlistment, despite successive increases in troop 
strength and regular losses at the hands of the enemy.”78 He continued: 
Since the abolition of slavery, the local administration has always favored, 
among the neighboring peoples to our territory for whom this measure 
could not be extended, freedom or, to say it better, manumission [rachat] 
paid for by slaves themselves. The combination that we propose for the 
recruitment of the Cochinchine battalion will be nothing but a new 
encouragement of this process of rachat.79  
Pinet-Laprade went on to state that a bonus of 200 francs paid to those 
who enlisted in the force departing for French Indochina was the equivalent of 
“the highest price for a full-grown male slave.”80 He claimed that many “slaves” 
who wanted to be free would be able to come to an agreement with their patrons 
to receive their liberty in exchange for a percentage of or their entire signing 
bonus. They would be given the bonus on the day they signed a seven year 
contract to become tirailleurs.  
Pinet-Laprade went on to propose a new paradigm for colonial forces: a 
rotation between colonial outposts. He suggested a regular alternation between 
the garrisons of various colonies and the depot in Senegal. Proposing the return 
of tirailleurs to Senegal after five years, including their journey to and from 
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Southeast Asia, the governor believed that it would be possible to create a 
reservoir of men who could capably serve throughout the French Empire. 
Further, through their contact with “civilization,” rendered generically, these 
soldiers would assist “the intellectual and moral development of the races of 
Senegambia.”81 In contrast to Millet, who argued that the best troops would be 
found in Fuuta Jalon, Pinet-Laprade claimed that it was on the upper Senegal 
River where the French military found “good elements.”82 But like his 
commanding officer, he believed it would be best to avoid sending any women 
or children. He argued that only single men should be enlisted in the 
Cochinchine forces.  
A CONTINUED NEED FOR VOLONTAIRES: AUXILIARY TROOPS AT THE CLOSE OF THE 
19TH CENTURY 
Pinet-Laprade died the following year in a cholera epidemic “that 
decimated French personnel” in Senegal. Prior to his death, the governor was 
warned not to provoke any wars in the region as he would not be liable to 
receive any European reinforcements. Due to the rise in conflict in Europe at the 
end of the 1860s, and the Franco-Prussian war of 1870 to 1871 that ended the 
reign of Louis Napoleon, the military administration in France once more turned 
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away from conflicts in Senegambia. One result of this was the recognition of Lat 
Joor as Damel of Kajoor in 1871.83 Under different leadership, the lack of 
available French soldiers and officers for military expeditions in Senegal might 
have led to a broader recognition of the capabilities of Senegalese men in the 
region. This does not seem to have been the case, as the complaints of colonial 
administrators a decade later show.  
In his report on the 1881-1882 campaign in the Western Soudan region, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Gustave Borgnis-Desbordes extolled the service of his French 
officers but described his African troops in less glowing terms. Those who 
participated in the campaign included the European officer class, a mixed 
cavalry platoon, and infantrymen who were mostly tirailleurs sénégalais and 
European disciplinaires, penal troops recruited from French prisons. However, 
Borgnis-Desbordes claimed that the disciplinaires among the ranks were too small 
in number to make any general conclusions regarding their level of aptitude. He 
also expressed the common concern among French officers for the fortitude of 
French soldiers in the grueling heat of the Sahel.84 
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Borgnis-Desbordes, who had been appointed commandant-superieur du 
Haut-Fleuve by Governor Brière d l’Isle, claimed he had a major problem with 
desertion in his 1881-1882 report. Furthermore, former captives accounted for 
four out of every five desertions. According to Borgnis-Desbordes, in the six 
months following December of 1881, he lost 10 tirailleurs in total: four from the 
6th company and six from the 7th company. Eight of these soldiers were former 
captives and eight ranked as tirailleurs of the 2nd class, though it is unclear if the 
same soldiers are represented by both figures. Further, Borgnis-Desbordes 
claimed that, given current desertion rates, the “native” troops would lose 11 
percent of their troop strength per year.85 In a footnote, he added that at the fort 
at Kita, over the winter months of 1881-1882, the French also lost seven tirailleurs 
from the 2nd company. Five of those tirailleurs were former captives and two 
were free men. Borgnis-Desbordes calculated that would lead to a yearly attrition 
rate of 10.5 percent at the fort.86 
Borgnis-Desbordes was of the opinion that the tirailleurs he described as 
prone to desertion may have been an exception to the general character of 
tirailleurs forces, adding that due to circumstances on the ground, they were 
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perhaps badly recruited and poorly composed. “Unfortunately,” he wrote, “this 
is not the case and the obvious proof comes from this sentence I wrote in a 
January 13, 1882 letter to the Governor.” Quoting his prior correspondence, 
Borgnis-Desbordes relayed his observation that the “two companies of tirailleurs 
are superior in all respects to those I have here.”87 Among his many complaints, 
he listed the general morality of tirailleurs, claiming that they regularly stole 
ammunition and tools and committed “genuine acts of brigandage.”88 When 
discussing the status of uniforms, Borgnis-Desbordes registered his complaint 
that tirailleurs, instead of traveling with their changes of clothes, would leave 
Saint Louis with only one full uniform, and sell the rest of their clothing before 
their departure. 
The commandant-supérior pointed out that due to a yellow fever 
outbreak, the large number of troops in the 6th and 7th companies under present 
command were almost completely out of commission. He had only half the 
typical number of officers: one captain, one 1st lieutenant, and one 2nd 
lieutenant. The captain had no experience working with tirailleurs sénégalais. As 
for the lieutenant, he was “just mediocre,” and of the two “native” officers, the 
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one who was most zealous was given no authority by the troops due to his status 
as a “former slave.” Caste identity resonated regardless of their military 
affiliation as ostensibly “French” soldiers.89 
Discipline was a major concern, particularly for those tirailleurs believed to 
have committed offense and those who refused to follow the orders of their 
French commanding officers. Borgnis-Desbordes described one incident at Kayes 
as follows:  
[A] captain came one day to inform me that his men, taking sides with one 
of their own who had just been shackled, had overrun the prison and 
refused to obey him. I was obliged to personally intervene and put an end 
to this protest, which was such a serious attack on discipline. I was 
determined to shoot on the spot the first tirailleur who refused to exit. 
They no doubt understood that the continuation of this revolt would cost 
them dearly, and after a few seconds of hesitation they came back to 
order.90 
Another incident of indiscipline described by Borgnis-Desbordes took 
place at Kita and concerned the use of corvée labor.91 The threat of highly severe 
punishments was not always enough, according to Borgnis-Desbordes, who 
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claimed that tirailleurs  “regularly” insulted superior officers and that the risks 
they were willing to take were becoming more frequent, despite “the very severe 
punishments that have been inflicted upon them.”92 The situation had become so 
dire, indeed, that he ordered the officer in charge to “blow the brains out” of the 
first tirailleur who was willing to strike an officer. It seems, however, that this 
threat quelled the recent rebellions by tirailleurs under French command. 
In addition to the tirailleurs under his command, Borgnis-Desbordes noted 
that he had a platoon of spahi cavalry made up of nine Europeans and 16 
Africans, though he again bemoaned the indiscipline and inferiority of his 
current platoon. He did find praise for his team of 19 interpreters. Unfortunately 
for the purposes of this research, he did not detail what languages these men 
spoke. Most were listed by first name only, though the recognizable surnames 
Fall and Dia are included among the group.93 Borgnis-Desbordes reminded the 
governor of the indispensability of interpreters for the colonial mission and 
despaired the elimination of the so-called “hostage schools” that provided better 
interpreters and contributed to French “political domination.”94  
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One of Borgnis-Desbordes’s major complaints was that the military 
instruction given to tirailleurs had not improved their weapons handling. Though 
he claimed that his African soldiers went “bravely and enthusiastically into the 
fire,” he was unhappy about their accuracy. He relayed an experience with 
tirailleurs on a reconnaissance mission on the Niger River, where enemy troops 
were slow to withdraw due to the “poorly directed fire” of the soldiers and the 
failure of the cavalry to shoot on target. Instead, Borgnis-Desbordes claimed, the 
enemy must have thought that his troops' rifles were “ineffective.”95  
Elsewhere, Malcolm Thompson has noted the “infamous case” of the 
Voulet-Chanoine expedition of 1898 to 1899. The expedition veered off course 
from its objective, to occupy what is today Chad, in order to go on a slaving 
mission. According to Thompson, French officers used these captives to “’buy’ 
the loyalty of their tirailleurs who only a few months before had been sòfa 
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warriors in the armies of Amadou and Samori.”96 This practice of conscription 
and the admittance of captives into conquering armies after the conflict 
originated in a Senegambian military culture in place since the 18th century. The 
flow of troops from one army to another created a reservoir of professional 
combatants in the region, and they would come to form the backbone of the 
French colonial military as it moved against enemies of its encroachment 
throughout West Africa. 
Conclusion 
A closer examination of French recruitment and training strategies 
illuminates the influence of the military governors of Senegal during the 
expansionist period of the middle to late 19th century. Charting the growth of 
the tirailleurs sénégalais army during a period of great conflict in the region 
clarifies the reality that, for the majority of the 19th century, the tirailleurs were 
one part of a multi-ethnic army made up of Europeans, Algerians, and 
Senegalese officers, cavalry, and infantry. The practice of conscription and the 
admission of adversaries into conquering armies in post-war landscapes 
originated in a Senegambian military culture in place since the 18th century. The 
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flow of troops from one army to another created a reservoir of professional 
combatants in the region, and they would come to form the backbone of the 
French colonial military as it moved against enemies of its encroachment 
throughout West Africa. 
CHAPTER FIVE: Soldiers Abroad: French Military Expansion in West Africa, 
1890-1910 
 
“The Senegalese in front of their pyramid tents, quietly smoke their pipes. For them war 
is the normal state; they do not live in peace…The elders recount stories of their 
campaigns since the time of Faidherbe, and their conquests and defeats at our side; for 
them there is only one Black king left who dares to resist France. This king is Béhanzin.”1 
 
INTRODUCTION: BROADENING THE TIRAILLEURS PROJECT  
 As evidenced in previous chapters, the period from 1850 to 1900 was 
marked by a vast expansion of France’s colonial army, despite the focus of the 
French political and military establishment on the European theater for much of 
the 1870s. In the early 1880s, the French military turned its attention back to West 
Africa, where it could expand the territory under its control. This period of 
conquest began in earnest despite little appetite in Paris for major military 
missions. For example, it was at this time that Lieutenant-Colonel Gustave 
Borgnis-Desbordes launched incursions from Senegal into what would become 
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262 
known as the Western Soudan, much of which is located today in the countries 
of Mali and Niger.2 As the army expanded, officers and other colonial officials 
labeled troops based on broad geographic areas or ethnolinguistic groups, 
including the tirailleurs sénégalais, soudanais, gabonais, malgaches, and haoussas, 
whose companies and regiments were raised in the 1880s and 1890s. Soudanais 
troops, for example, were made up of men from what is today Mali and parts of 
Niger and Chad. Malgache signified troops from Madagascar, while gabonais and 
later haoussas denoted soldiers from present-day Benin and Nigeria, and should 
not be confused with either the country Gabon, or the Hausa people of Niger and 
Nigeria. 
This chapter extends the scope of French colonial military expansion as it 
began to recruit soldiers in Mali, Niger, and Dahomey, particularly the tirailleurs 
haoussas recruited for the second Dahomey campaign in 1892. It also examines 
the attempt to enlist tirailleurs sénégalais, volontaires sénégalais, and tirailleurs 
haoussas in the Franco-Dahomean wars and their joint roles in the consolidation 
of the French colonial empire in West Africa. French accounts focus on the 
firepower of French soldiers during the Dahomey campaign, particularly the 
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lethality of their Lebel rifles. However, it is more likely that French success 
stemmed from three conditions: first, the military tactics of the Dahomean army 
itself, based on stalking warfare and the ability to surround the enemy; second, 
the presence of large numbers of tirailleurs sénégalais and volontaires sénégalais, 
whose experience conducting warfare in the Senegambia region would have 
familiarized them with similar Dahomean tactics;  and finally, the decision of 
Colonel Alfred-Amedée Dodds to make use of the Ouémé River instead of 
attempting an overland route through Dahomey. Dodds was a métis officer who 
took part in campaigns in Kajoor and Fuuta Tooro, where control over the 
waterways was integral to military success against the large-scale armies of Al-
Hajj Umar Taal, Lat Joor Joop, and others. In Dahomey, Dodds would also 
privilege the river over the road.  
In 1890, French forces were under the control of the Department of the 
Colonies and the Ministry of the Navy. The former was responsible for their 
deployment in the colonies while the latter was in charge of payment, 
promotions, and postings. Both departments were located in Paris and had been 
preoccupied with international affairs for much of the 1870s and 1880s. As a 
result, officers in the colonial military used this time to pursue their own 
imperialist agendas. Paris issued directives with regard to colonial concerns and 
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military security, but the execution of these missions was left to be interpreted by 
the men who led them.3 
French officers in particular were solidifying their control and expanding 
into the interior of West Africa. In fact, they first set up at Ouidah in the 14th 
century, maintaining troops there until 1797, when soldiers were recalled for 
financial reasons.4 Having slowly regained ground during the early 19th century, 
the French Republican government signed a treaty on July 1, 1851 with the Fon 
kingdom ruled by Emperor Ghezo, whose reign lasted from 1818 to 1858. Article 
9 of the treaty stated that France had a right to the fort at Ouidah. However, the 
actual occupants of the fort at that time were representatives of a commercial 
firm from Marseille. 
 Fighting began against Ghezo’s grandson, the Emperor Béhanzin, in 
February of 1890, sparked by disputes over rights to certain territory, the Ouémé 
Valley in particular. Two major battles were fought in what is today known as 
the First Franco-Dahomean War. The conflict resulted in French success with few 
casualties. On October 3, 1890, Dahomey signed a treaty recognizing the 
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kingdom of Porto Novo as a French protectorate. Béhanzin was also forced to 
cede Cotonou, but did receive 20,000 francs a year for giving up customs rights. 
Following his loss, Béhanzin invested in a vast enlargement of his weapons and 
artillery cache to provide up-to-date weaponry to his armed forces, in the 
“anticipation of a second, decisive conflict.”5 In March of 1892, Dahomean 
warriors returned to their practice of raiding in the Ouémé Valley. When a 
French colonial administrator, Victor Ballot, went to investigate, his gunboat, the 
Topaze, was attacked by Dahomean soldiers and five men were wounded. 
Béhanzin showed little interest in appeasing French officials and they declared 
war on him a second time shortly thereafter. 
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266 
 
Figure 5.1 Emperor Béhanzin, pictured in La France au Dahomey, by Alexandre L. 
d’Albéca (Paris: Hachette, 1895). 
267 
MILITARY ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING WITHIN DAHOMEAN FORCES 
The emperors of Dahomey divided the country into three military regions: 
the coastal provinces of Godomey and Abomey-Calavi around Ouidah, Allada, 
and Abomey. Each geographic area was expected to contribute troops for the 
army, both to the permanent divisions of regular soldiers, and the conscripts 
available for temporary duty. Men and women also participated in the transport 
of food, ammunition, and the transport and care of the wounded.6 
French colonial administrator Jean-Marie Bayol claimed that Dahomean 
troops learned to shoot from their “comrades,” as opposed to a formal practice 
setting like an école de tir, a shooting school. In this manner, a soldier would learn 
how “to load and unload his rifle” and how to fire, though Bayol claimed that 
they did so without aiming. Additionally, annual celebrations provided 
opportunities for Dahomeans to practice their weapons handling skills. The 
Dahomean army did engage in training exercises or as Bayol called them, 
“gymnastic exercises,” which included “long marches” and “continual dances.”7 
This description appears in Luc Garcia’s overview of the Franco-Dahomean wars 
as well. He writes that, within the specialized advance and rear guard units, 
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soldiers functioned as the regular army, stationed in the capital and border 
regions. Though regular troops did not receive a “systematic military education,” 
they did engage in marches, dances, and simulated attacks. Riflemen practiced 
target shooting near the village of Hoja, west of Abomey, and archers trained at 
Ajahito in Abomey.8 
Garcia presents the broadest overview of Dahomean military organization 
and military culture, based on a detailed survey of archival documents and 
contemporary sources. Like many states of the Senegambia region, Dahomey’s 
military was conscription based, where “any adult subject capable of bearing 
arms was obliged to serve on the battlefield and…respond to the mobilization 
orders given by the palace.”9 This system of organization dates to the 18th 
century reign of King Agaja. The army was divided in three: an advance guard, 
the main body of troops, and a rear guard. Male and female divisions had 
designated positions within these bodies and the commanders, ahouangan, 
oversaw battalions from their natal villages. These commanders were also civil 
leaders, occupying authoritative roles in both military and civilian life. What set 
the military organization of Dahomey apart from most other West African 
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kingdoms was its incorporation of women-only battalions, the last and most 
famous of which was the Houisodji corps of Dahomey’s Amazon warriors, 
created by King Glèlè in 1876.10 Bayol wrote that the army was organized with 
allied troops, supplied by “tributary countries,” marching first, followed by 
Dahomean “slaves,” then “regular soldiers,” supported by conscription practices, 
then the Amazons and the royal guard, who surrounded the king in the rear 
guard.11  
The Dahomean army can be broken down into numerous battalions, 
delineated by geographical location and occupational role within the army: the 
Aladatou were a battalion of riflemen from Allada; the Ahouan-houndé, the first 
line of attack; the Gohento, female archers; and the Ahouangnanton, women 
soldiers including royalty and commoners. Garcia estimates the Dahomean army 
was made up of no less than 12 battalions of men and 8 battalions of women.12 
The Hihoto, the personal guard of the king, was made up of elite troops including 
Amazons and the Blou, male and female soldiers reputed for physical prowess 
and military skill. One responsibility of the Hihoto was to intercede in combat 
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situations when the outcome became unclear and thus ensure the success of the 
Dahomean force.13 
Amazon warriors have received attention in novels, films, and popular 
culture. Their highly regarded weapons handling skills is a reputation backed up 
by the historical record. Alpern notes that they could handle “a bewildering 
variety of cannons.”14 However, cannons were typically used for salutes, not 
combat, due to the lack of proper ammunition and the climate of the kingdom. 
There were very few roads “wider than single-file bush paths” and the few 
horses in the country were “status symbols for chiefs.” Further, Dahomean 
tactics were based on “stealthy, encircling advances” and “swift surprise attacks” 
that the noise and commotion needed to move cannons around the country 
would greatly impact.15 Amazons were stationed at five palaces: Singboji, Jimé, 
Jibé, Bécon, and Goho.16 Bayol’s estimate in 1892 identified two battalions of 
Amazons, “Gougbé and Agodojiyé,” of no more than 1,500 soldiers.17 As has 
been noted elsewhere, they fought under female officers. It is difficult to 
enumerate the percentage of women soldiers who fought for Dahomey during 
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the Second Franco-Dahomean War. Using French estimates, Alpern suggests 
more than 3,000 were engaged in the army of Béhanzin prior to the First Franco-
Dahomean War. French officers guessed there were 2,000 women fighting in the 
Battle of Atchoupa.18 
According to Bayol, the “king’s regiment,” the “Muslim regiment,” and 
the “special guard of the crown prince” were armed with long guns 
manufactured in Birmingham, the same guns, he wrote, used by the Bambara 
and Tukulor of “upper Senegal” and the banks of the Niger. These “Buccaneer 
guns” were smoothbore muskets with an 80 meter maximum range that fired 
bullets and other projectiles. In addition to their muskets, each soldier carried a 
large knife and “a very hard wooden stick” called an aglopo.19 The majority of 
troops carried French 1822 muskets, a type of smoothbore flintlock musket. 
These guns worked well at close range but had little use outside of close combat 
situations. “Some” Dahomeans were armed with bows and arrows, including 
crossbows. The Mahi, Bayol wrote, more commonly used bows and arrows, and 
zagayes (spears), than their Dahomean neighbors. Bayol and Jules Poirier, who 
wrote about his experiences in the Second Franco-Dahomean War, were both 
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under the impression that Dahomeans on campaign only carried “cutlasses” and 
long, curved aglopo.20  
 Bayol estimated that since the conclusion of the First Franco-Dahomean 
War, Béhanzin purchased around 3,000 rifles from German commercial agents at 
Ouidah. Soldiers did not make use of cavalry: horses, which were typically small 
in stature, were status symbols often purchased in Abéokuta from Muslim 
brokers. Bayol believed that “a squadron of spahis would terrify the Dahomean 
army.”21 He also claimed that though he had heard rumors that the Germans 
sold the kingdom a Krupp cannon, that assertion remained unverified. The 
cannons he thought might exist, he wrote, were placed on carts, and stationed at 
the king’s palaces at Abomey.22 This is a questionable assertion, as the kingdom 
had been importing advanced firearms since the end of the prior war, described 
below. 
In his article on the various conflicts between the French and the 
Dahomeans throughout the late 19th century, the colonial administrator and later 
historian Robert Cornevin quotes the acting French Resident, M. Ehrmann, to 
Governor of Guinée Noël Ballay on the subject of arms trafficking in the 
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kingdom. “It is obvious,” he wrote, that in addition to “600 rifles introduced a 
month ago by Goedelt, they will reach the figure of 5,000 rapid-fire rifles.”23 
Indeed, at the end of hostilities in 1892, when the French searched Ouidah and 
Godomey, they discovered that from February 1891 to April 1892, the Wolber 
and Brohn, Godelt, Trongott, and Zölner houses sold the Dahomean emperor 400 
Peabody rifles, 230 Winchester rifles, 750 Chassepot rifles, 300 Snider rifles, 300 
Mauser rifles, 250 Albini rifles, 250 Spencer rifles, 6 Krupp cannons, 4 Reffye 
mitrailleuses, and an unlisted but “considerable quantity” of ammunition 
cartridges. In return, they received around 300 to 400 men, women, and 
children.24  
 In his comprehensive study, Garcia shows that the Dahomean army 
indeed had Snider, Peabody, Chassepot, and Winchester rifles. They also had 
less lethal Buccaneer guns and blunderbusses, firearms slow to load with less 
precise aim and firing capabilities. The Houisodji Amazons preferred the eight-
shot Winchester rifle but most soldiers, men and women, were armed with 
Chassepots, introduced in France in 1866. Peabody rifles were similar to the Gras 
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rifles most French soldiers carried, featuring metal cartridges. As mentioned 
above, the Dahomean army had Krupp cannons purchased from German 
commercial agents, and Dahomean soldiers received at least some training from 
German instructors on how to operate their artillery pieces.25 
Jean-Marie Bayol described the kingdom of Dahomey’s way of war as 
follows: first, the army would march in the opposite direction of the actual site of 
the attack; then, a vanguard force would stage a small surprise attack, 
presumably to convince the surrounding population that this was indeed the 
target; following this assault, the entire army would change direction and begin 
its approach on its actual target. The army received intelligence from a vast 
network of spies and then chose their points of incursion carefully, engaging in 
stalking tactics and surprise attacks.26 Villages would be surrounded, then 
soldiers would approach “at the break of day” and enter at a predetermined 
point, “shouting and shooting.” Terrified inhabitants of the villages and towns 
under assault, fleeing the area, would “fall into the hands” of Dahomean troops 
who would be “arranged on all roads that leave the village.”27 
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Dahomean soldiers avoided fighting in the evening. They took advantage 
of darkness to move through the country when preparing for a battle. Garcia 
writes that French forces in Dahomey had the impression that Dahomean 
soldiers “were everywhere and nowhere” in a “war without a front.”28 
Dahomeans marched over land, through dense forests, and across rivers they 
were able to forge. Once they reached the scheduled location, they waited under 
cover of the surrounding forest until dawn and then struck at dawn. This is how 
the French experienced the First Franco-Dahomean War, when in 1890 they were 
subjected to numerous surprise daybreak attacks notable for the “astonishing 
speed” of Dahomean soldiers.29 Moreover, the stealth approach of the Dahomean 
army was facilitated by a spy network that kept the army informed of any 
changes or complications ahead. 
Dahomean attacks were characterized by the pincer movement employed, 
forcing their foes into tight quarters where Dahomean troops could advance on 
them with no room for escape.30 This tactic is highly effective when the goal is to 
paralyze an enemy for the purpose of capture or enslavement, but less successful 
against a heavily armed opponent. As will be shown below, when Dahomean 
                                                 
28 Garcia, Le Royaume du Dahomé, 141, 145. 
29 Garcia, Le Royaume du Dahomé, 141. 
30 Garcia, Le Royaume du Dahomé, 142. 
276 
troops attempted this maneuver against the French “square” formation, they 
continued to take massive casualties as French soldiers reloaded.31 
French estimates in 1892 put the size of the Dahomean army between 
10,000 and 15,000 soldiers.32 Bayol placed the full troop strength of Dahomey at 
10,000 to 12,000 but claimed that a general call to arms would increase the army 
by another 10,000 men and women, for a total of 22,000.33 Garcia finds Bayol’s 
estimate much too high for the Dahomean population, which at the time 
amounted to around 150,000 inhabitants. Based on a number of contemporary 
accounts, Garcia suggests 8,000 at the outbreak of war in September of 1892, to a 
possible 10,000 once reinforcements arrived.34 Alpern uses these numbers to 
suggest that Amazons numbered close to 2,500. He builds his estimate from 
Garcia’s claim that in 1890 women made up at least 30 percent of the Dahomean 
army.35 In her study of firearms importation in West Africa, Sokhna Sané assesses 
the number of Dahomean troops at 15,000 to 18,000 soldiers, including 4,000 
Amazons.36 
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Figure 5.2 General Alfred-Amédée Dodds, pictured in La Guerre au Dahomey 1888-1893,  
by Edouard-Edmond Aublet (Paris: Berger-Levrault et Cie, 1894). 
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TIRAILLEURS, VOLONTAIRES, AND THE ORGANIZATION OF FRANCE’S DAHOMEAN 
FORCE 
The first company of tirailleurs haoussas soldiers was raised in 1891 in 
order to augment the corps of French colonial soldiers designated tirailleurs 
gabonais. According to Garcia, the impetus for the creation of the tirailleurs 
haoussas was the Admiral de Cuverville’s attempt to recruit Hausa soldiers in the 
Ibadan region. The earliest mention of this action is Albert de Salinis’s text on the 
Admiral de Cuverville expedition, which took place in late 1890. In a letter to the 
secretary of the navy, de Cuverville wrote of his difficulty with European troops, 
whose health failed in the hot, humid climate of Benin. However, the tirailleurs 
sénégalais and tirailleurs gabonais (later tirailleurs haoussas) were hardier in the 
tropical environment, though at this point in late 1890 most indigenous troops 
were under the command of French officers. Again, there was a preference for 
men under 30 years of age with prior experience in colonial forces, and 
particularly men between the ages of 20 and 25.37 In later correspondence with 
the colonial office, de Cuverville stated that recruitment of tirailleurs 
gabonais/haoussas was quite difficult in peacetime. Following the first Franco-
Dahomean conflict in 1890, it had become virtually impossible. Those rare 
                                                 
37 Albert de Salinis, La Marine au Dahomey: Campagne de “la Naïade” (1890-1892) (Paris: L. Sanard, 
1901), 60. 
279 
recruits that could be found were embedded in the pre-existing companies of 
tirailleurs sénégalais.38  
Recruitment was also stymied by the British presence in the coastal 
region. The Franco-British Convention of 1889 stipulated that English officials 
would not interfere with French recruitment from among the Egba and other 
people of the Slave Coast.39 However, one of de Cuverville’s lieutenant-colonels, 
Klipfel, informed him that the British governor of Lagos had promised stiff 
penalties for any and all persons discovered to be providing recruits to tirailleurs 
forces in neighboring territories. As a result, de Cuverville hoped to shift 
recruitment from within the Yoruba population. By November 15, 1890, local 
recruits numbered only 189 men after five desertions. De Cuverville noted that 
the deserters had not been able to take weapons with them, as the French 
military was keeping them under guard.40 This illuminates an ongoing concern 
among French officers that African troops could not be trusted, even with their 
own weapons. 
In a letter from April 23, 1891 Commandant Andry relayed his thoughts 
about whether or not two or three companies of tirailleurs haoussas could serve 
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the needs of France’s new colony. He argued that 150 soldiers would be 
necessary and French officers should be employed as leaders of the haoussas 
troops, as opposed to Africans.41 It was in this environment that the decree of 
June 23, 1891 set forth the desired numbers and characteristics of the new 
tirailleurs haoussas force. The law of March 9, 1831 provided the original 
authorization for the creation of “indigenous” militaries in France’s overseas 
territories. And a decree on November 26, 1869 reorganized the naval infantry to 
include indigenous troops in the French colonial force. The decree of 1891 was 
signed by the president of the French Republic, Marie François Sadi Carnot, who 
served as president from 1887 until his assassination in 1894, and the secretary of 
the navy, Édouard Barbey.42 
A decree on June 23, 1891 sanctioned the recruitment for a detachment of 
50 Hausa engagés, who would train under European officers. In the end, very few 
Hausa men served in these units. Instead, the tirailleurs haoussas at the onset of 
the 1892 Dahomey campaign were made up of 138 men: Senegalese, Gabonese, 
Ouatchi, Egba, Gun, Nagot, and “Portuguese mulattoes,” with only six Hausa 
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soldiers.43 In his letter to French colonial officials in Paris, on October 19, 1891, 
the head of the 2nd division, Emil de Lavergneley, wrote of his concern 
regarding raising enough tirailleurs haoussas troops. Lavergneley did not share 
Commander Andry’s opinion regarding the June 23, 1891 decree. In contrast, he 
believed there was no need to discern between auxiliaries and tirailleurs haoussas. 
It was simpler to identify all tirailleurs haoussas as auxiliary troops. The 
delineation of a tirailleurs haoussas corps was unnecessary and would not serve 
an appreciable advantage.44 In correspondence from October 1891, the French 
resident Ehrmann sent a letter to the French Governor in Konakry letting him 
know that the number of tirailleurs haoussas troops had not yet surpassed the 
number set forth in the June 23rd decree. This was a result of a great number of 
desertions by soldiers in the tirailleurs haoussas force, and other unnamed 
difficulties, which led to a loss well under the desired number of men in the 
force. Around the 1st of August, the number of troops had not reached 315, and 
by 1st October had only reached 369. At that point, it was still not possible to 
attain the number set forth the previous March.45 As the French resident 
Ehrmann wrote in 1891:  
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The size of the corps of Hausa tirailleurs did not exceed the figures fixed 
by the decree of June 23rd. The engagements I had the honor to recount to 
you in my report of the 10th of August, have for no other purpose than to 
supplement a staff, which, owing to numerous desertions and various 
difficulties, had fallen to a single figure, much lower than the regulatory 
requirements.46 
Poirier and Captain Edouard-Edmond Aublet discussed a recruitment trip 
taken by then Colonel Dodds to Senegal, where he held a meeting in Saint Louis 
with the chiefs of Kajoor, Njaambur, Waalo, and Fuuta Tooro on the May 14, 
1892. At this meeting, Dodds told the chiefs in attendance that he would pay a 
total of 40 francs for each “volunteer” they were willing to furnish for the 
Dahomey mission. These men would also be given compensation and rations 
like other tirailleurs sénégalais troops.47 Following his meeting, Dodds contacted 
the secretary of the navy, telling him, “I have gotten the native chiefs, with the 
Governor’s assistance, to promise to provide more than 500 Senegalese 
volunteers [volontaires sénégalais], chosen from among leading notables; taking 
into account the unfit, I expect to have 2 companies of Ouolofs [Wolofs] and 1 of 
Toucouleurs [Tukulors] for departure to Cotonou on July 5th.”48 
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French archival sources quoted in Garcia provide the following numbers 
for the army that invaded Dahomey: engineering corps: 2 officers and 60 
soldiers; naval infantry: 3 officers and 111 soldiers; 1st group: 16 officers and 533 
soldiers (286 “natives”); 2nd group: 19 officers and 612 soldiers (169 “natives”); 
3rd group: 15 officers and 517 soldiers (268 “natives”); cavalry: 9 officers and 36 
soldiers (30 “natives”); “services”: 2 officers and 219 soldiers (177 “natives”). In 
total, the French had 75 officers and 2,092 troops, with 930 “native” soldiers 
among them.49 As Alpern observes, the French force that invaded the Dahomean 
interior was at least 50 percent African. It is hard to gauge the full extent as the 
French Foreign Legion did not detail the composition of their troops. Alpern 
estimates 930 African soldiers out of 2,164 troops at the start of the conflict, and 
830 of 1,455 at its close.50 It is unclear, however, due to the opacity of this list, 
whether it includes the volontaires sénégalais who certainly fought in Dahomey 
and appear elsewhere in the record. Captain Charles Romagny, who wrote a 
number of synopses of wars in Africa for French military academies, included 
further details on troop numbers for the initial Dahomey campaign. Romagny 
recorded a much higher number than Colonel Dodds, perhaps because of the 
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inclusion of the companies of volontaires. According to Romagny, at the outset of 
the campaign, Dodds had at his disposal 3,500 men to fight Béhanzin: one 
battalion of the foreign legion, two battalions of tirailleurs sénégalais and haoussas, 
one company of naval infantry, and three companies of volontaires sénégalais. 
Among these troops were 1,461 Europeans. There were additionally two 
squadrons of spahis, engineers, and mountain artillery. Of this group, about 2,000 
were enlisted as an expeditionary force.51  
A later summary by Dodds also provided more detail into the formation 
of his expedition. Writing at the close of the campaign in 1894, he listed details 
for various troop strengths at the end of 1892, the close of the initial campaign. 
These numbers include the following: two companies of legionnaires (319 soldiers, 
13 officers); three companies of the Bataillon d’Afrique, which as noted earlier 
was typically composed of European troops (271 soldiers, 18 officers); four 
companies of naval infantry (419 soldiers; 10 officers); six companies of tirailleurs 
sénégalais (881 soldiers, 26 officers); four companies of tirailleurs haoussas (511 
soldiers; 15 officers); one artillery battery (158 soldiers; 4 officers); one company 
of “conducteurs” (263 soldiers; 5 officers); one company of artillery workers (32 
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soldiers; 2 officers). The totals amount to 2,854 soldiers and 94 officers. Here 
again, there is no mention of volontaires sénégalais, though due to the numerical 
breakdown, it is likely those who were volontaires might be grouped with the 
large numbers of tirailleurs sénégalais and haoussas, particularly considering 
French difficulties in finding troops for the haoussas companies.52  
Soldiers in French forces were to be between the ages of 17 and 35 and in 
good physical condition. Spahis, cavalry, could be recruited up to age 40. Military 
contracts were administered with the help of interpreters, and at least two 
witnesses from the officer class, either French or indigenous non-commissioned 
officers, corporals, or sergeants. The soldiers swore their oath on the Qur’an. 
Their terms were anywhere from three to five years and they were paid a daily 
rate. This rate could be contentious, and soldiers in the tirailleurs haoussas force 
used desertion as a method to have their demands met by colonial officials. The 
tirailleurs sénégalais in particular believed themselves to be a professional force. 
An anonymous French soldier who wrote about his experience in the Second 
Franco-Dahomean War recalled that one of the tirailleurs sénégalais, impressed 
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with the bravery of the members of the French foreign legion, said, “Those 
legionnaires, they are not white, nor are they Black; they are tirailleurs.”53  
In his account of the second French campaign in Dahomey, Jules Poirier 
discussed at length the difference between what he called “volontaires sénégalais” 
and “tirailleurs sénégalais.”54 The French forces fighting against the Emperor 
Béhanzin’s troops were a majority African army. According to Poirier, the 
volontaires were comprised of contingents from “Cayor and Baol,” and also 
included “Sereers.”55 These men were accomplished troops who had already 
participated in wars in West Africa and, as a result, the French allowed them to 
nominate men from within their ranks to serve as officers in the colonial force. 
The only major concerns were discipline and military maneuvers, which French 
colonial officials believed could be imparted through regular drills and exercises.  
In direct contradiction to these professional volontaires were the soldiers 
designated tirailleurs. Poirier’s account both echoed French military officers who 
came before him and presaged those who employed similar troops in 20th 
century campaigns in Europe. According to Poirier, the corps of Senegalese 
volontaires came from the kingdoms of Kajoor, Bawol, and Seereer, and had 
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already served in many French campaigns. He complained that it was difficult to 
make them understand the need for exercise and discipline. These volontaires 
should not be confused with the tirailleurs sénégalais, he wrote, “they differ 
completely.”56 Poirier stated that the tirailleurs had been recruited from the 
lowest strata of the indigenous population in Senegambia. He described them as 
“sòfas” or “slaves of the state,” as opposed to the volontaires who were 
descendants of the “diambours,” a military caste of the Wolof states whose only 
employ was combat.57 This could also be a reference to the northernmost 
province of Kajoor, Njambur, where the Kajoor nobility fled during the long 
conflict against the French. If so, it is possible that these men were conscripts or, 
perhaps, ceɗɗo. Certainly the description of their military status and the gris gris 
they wore supports this conclusion. Tirailleurs, admirable soldiers after some 
time under French service, Poirier claimed, were mostly recruited from the lower 
strata of the indigenous population. They were “sòfas,” “captive soldiers.”58 
Aublet also asserted that indigenous officers in the volontaires sénégalais forces 
could not be taken from the tirailleurs sénégalais ranks. The volontaires sénégalais, 
taken from among noble families, refused to serve under lower caste men. 
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Further, each company of volontaires had to be comprised of men from the same 
ethnic heritage.59  
Badin also noted the difference between tirailleurs sénégalais and volontaires 
sénégalais throughout the French campaign in Dahomey. He stated that the three 
volontaires sénégalais companies fighting with French forces were recruited from 
non-slave status populations in the colony. This fits in with Dodds’s claim to 
have received three companies of volontaires from the kingdoms of Senegal. The 
first company in particular saw a great deal of fighting during the second 
Franco-Dahomean campaign, fighting all the way to Abomey and incurring 
numerous losses and injuries. The other two played a less active role, serving as 
coastal garrisons or temporary guards over military depots, though they also 
suffered casualties. Badin was impressed by the dedication showed by these 
Senegalese volontaires, though he gave more credit to the European officers who 
commanded them, claiming that these officers inspired loyalty and bravery 
through their own actions in battle.60 
Many French officers’ accounts are marked by their racism. Military 
memoirs also suffer from this prejudicial lens. For example, Captain Aublet, 
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when describing the great value of the tirailleurs forces, still portrayed them as 
children, unaware of the danger they faced. He described them on the march for 
nine hours through woods and marshes, sinking into thick mud, all the while 
laughing and singing, happy to be part of the campaign.61 This makes even less 
sense in an account where he lauded the bravery of both tirailleurs sénégalais and 
tirailleurs haoussas, claiming that they did not hesitate to charge the enemy or flee 
close combat situations. For example, Aublet described a situation when one of 
the tirailleurs sénégalais in his company came face-to-face with a Dahomean 
soldier and ran him through with his bayonet; and another where a tirailleur 
haoussa who sensed an enemy hiding in the brush, sought him out, cut off his 
head, and held it up as a trophy.62 
Language was particularly important for officers, and General Dodds 
underscored the need to have daily sessions for corporals and corporal cadets to 
learn French. Dodds wanted his European officers to look out for any soldiers 
with a high aptitude for language learning and those who could read and write, 
though he believed that soldiers who arrived around age 20 were unable to 
benefit from French lessons and it was a waste of time to try to teach them.63 
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Further, it was necessary to hold sessions in the barracks each evening to teach 
French to African recruits and help soldiers familiarize themselves with 
particular commands. These recruits were also to have 30 minutes to an hour of 
shooting practice and Dodds was preparing in 1891 a new shooting range for this 
purpose.64 Dodds also highlighted the need for a school in which to instruct 
haoussas non-commissioned officers. The school would train sergeants and 
corporals in administrative roles as well as leadership skills in the commanding 
of troops. These sessions should take place twice daily, for at least one hour to 90 
minutes in the mornings and evenings.65 
Jean-Marie Bayol wrote that French tactics on the African continent were 
based on tight, compact formations like “the traditional square.”66 This was a 
defensive maneuver to quickly identify surprise encounters by African “natives” 
who engaged in skirmishing, or as Bayol termed it “scattered order.” 
Skirmishing could be particularly dangerous following the adoption of rapid-fire 
weapons, as they allowed for greater versatility of movement than the square 
formation.67 According to Badin, one of the highest performing forces was the 
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Senegalese spahis, cavalry, comprised of 250 men under the command of eight 
officers. According to Bayol, both the spahis and the volontaires sénégalais had to 
operate under the orders of French officers to avoid disciplinary issues. The 
naval infantry and the foreign legion were outfitted with Lebel rifles, while the 
indigenous troops were provided Gras rifles, also known as the 1874 model, a 
gun more prone to misfire and jam.68 
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Figure 5.3 Map of Dahomey, 1893, in La Guerre au Dahomey 1888-1893, by Edouard-Edmond 
Aublet (Paris: Berger-Levrault et Cie, 1894). 
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THE SECOND FRANCO-DAHOMEAN WAR: A REVIEW OF OPERATIONS 
Upon receipt of the French declaration of war, in April of 1892 the 
Emperor Béhanzin wrote to Victor Ballot that he did not know during the 
previous conflict “how to make war,” but now had so many soldiers that “they 
look like worms coming out of holes.” He was ready for a war and he declared it 
would not end “even if it lasts 100 years and kills 20,000 of my men.”69 Prior to 
1890, Dahomeans had rarely if ever faced off against soldiers armed with rifles.70 
Bayol expressed concern, however, that by this time the soldiers of Béhanzin, 
“like those of Samory” were armed with “formidable rifles” that would make 
them even more lethal when they engaged in surprise attacks and guerrilla 
tactics. In Dahomey, “dense vegetation allows the enemy to hide,” he wrote, and 
“escape our salvos…to follow us patiently on our march, for, at the moment 
when our surveillance is reduced, to creep only a few meters from our soldiers 
exhausted from the torrid climate, strike them at close range, and disappear into 
the impenetrable forests.”71  
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 The French entrusted the war effort against Dahomey to then Colonel 
Alfred-Amédée Dodds. Colonel Dodds, the commander of French colonial forces 
in Dahomey, was born in Saint Louis to a métis family of British, French, and 
Senegalese descent. His paternal great-grandmother was Pulaar and his mother 
was the signare Marie Charlotte Billaud.72 Dodds attended the military academy 
at St. Cyr and was promoted to lieutenant five years later. Among other postings, 
he served as an officer in Senegal from 1888 to 1891, suppressing revolts in Fuuta 
Tooro, Bawol, and Kajoor, including those in support of Lat Joor.73  
Dodds also led French operations from February to October 1890 in the 
First Franco-Dahomean War and thus had extensive knowledge of the territory. 
He officially took control of the second Dahomey campaign when French 
President Sadi Carnot appointed him commander of the 4th regiment of naval 
infantry in May of 1892. Dodds established a blockade of coastal ports on June 
15th to prevent the flow of weapons further upcountry though, as Sané has 
shown, the efficacy of this move is questionable.74 For example, Béhanzin had 
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et l’émergence politique des Africains au Sénégal, 1881-1897,” Cahiers d’études africaines 24, no. 96 
(1984): 477-504. 
73 Poirier, Campagne du Dahomey, 128. 
74 On the blockade, see Cornevin, “Les divers épisodes,” 189. On its efficacy, see Sané, “Guerres 
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already purchased from German merchants 1,700 rapid-fire rifles, six cannons of 
different calibers, six mitrailleuses, 400,000 cartridges of ammunition, and a large 
quantity of artillery shells. At least some of these materials came from the 1870 
Franco-Prussian war.75 
  An early decision by Dodds was both prescient and practical. Building on 
France’s practice in Senegambia of making use of waterways to avoid larger 
forces in territories with which they were less familiar, Dodds focused the course 
of his expedition on the Ouémé River.76 Using the river also allowed for the quick 
evacuation of injured and ill soldiers and the resupply of goods. Like the states 
and kingdoms of Senegal, Dahomey did not focus on building a naval fleet and 
preparing for marine warfare. It was, again like Senegal, a military culture 
focused almost entirely on land wars. 
On June 26, 1892, Béhanzin’s soldiers staged an attack on a military 
pirogue at Lake Denham. Shortly thereafter, they attacked the village of Gomé, 
taking as captives 10 men and five women.77 In retaliation, Colonel Dodds sent 
the gunboats Topaze, Emeraude, and Corail up the Ouémé River to bombard the 
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village of Azaourissé, the capital of Dékamé. Based on a report by Captain 
Audéoud, who led an earlier mission through the kingdom, Dodds chose the 
village of Awan-Li, on the left bank of the Ouémé River, as the staging point for a 
march on Abomey.78 
To create a diversion, similar to Dahomean tactics, Dodds began a 
bombing campaign on August 9th against Godomey, Abomey-Calavi, and 
Ouidah. He sent Captain Audéoud west in order to draw Dahomean troops from 
the Ouémé River and served to divide the Dahomean army over a vast swathe of 
territory.79 On August 18, 1892 a French column made its way upriver, comprised 
of one company of naval infantry, six companies combined of tirailleurs sénégalais 
and tirailleurs haoussas, and one battery of artillery. They crossed the Adjara River 
the following day and reached Sakété on the 20th. Five days later, French troops 
were reassembled at Katagon in Dékamé. On August 23, the Mytho and St. 
Nicolas delivered 800 légionnaires, two squadrons of spahis sénégalais, and an 
engineering detachment and by mid-September, the French convoy was 
stationed near Affamé.80 The convoy numbered 2,209 soldiers and 2,594 carriers 
or porters, according to Garcia. They were divided into three corps, and each 
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corps had its own auxiliary support. In this way, they traveled in the square 
formation, with the cavalry constituting the fourth flank.81 
According to Article 8 of the decree establishing the tirailleurs haoussas, 
both tirailleurs sénégalais and tirailleurs haoussas were entitled to a per diem in lieu 
of food: 1 franc for NCOs and 80 centimes for infantry troops. However, 
commanding officers were given the right to withhold compensation and deliver 
rations in kind. Jules Poirier’s account of the Dahomey campaign lists the rations 
for African troops as follows: rice or bread five times per week, fresh meat four 
times per week, beef jerky, sugar, coffee, and salt. When the troops were on the 
march, they would also be provided with two kola nuts per man per day.82 This 
placed African troops halfway between European soldiers, who received higher 
rations as well as tea and wine when available, and porters, typically men 
conscripted from local polities.83 Porters traveling with the French forces received 
only rice and salt during the Second Franco-Dahomean War. It is clear from 
correspondence between military personnel and civilian officials that the 
withholding of per diem was a major issue, causing serious disorder and mass 
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desertions. By lowering the daily rate paid to soldiers, the French colonial 
government put itself at risk, and in times of military necessity, was forced to 
reinstate the higher per diem. Language could also be a problem on the 
campaign. In a telling example, a translator called Suleyman, who was in charge 
of relaying orders from French officers to African troops, ran into great difficulty 
one day when he had to simultaneously translate French commands into Wolof 
and Sarakule.84 
The French first took account of the effect of their Lebel rifles, adopted in 
1886, at the Battle of Dogba, which served as the initial battle between Dahomean 
and French forces in late September 1892.85 As mentioned above, Dodds’s 
decision to use the Ouémé River and thus camp at Dogba was a significant 
surprise to the Dahomean army. Béhanzin’s brother Gucini had been lying in 
wait for the French column to take the overland road typical of military 
expeditions heading toward Abomey, and was stationed near Abomey-Calavi. 
Learning of the much larger French presence stationed at Dogba, Gucini made 
his way north of Dogba to Bonou. There he received reinforcements: an 
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Ahouangnanton Amazon regiment.86 True to form, the Dahomean force staged a 
surprise attack in the early hours of September 19th. The previous evening, 
troops crossed the Ouémé River in silence, and waited for daybreak a few 
hundred meters from the French encampment. Their movements were stealthy 
enough to avoid detection by French units who had traveled to Bonou on the 
18th.87  
On the 19th, Dahomean troops attacked from a wooded area east of the 
camp. The recreation of the battle by Garcia includes the following among 
French detachments: foreign legion; artillery; naval infantry; tirailleurs sénégalais; 
and volontaires sénégalais. The Dahomean onslaught went on for three hours, but 
the soldiers were unable to breach the French line of fire, set up quickly 
following the initial attack, where Dahomean soldiers shot directly into the 
camp. The gunboat Opale also launched shells from its Hotchkiss into the forest.88 
Cornevin estimates 4,000 Dahomean soldiers participated in the attack, who 
engaged in four assaults on the camp of legionnaires, though they were ultimately 
repulsed. Dodds wrote that numerous rapid-fire weapons were found among the 
corpses of Dahomean soldiers, who lost at least 130, while the French suffered 
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minor losses of five dead and 15 injured, of whom four were “natives.”89 Garcia 
notes that the Demartinecourt report assessed 1,000 dead Dahomean soldiers 
following the attack, quite a discrepancy from the numbers provided by Dodds. 
From fallen Dahomean soldiers, French and Senegalese soldiers recovered 
Chassepot, Peabody, and Snider rifles. Most of their bodies were burned by the 
French.90 
One matter of little notice in the official reports is the presence of the 
Ouémé River, which served as the “fourth face” of the French square formation. 
As noted earlier, Dahomean warfare was predicated on the ability to immobilize 
an army with sudden and overwhelming force, typically in an ambush. French 
forces were too spread out to be effectively surrounded, and the Opale was 
monitoring the situation on the Ouémé. Further, Dahomean forces rarely used 
warfare on the rivers that crisscrossed the country, similar to the Senegambian 
armies attacked by the French during the middle of the 19th century. Clearly the 
inability of Dahomean forces to break through French lines spurred their 
withdrawal and eventual retreat. Garcia writes that, further, French forces were 
shaken by the inability of their sentries to identify Dahomean soldiers, who they 
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had confused with porters.91 Despite military success at Dogba, French officers 
ordered a higher level of vigilance and greater surveillance to prevent future 
surprise attacks. 
At the Battle of Poguessa, in some accounts called Kpokissa, on October 
4th, the Dahomean forces again “staged several furious charges.” The French 
responded in turn with their own bayonet charge, “a highly successful tactic they 
would use throughout the rest of the campaign.”92 French rifles had fixed 20 inch 
bayonets and their reach was greater than that of Dahomean swords and 
machetes. This attack in particular involved at least a few “contingents of 
Amazons.”93 That same day, a charge of spahis led to the capture of three 
Germans and one Belgian allied with Dahomean troops. These men were 
brought in front of Dodds, interrogated, sentenced to death, and shot, though it 
is unclear from sources what intelligence, if any, they might have given to their 
interrogators.94 Following the Battle of Poguessa, French forces advanced from 
Poguessa through Akpa toward the Koto Lagoon, and then returned to camp at 
Akpa. Over the course of that week, October 10 to October 17, 1892, French 
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troops were attacked numerous times by Dahomean troops, particularly on the 
12th, where combat ensued for the better part of a day. On the 13th the French 
again recovered numerous weapons and ammunition from Akpa. Dahomean 
soldiers staged three assaults on the 14th and 15th, before the French returned to 
Akpa on the 16th. Over the course of October 6th to October 17th, the French lost 
21 soldiers, with 136 wounded.95 
Dahomean forces struck again on October 20th at the French encampment 
at Akpa. They were finally repulsed by a bayonet charge of the tirailleurs 
haoussas. The legionnaires were most impacted by the Dahomean attack, with 12 
dead and 35 wounded.96 On October 26th, another bayonet charge by French 
soldiers pushed Béhanzin’s forces out of Kotokpa. They continued to defend 
against surprise incursions by Dahomean troops but on November 3rd, a 
bayonet charge again dislodged Dahomean soldiers from the palace of Djéhoué.97 
The French force was also buffeted by Dodds’s decision to take advantage of the 
rivers of Abomey. By using waterways like the Koto River, French troops gained 
brief but important respite from the regular ambushes employed by the 
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Dahomean army. As Garcia has written, the French use of the Koto River, in 
combination with regular fire from an artillery section at Akpa against royal 
troops nearby, denied Dahomean forces the time to regroup and stage further 
surprise attacks against the French.98 
On November 4th, Béhanzin made the risky decision to stage a large 
incursion, assembling his entire force for what would be a “supreme effort” 
against French forces. However, his deployment of the army between trenches 
and smaller skirmishing regiments would not be enough to succeed against the 
French force. Following artillery fire and multiple salvos, the Dahomeans held 
their ground. But the French column continued to push forward against the Fon 
soldiers and repulsed a final “shock” attack of the Gbéto Amazons. The all-out 
assault led to close combat between French, Senegalese, Fon, and assorted other 
troops. At the end of the day, French allied troops emerged victorious. 
Béhanzin’s army, including the whole of his Amazon contingents, sustained 
incredible casualties: 4,000 dead; 8,000 injured.  
As a result, Dodds was promoted to general, and Béhanzin entered into 
treaty talks with French officials.99 During negotiations, General Dodds ordered 
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the Emperor to disarm and turn his weapons over to French authorities or risk 
the resumption of conflict. The following day, French troops marched on 
Abomey and burned a number of homes and other structures. On November 
17th, they raised the French flag at Simbodji palace.100 When the original 
expeditionary force was disbanded on December 1, 1892, French losses included 
15 officers and 70 men killed, among them 48 Africans; with 29 officers and 411 
wounded, among them 245 Africans; another 173 Europeans and 32 Africans 
died of disease.101 The war, however, would not end until early 1894.  
On August 12, 1893, Dodds contacted the secretary of the navy to tell him 
that there were not enough recruits for either the tirailleurs forces or the military 
police. Dodds believed that the relative infrequency of enlistment by local men 
was due to their ignorance of the benefits of colonial military service. He thought 
that the only way to truly increase enlistment was to use local agents who would 
be paid for each soldier they recruited into the colonial force.102 Dodds’s wish 
was granted: on October 12, 1893, Governor Ballot sent a response that he was 
amenable to Dodds’s request. According to Ballot, the British were paying a fee 
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of £1 (the equivalent of 25 francs) for each recruit. Ballot gave Dodds permission 
to pay the same amount to recruiters who would furnish soldiers for the French 
forces, and noted that the money would be drawn from the colonial budget as 
part of the cost of occupying Dahomey.103 
 Those tirailleurs deemed worthy of promotion could serve as 1st class 
tirailleurs, corporals, or sergeants. Their rations and pay were to be increased as 
they rose up through the ranks. Dodds noted, for example, that a sergeant who 
re-enlisted after 15 years of service would be entitled to 2 francs and 30 centimes 
per day. These African troops were also entitled to service medals under the 
same stipulations as European soldiers, including the Legion of Honor in 
recognition of outstanding service. Medals for bravery earned 100 francs per 
year, and the high distinction of the Legion of Honor gleaned 250 francs per year. 
These sums were payable every year until the death of the holder.104 
 Dodds wrote that Béhanzin’s forces remained at Atcheribé in September 
of 1893, and the following month described their practice of blending in with the 
local population to avoid detection by French forces in the countryside. In 
response, Dodds continued to organize troops of Mahis, long involved in 
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struggles against the Dahomean Fon of Béhanzin, to track and assault the 
remnants of Béhanzin’s army. He created a column of 12 companies, including 
one company of European troops and two companies of “natives,” armed with 
two cannons. Unfortunately these troops, just as during the prior campaign, were 
systematically diminished by the regular desertions of Mahi and other haoussas 
soldiers. Béhanzin himself was reported to be seeking exile in the British territory 
of Lagos.105 Pursued by “flying columns” of French troops and struggling for 
support in the territory formerly under his full control, Béhanzin turned himself 
over to French officers in January of 1892.106 
MILITARY CONCERNS IN POST-WAR DAHOMEY 
In his report on the political and military situation of Dahomey in March 
of 1894, roughly two months after the conclusion of hostilities, Dodds expressed 
some concerns about the state of the tirailleurs haoussas. Like the garde civile, the 
French police force, he wrote, the haoussas were made up largely of Nagots and 
Hausa, “hereditary enemies of the Dahomeans,” who were “animated by the 
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desire to avenge the oppression which has so long weighed upon their race.”107 
In one incident, tirailleurs haoussas and some members of the garde civile forced 
their way into the king’s palace at Abomey, “forcibly kidnapping women” and 
releasing inmates held in royal prisons. The soldiers claimed that “everyone was 
free” and that “whoever calls himself a king in reality is nothing.”108 Dodds 
punished the soldiers who took part in the prison break and regarrisoned them 
at a more remote location. However, he believed that this situation could 
reappear if the military posts of Dahomey were manned only by haoussas troops. 
They had not spent enough time training in French regiments or military 
schools to develop familiarity with French ideals, he asserted. European cadres, 
however, could manage only short stays in the territory, “due to the insalubrity” 
and thus could not sustain long periods of engagement to instruct these men.109 
Dodds suggested that it would be “prudent” to keep in Benin two companies of 
tirailleurs sénégalais. They exhibited “much more military discipline” than the 
haoussas and, further, did not express the same “hate” toward Dahomeans. 
Instead, he thought it would serve French interests to have two companies of 
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tirailleurs haoussas serve in Senegal where they could “more easily acquire” the 
military discipline of sénégalais troops.110 
In a report specifically concerned with the military organization of 
Dahomey penned the following day, Dodds repeated his worries about 
employing Nagot men as tirailleurs given their conduct in Abomey and issues of 
“looting.”111 The tirailleurs haoussas company that had been stationed in Abomey 
was removed from the city and replaced with a company of tirailleurs sénégalais. 
This situation was unsustainable, particularly due to numerous desertions, 
which Dodds blamed on the “commercial spirit of the Muslims of Lagos.” The 
merchants, it seems, were sending their “slaves” to become engagés in the French 
military, similar to policies instituted in Senegambia earlier that century. 
However, once they received their “bonus,” these men deserted. Dodds 
maintained that though this was only a theory, it was likely “because it occurred 
in Senegal” and also was an issue for recruitment into the garde civile.112 
It is clear, however, that recruitment continued to be a problem for the 
French, even after the wars against Béhanzin came to a close. In August of 1894, 
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Lieutenant-Colonel Nény wrote that though the weapons training of tirailleurs 
haoussas was going well, they showed low aptitude for their military drills, 
attested to by Nény as a result of numerous desertions, including 11 in the 
previous month. Nény believed that soldiers’ morale and aptitude would 
improve once those who were recruited during the conflict were discharged, as 
they had received little training and showed poor morale.113 That December 
proved no better, with Nény stating that 20 men had deserted the previous 
month, though he claimed, “I do not believe there is one sole cause.” Instead, 
Nény thought the problem lay in tasking soldiers with non-military duties and 
chores. Though they were happy to serve in the military, according to Nény 
these men derived little satisfaction from manual labor, construction, and 
porterage.114 
Tirailleurs sénégalais troops continued to serve in Dahomey until at least 
the late 1890s, evidenced by an exchange in March of 1897 regarding the 
repatriation of these tirailleurs along with their wives and children. The tirailleurs 
referenced were sent as part of a French expedition to establish a telegraph line 
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to Carnotville. It is unclear whether they were deemed unsuitable for the task or 
if extenuating circumstances meant their services were no longer needed by 
French officials. Either way, Governor Ballot wrote that it was “impossible” to 
send them to Upper Dahomey and requested permission to send them back to 
Senegal.115 
Conclusion 
 In the late 19th century, French colonial forces began in earnest to recruit 
African soldiers outside of the Senegambia region, particularly the tirailleurs 
haoussas for the French campaign against Emperor Béhanzin in Dahomey. This 
was their first attempt to create a multi-ethnic African force. In Dahomey, the 
French dependency on auxiliary troops continued, including volontaires sénégalais 
who were “recruited” from Senegambia to fight against the Fon. These 
professional soldiers were integral to French success in its Dahomey campaign, 
where the military culture of Dahomey failed to account for new approaches to 
warfare. These strategies thwarted the Fon reliance on espionage, stalking, and 
surprise attacks to overcome adversaries. Further, many of the tactics employed 
by the French in Dahomey were based on their experience of Senegambian 
warfare. 
                                                 
115 Governor Ballot, March 23, 1897, Dahomey XVI 8, ANOM. 
311 
 
Figure 5.4 Tirailleur Sénégalais, ca. 1890s, in La France au Dahomey, by Alexandre L. 
d’Albéca (Paris: Hachette, 1895). 
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CONCLUSION 
TIRAILLEURS AT THE DAWN OF THE 20TH CENTURY 
When Théodore Ducos, the minister of the navy and colonies from 1851 to 
1855, discussed the enlistment of African troops in Senegal with Emperor 
Napoleon III, he laid out the plans for only two companies. A historical 
overview, labeled simply “les Sénégalais,” held at the Ministry of Defense 
archives in Vincennes, elaborated the trajectory of this force.1 Originally 
envisioned by Ducos and his subordinates as the compagnie du Sénégal and the 
compagnie du Gorée, the two companies were expanded to four with the official 
sanction of the tirailleurs sénégalais in 1857. In 1862 another two companies of 
tirailleurs were added, and two more in 1867, bringing the total to eight. 
However, in February of 1872 the 6th company of tirailleurs sénégalais was 
disbanded, with the 7th and 8th companies following shortly after, in March of 
1873.  
Other tirailleurs forces were created during the middle to late 1800s and a 
decree on July 30, 1880 laid out four companies of tirailleurs sénégalais and four 
companies of tirailleurs soudanais. The tirailleurs soudanais were, generally 
speaking, of Malian origin. Given the prolonged conflict between the French and 
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the jihādist leaders Al-Hajj Umar Taal and Amadu Seku Taal, regional instability 
would have caused higher enlistment rates. In 1881 and 1882, one company of 
tirailleurs sénégalais was added, bringing the total back to five, and a new 
company of tirailleurs gabonais was created. In 1884 one squadron (peloton) of 
tirailleurs dahomey was commissioned. These soldiers were tirailleurs sénégalais 
serving in French-administered areas of Dahomey, not to be confused with the 
tirailleurs haoussas who were recruited locally in the Dahomey region.  
A new decree released on August 31, 1884 created one full regiment of 
tirailleurs sénégalais. This regiment was divided into two battalions made up of 
nine combined companies of tirailleurs sénégalais and tirailleurs soudanais, and one 
company of tirailleurs gabonais. Tirailleurs gabonais forces doubled to two 
companies in 1887 but those companies were dissolved in 1891 and reconstituted 
as tirailleurs haoussas.2  
During the final 10 years of the tirailleurs sénégalais numerical breakdowns, 
the numbers of soldiers grew as companies were redesigned for different 
purposes. In February of 1892, the regiment of tirailleurs sénégalais was divided 
up as follows: six companies of tirailleurs sénégalais, six companies of tirailleurs 
soudanais, and three companies of tirailleurs dahomey (two companies of tirailleurs 
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haoussas were added in May of 1892 and January of 1893 respectively). In April of 
1893 the number of tirailleurs dahomey was doubled to six companies. Moving 
into the mid-1890s the number of tirailleurs companies was expanded. At that 
time, tirailleurs were serving in campaigns in today’s Central African Republic 
and Burkina Faso, and in Côte d’Ivoire under the column led by P. L. Monteil.3  
A major reorganization process took place in January of 1896, where the 
French military created one regiment of tirailleurs sénégalais and one regiment of 
tirailleurs soudanais. The regiment of tirailleurs sénégalais was made up of eight 
companies of tirailleurs sénégalais, three companies designated oubanghi (a 
reference to today’s Central African Republic), and two companies designated 
“Côte d’Ivoire.” In October of that year, the Ivorian companies were dissolved. 
One company designated Guinée was created under the tirailleurs sénégalais 
regiment in January of 1898. The regiment of tirailleurs soudanais, also created in 
January of 1896, was made up of four battalions of 16 companies. Fifteen of those 
companies were tirailleurs soudanais, though one company of tirailleurs sénégalais 
also belonged within this regiment. Further, four companies of tirailleurs haoussas 
were also established by the January 1896 decree.4 
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The year 1900 is one of the most important for any researcher of the 
history of tirailleurs forces as it is the year that all colonial troops in West Africa 
were designated tirailleurs sénégalais, regardless of origin. No longer designated 
as separate regiments, in May of 1900 the regiment of tirailleurs sénégalais and the 
regiment of tirailleurs soudanais, for example, became the 1st (12 companies) and 
2nd (18 companies) regiments of tirailleurs sénégalais, respectively. A 3rd 
regiment of tirailleurs sénégalais was created, and was comprised of four 
battalions of 16 companies designated generically “regiment colonial,” the 
“colonial regiment.” In December of 1900, in addition to the aforementioned 
three regiments, military administrators added four companies of the following: 
tirailleurs sénégalais of Chari, tirailleurs sénégalais of Côte d’Ivoire, tirailleurs 
sénégalais of Zinder (in today’s Niger), and tirailleurs sénégalais of Diègo Suarez 
(today Madagascar).5  
TIRAILLEURS SÉNÉGALAIS: RECENTERING THE NARRATIVE 
What the above outline obscures is the creation of the tirailleurs sénégalais 
as a particularly Senegambian phenomenon. Though the tirailleurs sénégalais who 
fought in World War I and World War II were not, in any real sense 
“Senegalese,” the original project to create this multi-national and multi-ethnic 
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French force had a direct relationship to the French military experience of 
Senegambia in the 19th century. The previous chapters have outlined the 
development of a military culture in the Sahelian region of Senegambia, based on 
conscription and the emergence of a professional class of the ceɗɗo and sòfa 
soldiers. These men were trained and tested in surprise attacks, espionage, siege 
warfare, and cavalry tactics, and developed superior weapons handling skills 
over the course of the 18th and 19th centuries. French colonial forces like the 
tirailleurs sénégalais and later the tirailleurs soudanais and tirailleurs haoussas took 
advantage of widespread conscription practices of both free men and captives 
who were integrated into conquering armies.  
French officials assumed the social stigma toward many of their troops 
was based on their view of tirailleurs sénégalais as members of “slave” or servile 
castes. This may have been true in some cases. However, it was partially a result 
of the presence of professional soldiers whose martial reputation in Senegambian 
societies divided them from the civilian population. Whether from the 
ceɗɗo/jaami-bur system of the former Jolof Empire or the sòfa/tónjon armies of 
Fuuta Tooro and jihādist forces of Al-Hajj Umar Taal and his successors, this 
reservoir of men likely provided the troops French officers needed for their 
expanding campaigns in the late 19th century. Many would continue to serve at 
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home and abroad in the early decades of the 20th century. Due to the chaotic 
political situation in the 19th century, more and more professional soldiers were 
available for military service as the states and nobility they served could no 
longer sustain their livelihoods. They found a new patron in the burgeoning 
French colonial army.  
French officers in West Africa, many of whom were métis men born and 
raised in Senegambia like General Alfred-Amédée Dodds, led the troops under 
their command throughout the region and further abroad, in particular to 
Madagascar and Dahomey. The lessons they learned fighting battles in the Sahel 
made them wary of stalking tactics and surprise attacks, and also highlighted the 
importance of available waterways. The navigation of the rivers of West Africa 
allowed these officers to avoid dependence on cavalry and infantry units that 
were vulnerable to larger forces more familiar with the terrain. In the final 
decades of the 19th century, the adoption of repeating rifles and artillery would 
further the advance of colonial troops, but the embrace of this technology alone 
was not in itself a failsafe plan. Even after the “weapons revolution,” France was 
dependent on auxiliary troops like the volontaires sénégalais.  
 
  
318 
EPILOGUE: Races Guerrières: The Development of French Martial Race 
Theory in West Africa 
As the previous chapters have shown, by the onset of the 20th century 
French colonial officials had already spent more than 50 years carrying out 
extensive military campaigns throughout West Africa. The varied impacts of 
these experiences on the lives of French officers and the African men under their 
command were manifold. Parallel to the process taking place elsewhere in 
European colonial possessions on the African continent, in the 19th century 
France was developing its own professional system of racial classification.1 This 
process is less well known today because, though a number of anthropological 
and sociological studies of race began in France, its study was institutionalized 
later there than in Britain, the United States, and Germany. Alice Conklin has 
argued convincingly that the slower professionalization process in France 
resulted from “early divergences over how to define…the various branches of a 
new science of man in the age of Darwin, a lack of forceful personalities at the 
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right moment, and the periodic politicization of scientific agendas because of 
persistent ideological division.”2 
The publication of military accounts by the European officers who 
described and recruited African soldiers had a major effect on recruitment 
practices over the first half of the 20th century. Martial race theory came together 
most coherently in the period between 1880 and 1910. Based on assumptions of 
racial superiority, physical attributes and cultural achievements divided races 
into a hierarchy, which greatly affected colonial policies throughout the British 
and French Empires. In the certain circles, race was believed to be identifiable 
through an examination of skin color, head size, nose shape, and other physical 
characteristics. These features were measured through phrenology, physicality, 
and anthropometry, and believed to be empirically verifiable. Further, racial 
characteristics were understood to be inborn, transferred genetically from 
generation to generation.3 
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Before delving into the effects of martial race theory in the 20th century, it 
is important to review the descriptions written by French officers themselves. 
Those who participated in campaigns in West Africa developed an ideology of 
racial hierarchies based on which men were more likely to follow orders, versus 
those who eschewed colonial understandings of military discipline. But all of 
these impressions were based upon those of men who served in colonial forces. 
For obvious reasons, those subject populations who defied French rule and 
presented the greatest challenge were often seen as inherently violent, but that 
did not equate to French officers believing those men to be good soldiers. The 
markers of a good soldier in most French military accounts included a 
propensity to follow orders and deference to chain of command, characteristics 
valued in military organizations throughout history.  
                                                                                                                                                 
Kirk-Greene, ”‘Damnosa Hereditas’: Ethnic Ranking and the Martial Races Imperative in Africa” 
Ethnic and Racial Studies 3, no. 4 (1980): 393–414; William Pinch, Warrior Ascetics and Indian Empires 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006; Heather Streets, Martial Races: The Military, Race 
and Masculinity in British Imperial Culture, 1857-1914 (New York: Manchester University Press, 
2004); Ronald M. Lamothe, Slaves of Fortune: Sudanese Soldiers and the River War, 1896-1898 
(Rochester, NY: James Currey, 2011); and David Killingray, “The Idea of a British Imperial 
African Army,” Journal of African History 20, no. 3 (1979): 421-436. Less research has been 
conducted on the French context of martial race ideology. Studies include Richard S. Fogarty, 
Race and War in France: Colonial Subjects in the French Army, 1914-1918 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2008); Joe Lunn, ”‘Les Races Guerrières’: Racial Preconceptions in the French 
Military about West African Soldiers during the First World War,” Journal of Contemporary History 
34, no. 4 (1999): 517–536. 
321 
The accounts that follow are taken for the most part from officers who 
served in Dahomey and shared their observations of both Dahomean and 
Senegambian soldiers. Of course, the terminology of tirailleurs forces brings forth 
questions about identity, though in many cases this was a subject of concern for 
the officers themselves. For example, Captain Obissier, who led campaigns in 
Senegambia and the French Soudan during the late 19th century and published 
his experiences and thoughts in his 1903 Notice sur les Tirailleurs Sénégalais, wrote 
that the tirailleurs known as haoussas came from the coastal regions of Benin, not 
from the interior. Obissier claimed that the designation haoussas was quite 
inaccurate. Those referred to as haoussas were Yoruba or Nagô, and he believed 
them to be inferior to the soudanais (Malian or Nigerian) Hausa, describing their 
character as soft and docile, unintelligent, and fearful. However they were also 
loyal and could be courageous, industrious, and patient.4 
Jules de Cuverville, who led the campaign during the First Franco-
Dahomean War in 1890, also claimed that the tirailleurs haoussas were not, in fact, 
part of the Hausa ethnic group. Like Obissier, he described them as gabonais, or 
from Gabon, and preferred those from the Pahouin ethnic group, which he 
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believed to be a race guerrière, a warrior race. According to Albert de Salinis, 
Pahouins were a Bantu speaking group, possibly Fang.5 De Cuverville also 
claimed many men who were presented to him as haoussas were actually Egba, 
who were not known for their military prowess.  
As noted in Chapter Five, in his overview of the history of Dahomey Luc 
Garcia cites sources for the Second Franco-Dahomean War of 1892 who claimed 
that one particular company of tirailleurs haoussas were made up of more than a 
dozen ethnicities, including Senegalese, Gabonais, Ouatchi, Egba, Nagô, and 
Gun, with only six actual Hausa soldiers out of a group of 138, despite their 
classification as haoussas.6 In General Dodds’s account following hostilities with 
Emperor Béhanzin’s army, Dodds identified Béhanzin’s soldiers as members of a 
“Dahomean race.”7 The qualities of this race included discipline, endurance, 
courage, and respect for hierarchy. He wrote that the tirailleurs haoussas were 
recruited from the “Nagots” from Porto Novo or near British-held Lagos and 
German-held Togo. However, he complained, these men were naturally lazy and 
did not make good soldiers. Further, they were “animated by a national hatred 
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militaire,” March 25, 1894, Dahomey XVI 11, ANOM. 
323 
towards Dahomeans” and were likely to abuse their power and to plunder 
territories under their control following conflicts.8 
The Senegalese men who served in Dahomey and in prior conflicts in 
West Africa were the subject of further discussion. It would follow that these 
men were more likely to be studied for, as we have seen, they had participated in 
French conflicts longer than men from any other French-held territory in Africa, 
going back at this point an entire century. Though the term sénégalais would later 
serve as a general term for all West Africans in the French military, at the outset 
of the 20th century, most of these men were indeed from the region of 
Senegambia. As demonstrated earlier, until 1910 the French maintained 
categories like sénégalais, soudanais, and haoussas. While these terms are more 
general than those one would use in the present day, they allow for more 
precision than has been allowed through a review of previous scholarship.  
Additionally, the officers who prepared these works and described 
martial races in Senegambia were aware of many of the “real” identities of their 
comrades and described them as Tukulor, Wolof, Bambara, and so on. According 
to Obissier, the best Senegalese soldiers were Tukulors and Bambaras. Tukulors 
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were believed to be the result of Peul and Wolof intermarriage.9 Similar views 
were expressed by Commanders Georges Joseph Toutée and Jules Sarzeau in 
their respective accounts of West African campaigns. Both discussed the 
importance of enlisting a majority of soldiers from Wolof, Tukulor, or Bambara 
origin.10 
The longest accounts of the martial races of the Senegambia region are 
those of Obissier and Colonel Henri Frey’s Campagne dans le Haut Sénégal at dans 
le Haut Niger (1885-1886), published in 1888.11 As Charles Mangin would later 
state in his influential work La Force Noire, Frey claimed that the different races of 
Senegal were easily distinguished from one another. In fact, a simple inspection 
would suffice to differentiate between indigenous peoples. Obissier, however, 
came to a different conclusion, claiming that throughout Senegal and Niger, the 
different “races” were often intermixed and the long history of wars and years 
spent by many in captivity led to numerous bi- or multi-racial identities. Obissier 
also advised his audience that despite certain differences in military aptitude, 
there were particular characteristics that could be applied to the entire “race 
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noire,” “Black race”: the ignorance that made them prey to religious fanaticism, 
their laziness, and their lack of foresight, among others.12 
In opposition to Mangin and Frey, Abel Lahille, in his article “La 
Population Soudanaise,” published in 1908 in La Revue du Mois, made the 
opposite claim of Obissier. Instead of maintaining that years of intermarriage led 
to difficulty in identifying different West African races, Lahille argued that it was 
hard to distinguish members of the same race because of the wide territory each 
ethnic group inhabited. For example, Lahille claimed that a Moor from North 
Africa would not bear a strong resemblance to a Moor from Southern 
Mauritania, even though they were racially identical.13 Though Obissier was 
comfortable describing the “general” characteristics of separate races in Senegal, 
Lahille chose to speak only of the race noire, broadly framed to include the 
“Blacks”: Bambaras, Malinkés, Tukulors, and the “bronzed”: Peuls.14 
In an interesting twist, Obissier and Frey both attested to the supposed 
“white” origins of a number of Senegalese ethnicities, particularly the Sarakule, 
Peuls, and Moors.15 Though Frey claimed these three groups descended from the 
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“white race,” he unfortunately did not specify where he first uncovered this 
information. In his own account, Obissier also claimed the Sarakule descended 
from the “white race.” Beyond this claim, Obissier described the Sarakule as 
descendants of a “Semitic line,” and claimed their name, the word “Sarrakholé,” 
was a synonym for “white man.”16 
 In the Senegal region, Obissier identified the following groups and 
provided descriptions of their martial traits: Wolofs, Tukulors, Bambaras, and 
Peuls, stating that within his unit, the 3rd regiment of the tirailleurs sénégalais, the 
majority of soldiers were of Wolof, Tukulor, or Bambara origin. Throughout his 
account, Obissier recounted the best command structures for African soldiers: 
the Bambaras would not serve under Tukulors; the Wolofs would serve well 
under Tukulors but refused to serve under Bambaras; and the Tukulor could 
serve under Wolofs, but not Bambaras.17 
The “manuel tactique pour L’Afrique Occidentale Française,” published 
for French military officers, provided descriptions of numerous perceived 
“martial races.” For example, the manual referred to Wolofs as poor soldiers, due 
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to their perceived “indiscipline” and their love of distractions. However, they 
were lauded for their intelligence and believed to make good officers.18 Frey did 
not discuss the military prowess of the Wolof, noting only that they were more 
civilized than the other races, and had a genteel nature and refined manners.19  
Obissier lauded the skill of Wolof men as soldiers and, conversely, 
believed they made poor officers.20 Like Frey, Obissier noted that Wolof people 
regularly interacted with Europeans from at least the early 18th century. He 
believed that their exposure to a “European” worldview resulted in a more 
refined culture and their higher intelligence.21 Wolof soldiers might be quick 
studies, but they could not retain information without constant repetition.22 
Finally, they might make good personal assistants to French officers but would 
not be disciplined enough to be officers themselves.23 Echoing 19th century 
travelers accounts that claimed the Wolof were only nominally Muslim, Obissier 
wrote that their “weak character” and their long exposure to Europeans and 
European culture rendered their commitment to Islam mediocre at best. Obissier 
declared that Wolof Muslims would only “observe some practices” of the 
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Qur’an, when out from under the gaze of watchful marabouts, instead of 
accepting Islam as a full moral and legal code.24  
Colonel Frey wrote at length about the martial characteristics of Tukulor 
men, and he identified the Peul and Tukulor people as both the most intelligent 
and warlike people in the Senegal region, a characterization that recalls the 
description of many officers during the tumult of the mid-19th century, who 
often discussed the fanatical and warlike nature of the Tukulor in the context of 
the jihādist conflicts that marked the era.25 The official publication put out by the 
French military in the early 20th century that served as a tactical manual for 
French officers in West Africa repeated earlier claims that the Tukulor were 
descended from Peul and Wolof intermarriage. Unlike the “pure race” Peuls, 
however, the Tukulor were more “attached to the land and apt to cultivate it.”26 
It also identified them as fanatical Muslims and warriors with similar soldiering 
skills to the Peul.27  
A French colonial administrator writing in the late 19th century, André 
Lebon, did not identify the Wolof as the ancestors of the Tukulor people, writing 
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that they were descendants of Peuls and “Blacks.” Like the later manual, he 
discussed their attachment to farming and the land, as opposed to Peul herders, 
and their great intelligence and adventurousness.28 Frey had the most critical 
view of the Tukulor, which certainly resulted from his history of military 
campaigns against them. At one point he described their “love of plunder and 
hatred of Europeans” as self-designated virtues.29 He noted that the majority of 
jihādists were of Tukulor origin. Though he did not mention them by name, given 
the time period he was most likely referring to Al-Hajj Umar Taal and his 
successor Amadu Seku Taal, who led jihāds in Northern Senegal and Western 
and Central Mali during the 19th century. 
Obissier claimed that all Tukulors were Muslim, zealously so.30 Obissier 
found Tukulor soldiers to be undisciplined, rebellious, devious, and wary of 
French authority. He believed that the only reason large numbers of Tukulor 
soldiers would enlist in the French military would be to satisfy their “taste for 
war.”31 Similar to his depiction of Wolof devotion to Islam, Obissier said that 
men in the 3rd regiment who were sent to serve in Madagascar were quick to 
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drop their practice of Islam. Obissier noted the difficulty of enlisting Tukulor 
soldiers in the colonial force. Though he identified the Tukulor as the fiercest 
warriors, he also argued that under the wrong circumstances, they might rise up 
and rebel against their French commanders.32 
Obissier repeated the assertion that the Peuls were the progenitors of the 
Tukulor people. Though they were not prevalent in Obissier’s 3rd regiment, he 
said: 
 [They] are mainly nomadic pastoralists, they are not indigenous and 
appear to have come from the East; some demographers attribute their 
origin to Upper Egypt. In any case, they do not belong to the Black race; 
themselves claim to the white family. The Peuls and the whites say they 
are close relatives.33  
Unlike their Tukulor descendants, Obissier alleged, the Peuls were not 
fanatical Muslims, though they did practice Islam.34  
The tactical manual for French military officers identified Peuls as poor 
candidates for the tirailleurs force. As a result of their “psychological 
vulnerability” they were difficult to instruct and control, though they were seen 
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as of higher intelligence than the races of “non-white” origins, and would make 
good officers. Peuls would also serve better in the cavalry than infantry force, 
due to their heritage as herders and horsemen. They were identified as partially 
Muslim, partially animist.35 This contrasts with Frey’s depiction of Peuls, along 
with their Tukulor brethren, as the most intelligent and bellicose of the 
Senegalese people.36 
Over the course of the 20th century, the most important subset of soldiers 
in the tirailleurs sénégalais would be the Bambara. In fact, the Bambara language 
became the lingua franca of the tirailleurs army before the introduction of French 
language training. The preference for Bambara soldiers may also have been a 
result of the French perception that the Bambara were greatly opposed to 
Muslim expansion in West Africa and the most likely to aid the French against 
so-called “races musulmanes,” Muslim races.37 What is most interesting is that this 
is not borne out by any independent evidence: colonial administrators may just 
have been confused by certain religious rituals that combined Islam with local 
spiritual practices. Bambaras were seen as the ideal type: personable, open, of 
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hardy character and average intelligence, they were believed to possess absolute 
loyalty and confidence in their leaders.38 
According to Lebon, however, the Bambaras were not an autonomous 
group, but shared a lineage with the “Mandingue” people, the Mandinka. 
However, where the Mandinka people were Muslim, the Bambara remained 
“animist” and were absolutely opposed to the “religion of Mohammed.”39 While 
Lebon claimed the Bambara condemned Islam and sought a religious argument 
for their military presence, Colonel Frey presented a different case. He identified 
the Bambara as the most enslaved group in Senegal and Niger, which may have 
led to their overabundance in the tirailleurs force. As noted in previous chapters, 
many recruits, particularly in the early stages of the tirailleurs sénégalais, were 
often former captives. According to Frey, Bambara men were robust and of calm 
temperament.40 
It is Obissier who provided the most extensive description of Bambaras. 
He also conveyed their relationship to the Mandinka “race” and noted their 
prevalence in the tirailleurs sénégalais forces. Obissier maintained that the 
Bambara were of average intellect and had difficulty understanding complex 
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40 Frey, Campagne dans le Haut Sénégal, 81. 
333 
ideas.41 This meant that an officer must be very specific and clear in his 
commands to a Bambara soldier, lest the tirailleur’s “rude intelligence” prevent 
the proper execution of military tasks.42 For Obissier, the overarching quality of 
the Bambara was their “boundless confidence” in European commanders, to 
whom they had an unstoppable dedication.43 He claimed that Bambara men 
could be proper officers in the French forces, as long as they exhibited a superior 
intelligence.44 
Ethnolinguistic groups who had less of a presence in the tirailleurs 
sénégalais forces include Lebu, Seereer, Mandinka, and Sarakule. The tactical 
manual described Seereers as similar to the Wolof people, only less intelligent 
and less personable. It further identified them as “pagans” and described their 
physical character as better suited to agricultural labor than military service, 
claiming that they were “mediocre soldiers.”45 The manual described the 
Sarakule as devout Muslims and relatives of the “Mandingue race.”46 According 
to Lebon, the Sarakule and Soninké were related ethnicities, descended from the 
Mandinka. Lebon identified them as progeny of the ancient empire of Ghana, 
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which lasted from roughly the 8th century B.C.E. to the 11th or 12th century C.E. 
He also identified them as Muslims.47  
Colonel Frey was the most familiar with the Sarakule, having fought a 
long campaign against them in 1885. According to him, they were willing to 
sacrifice anything in service to their marabout.48 He believed the Sarakule did not 
make good soldiers or spahis because they could not handle the difficulties of 
military service and would not accept the low pay.49 Due to intermarriage, the 
best traits of the Sarakule were degraded, and they came to possess a number of 
less enviable traits from the “races noires” with whom they created families.50 
Despite this miscegenation, Frey noted, the Sarakule retained a “higher 
intelligence” and “more advanced civilizations” than the people among whom 
they lived.51 
French racial ideology was significantly influenced by officers in the field 
on colonial military duty, but it had civilian origins. The first French studies of 
environmental factors on the development of different races of people were 
conducted in Algeria by Dr. Eugène Bodichon. He argued for a radical form of 
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environmental determinism, in which the effects of a particular climate altered 
human evolution physically, psychologically, and emotionally. Predictably, he 
claimed that the European from a temperate northern climate was “likeable, 
sociable and intellectually curious,” while the African who lived in harsher and 
hotter climes was “hostile, violent and instinctive.” Moreover, he warned 
colonial authorities that the African climate would “corrupt” any non-Africans 
who lived there.52 
Unlike Bodichon, a number of the first amateur French ethnologists were 
also military officers, some of whom became involved with the Paris 
Anthropological Society and other similar institutions in France.53 Examples of 
French “military ethnologists,” to use Patricia Lorcin’s term, included Louis 
Faidherbe, who as seen earlier features prominently in the military history of 
Senegambia, and Adolphe Hanoteau, who was active in French campaigns in 
Algeria. Though these officers were concerned with anthropological and social 
science studies, the reasoning behind much of their work was for practical and 
immediate military ends, thus “they were military men first, social scientists 
                                                 
52 Patricia M. E. Lorcin, Imperial Identities: Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Race in Colonial Algeria (New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), 125. In addition to Lorcin’s study of martial racism in the French 
Empire, see Richard S. Fogarty, Race and War in France: Colonial Subjects in the French Army, 1914-
1918 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008). 
53 Lorcin, Imperial Identities, 131. 
336 
second.”54 Many of the reports and reminiscences featured in this project 
represent the interests of these men and their focus on a variety of aspects of life 
in a colonial military setting: military tactics, including their successes and 
failures; environmental and political conditions; local social and cultural 
practices, especially traditions of conscription and the employ of auxiliaries; and 
other assorted observations and adjustments. Those accounts that were 
published certainly affected public perception in France. 
Beyond the influence the studies conducted by French officers would have 
on the civilian population in France, they would also grow to influence French 
recruitment practices in colonial holdings during the 19th and 20th centuries. 
Certainly some of the officers and soldiers featured in earlier chapters shared 
their impressions of the African men in their battalions with colleagues in France, 
several of whom would make decisions based on these biased observations 
without any firsthand knowledge of the peoples described.  
The ideology of martial race theory resulted from both academic and 
other civilian speculations and the observations of military officers on the 
battlefields of the early colonial wars. It had an effect on the military recruitment 
of indigenous groups in both Africa and Asia. Colonial administrators held that 
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certain ethnicities, through inherited characteristics or as a result of their 
environment and the geographical landscape, were inherently predisposed to 
violence and hence more suited to recruitment into colonial armies. In both the 
British and French Empires, military officials believed in the existence of ideal 
soldiers, typically illiterate men drawn from the social margins of remote 
regions, as opposed to locally dominant groups from more metropolitan areas. 
The qualities particularly valued were tenacity, discipline, obedience, and 
military prowess, similar to the characteristics officers searched for within their 
own communities in the metropole.  
In fact, the martial reputations of subject peoples were more often built on 
their acceptance of colonial authority, instead of some innate fearlessness or 
capacity for violence. Martial race theory hid this connection, perhaps even from 
recruiters in the field. Recruitment was facilitated far more by a society’s failure 
to attain territorial integrity or establish a stable political system than any 
supposed inclination to violence or martiality. Thus, men from these ethnicities 
came to be overrepresented in the military and police forces, and were less likely 
to mutiny. In fact, ethnic groups who achieved high levels of military and 
political organization in the pre-colonial period were often free from conscription 
and recruitment. Resistance to colonial encroachment led to targeting by colonial 
338 
officials, who employed their newly formed armies of indigenous soldiers to 
help pacify the more rebellious areas. As the colonial military gained size and 
strength, societies that continued to challenge British and French authority 
experienced the erosion of their territory and political autonomy. Over time, 
some ethnic groups assumed the identity of a martial race. Though certain men 
may have enlisted out of a patriotic sense of duty to Britain or France, others who 
sought advancement could use military service to their social, economic, or 
political advantage. 
The impact of martial race theory has been studied mostly in relation to its 
impact on British colonial forces and the resulting identity constructions that 
took place following the codification of this martial sorting process. British 
policies based on martial race theory were first established in India, though these 
guidelines were eventually applied in many British colonies. Indeed, martial race 
ideology was for the most part diffused throughout the British Empire via 
administrators who had been transferred from India.55 Outside of India, these 
policies were instituted most thoroughly in Britain’s African colonies, affecting 
military recruitment into the Egyptian Army, the King’s African Rifles (KAR) of 
East Africa, and the Royal West African Frontier Force (WAFF). Colonial officers 
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preferred Muslims and rural animists, who were understood to be more 
authentically “African” than those who converted to Christianity. As in India, 
ethnicities from more remote regions and socially marginalized men were 
particularly targeted for military service.  
 In Egypt and Sudan, for example, soldiers in the Egyptian Army were 
recruited from an invented race in what is today South Sudan.56 Like the terms 
“Gurkha” and “Highlander,” “Sudanese” was established as a racial 
identification and employed by British colonial authorities. However, Sudanese 
regiments were made up of distinct ethnic groups with different languages and 
cultural practices, including the Dinka and Shilluk. Many of these men were 
former “slaves,” preferred by the Egyptians in the period pre-dating British 
control. Though their slave status was removed when Egypt and Sudan fell 
under British control, these men continued to be disproportionately recruited 
into the British colonial force. Some of their so-called martial traits were in fact 
the product of British recruitment policies and the post-enlistment marginality 
these men experienced when they attempted to return home. Sudanese soldiers 
                                                 
56 Ronald M. Lamothe, Slaves of Fortune: Sudanese Soldiers and the River War, 1896-1898 (Rochester, 
NY: James Currey, 2011). 
340 
were also employed in British East Africa, until a mutiny in 1897 led to their 
exclusion from the King’s African Rifles.57  
 Following the Sudanese revolt, British colonial recruitment concentrated 
on the Nilotic peoples of Uganda, in particular the Acholi, and discouraged 
enlistment of the Baganda. In Tanganyika, the preferred ethnicities were the 
Hehe and Nyasa. In Kenya, Kamba and Kalenjin men were preferred over 
Kikuyu, Maasai, and Luo.58 Though these identities were eventually established 
as martial or non-martial races, the real reason behind the preference for certain 
groups was based upon their initial resistance to British encroachment: the 
Maasai managed to retain enough land to preserve their pastoral lifestyle and the 
Kikuyu had more educational opportunities than other societies; the Kamba, 
however, found their livelihoods gradually reduced during the colonial period, 
and military service became a more attractive offer. In fact, initially KAR officers 
were unimpressed by the Kamba, preferring foreign-born Sudanese soldiers, 
Acholi, Kalenjin, Luo, and Somalis. An example of “Gurkha syndrome,” the 
Kamba began to self-identify as a martial race as a result of economic necessity, 
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remaking their identity and enlisting in large numbers. Over time, KAR 
recruitment came to reflect a preference for Kamba men. 
In British West Africa, the first recorded military recruits were believed to 
be current or former “slaves” who enlisted in large numbers to escape servitude. 
These men made excellent soldiers because colonial employment protected them 
from persecution or a less-desired form of servitude and, as a result, they 
demonstrated a high level of obedience.59 However, this system of recruitment 
made the colonial force highly unpopular in the hinterland areas from which 
these men escaped. Their authority was questioned by indigenous leaders. 
Regiments of former captives were considered to be social outcasts. Recruitment 
patterns were also a result of the geography of imperialism in Africa. Coastal 
societies were enlisted into the colonial force until the interior was reached, at 
which point those ethnic groups perceived to be less subservient were replaced 
by those perceived as less educated. For example, in recruiting soldiers for their 
West African Frontier Force (WAFF), the British came to prefer men from 
northern regions. In colonial Nigeria, Igbo and Yoruba soldiers were discarded 
for Nupe and, later, Hausa men. In the Gold Coast colony, the Frafra, Tiv, and 
Dagomba replaced the Ga, Asante, and Krobo. In Sierra Leone, the Kissi and 
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Mende dominated military enlistment, over Temne, Sherbro, and Kono men. 
During the later colonial period, more than half of the recruits for the WAFF 
came from northern or interior regions of Britain’s West African colonies. For 
example, by the 1930s almost 90% of colonial recruits in Sierra Leone were 
recruited from the interior.60 
As noted above, West Africa is also where the French imperial theory of 
martial races originated. Coincidentally, this took place in 1857, the same year as 
the Indian Rebellion in the British Empire. Though Governor Louis Faidherbe in 
many ways created the first French West African force, his initial concern was 
finding recruits, regardless of ethnolinguistic background. French martial race 
theory was most cogently asserted by General Charles Mangin, who served as 
commandant-supérieur des troupes in French West Africa between 1907 and 
1911. 1910 marked an important year for the formation of a French system of 
martial races. That year General Mangin published his influential book, La Force 
Noire, which identified and described numerous West African races and their 
capacity for soldiering.61 Mangin asserted that there were certain martial races, 
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known in French as races guerrières (warrior races), that were endowed with 
innate and inheritable attributes that made them outstanding soldiers. 
In his work, Mangin claimed that Africans were able to live in harsher 
climates than other races, had a greater capacity to carry heavy loads and travel 
great distances without fatigue, and a nervous system that was less developed 
than that of Europeans, allowing for greater resistance to pain.62 He also stressed 
the patriarchal nature of African societies imbued Africans with a sense of 
hierarchy and discipline that made them particularly suited for soldiering. 
Mangin further argued that Africans were the most disciplined, loyal, and 
warlike soldiers in the French Empire. However, he differentiated between 
groups, describing the martial capabilities of different West African ethnicities. 
According to him, the least advanced Africans came from the coastal regions. 
“Races” from the interior were not only more warlike but also more intelligent 
and civilized.63  
Closely correlated to policies based on martial race theory established by 
the British in India and Africa, Mangin’s assessment reflected contemporary 
assumptions of racial superiority. As in the British Empire, the identification of 
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martial races corresponded to the size and military strength of pre-colonial 
African states, and the extent of resistance or support offered to the French 
during the conquest. Unlike British military officers, French authorities believed 
that men from heavily forested areas were unsuited to military combat. Instead, 
they chose to recruit groups from the savannah or riverine areas. Mangin himself 
doubted the tenacity, discipline, and stamina of “forest peoples.”  
In French West Africa, recruitment was focused on men from the French 
Soudan and the Upper Volta, what is today Mali and Burkina Faso. Soldiers were 
disproportionately conscripted from the Mossi ethnic group and Bambara-
speaking areas. As noted earlier, Bambara became the lingua franca of the 
colonial army in the 20th century. Other preferred ethnicities included the Peul, 
Tukulor, and the Mandinka. Like the British invented identity “Sudanese,” the 
French created an ethnicity called “Sénégalaise,” which included the Wolof, 
Seereer, and Lebu ethnic groups. Martin Klein has more recently argued that the 
tirailleurs were seen as so effective by the French that, by 1886 when Joseph 
Gallieni became commandant-supérieur of the Western Soudan, the French 
relied almost completely on African troops.64 Klein notes that “Mangin wanted to 
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recruit volunteers only from those ethnic groups that had a military tradition.”65 
The result of Mangin’s efforts was a law enacted in 1912, which provided for 
conscription, but did not limit recruitment to supposedly warlike ethnic groups.  
Mangin’s work has been recognized by scholars for its effect on French 
recruitment practices during World War I and World War II.66 Martial race 
theory had become conventional wisdom within the French officer corps by the 
outbreak of World War I. In 1918, the aforementioned manuel tactique was 
published and distributed to officers new to West African units. The guide 
devoted several pages to the evaluation of the martial capabilities of various 
races of French West Africa, elaborated above.67  
Recruitment based on martial race theory was also conducted in French 
North Africa, though to a lesser extent than in West Africa due to the smaller 
number of available men for service.68 A further reason for this was Mangin’s 
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suspicion of North African troops, due to their practice of Islam and a growing 
sense of Arab nationalism. Further, the French were unable to maintain the same 
level of political and social dominance, and this affected recruitment possibilities 
in the more remote regions of the interior. Within Algeria, the French army tried 
to identify martial races. They first recruited from the Zouaouas, who were 
characterized as innately violent and warlike. The French also preferred men 
from the Kabylie region of Northern Algeria, part of the Tell Atlas mountain 
range. Like the British characterization of the Scottish Highlanders, the French 
military command attributed martial qualities to these men based on their 
upbringing in a difficult climate. Soldiers from the Kabylie region were described 
as more disciplined, reliable, and militarily skilled, and less prone to religious 
fanaticism. Further, some officers believed that the Kabyles were descendants of 
the Vandals, due to their light skin and blond hair, and thus more similar to 
Europeans than other Algerians.69  
In the racial hierarchy created by the French colonial military, West and 
North Africans were considered better soldiers than men from Madagascar and 
French Indochina, what is today Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Mangin argued 
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that Malagasy soldiers from Madagascar were of low quality, due to poor 
physical constitution and lack of discipline.70 According to Mangin, the 
“Indochinese,” another invented identity, were the most intelligent of all French 
colonial races, but they were too physically weak for military combat. He 
thought they would serve well as personal servants, cooks, and drivers. Both 
Madagascan and Indochinese men were characterized as innately subservient 
and effeminate, incapable of dominance on the battlefield. As with British forces, 
this could serve as a self-fulfilling prophecy, one which played out most clearly 
during World War I: because Indochinese and Madagascan recruits rarely saw 
battle, while their West and North African compatriots often served at the front, 
racial stereotypes were reinforced.71  
As Richard Fogarty outlines in Race and War in France, race was at the 
center of French treatment toward Africans and other colonized populations 
during the period leading up to and during World War I. For Fogarty, the French 
originally recruited African troops because of manpower needs in addition to a 
commitment to spread the ideals of republicanism and to “civilize” conquered 
populations. However, French officials did not recognize most colonized peoples 
                                                 
70 Mangin, La Force Noire, 202. 
71 Fogarty, Race and War in France, 40-42. 
348 
as French citizens, even among the most educated. Many Africans saw their 
military service as a gateway to citizenship, but racist ideologies affected 
recruitment and deployment strategies, as well as the treatment of African versus 
French or other European soldiers. As outlined above, the French viewed certain 
African ethnic groups as more warlike and others as docile, untrustworthy or 
weak-minded. Fogarty points out that these conceptions led to real life 
consequences, especially for the groups the French identified as prime candidates 
for soldiering.72  
Martial race theory lost prominence among French and British colonial 
officials following World War II, a result of changes in racial attitudes and shifts 
in scientific opinion. Further, political realities undermined the foundation of 
martial race ideology, with revolts throughout the British and French Empires. 
However, racial classification continued to affect recruitment and conscription 
policies, and the treatment of indigenous soldiers in the British and French 
militaries, until the independence of these colonies in the post-war period.  
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Gorée, Sénégal, 1758-1837. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2015. 
 
Hobsbawm, Eric, and Terence Ranger. The Invention of Tradition. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012. 
 
Hoffman, Barbara G. Griots at War: Conflict, Conciliation, and Caste in Mande. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000. 
 
Hoffman, Danny J. The War Machines: Young Men and Violence in Sierra Leone and 
Liberia. Durham: Duke University Press, 2011. 
 
Holder, Gilles. “Esclaves et captifs au pays dogon: La société esclavagiste sama.” 
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